Estratégia universitária vol 1 a abordagem central

Clássicos de Estratégia e Diplomacia.
19 de janeiro de 2016.
B. H. Liddell Hart, Estratégia (1954)
Agradecemos a A. Bradley Potter, da Universidade Johns Hopkins SAIS.
Entre os estrategistas mais lidos está BH Liddell Hart, famoso pela “abordagem indireta”. A maioria dos cursos que analisam a estratégia militar ou sua grande estratégia de primos mais amplos dedica pelo menos uma parte de seu tempo à ideia central da carreira de Liddell Hart como estrategista e analista. historiador. Escrevendo em resposta ao que ele via como erros de interpretação e mal-entendidos calamitosos do pensamento militar clausewitziano, Liddell Hart procurou finalmente criar uma visão integrada e moderna de estratégia aplicável não apenas a forças militares, mas também a todas as atividades governamentais que apóiam a consecução de objetivos políticos durante guerra. As revoluções na tecnologia que ajudaram a definir as Primeiras e especialmente as Segunda Guerras Mundiais, junto com a destruição que elas causaram, falaram sobre a necessidade de uma nova estrutura estratégica. O livro de Liddell Hart, Strategy, foi sua resposta para esse desafio.
Este ensaio tem como objetivo introduzir novos estudantes de estratégia aos argumentos centrais de Liddell Hart deste trabalho mais famoso. Primeiro, uma breve exploração da carreira acadêmica e militar do homem prepara o terreno para um exame cuidadoso de sua abordagem indireta e suas implicações. Após essas discussões, uma breve revisão de como o pensamento de Liddell Hart continua a afetar os debates em torno da estratégia oferece uma chance de aplicar suas teorias. Em última análise, Liddell Hart encoraja seus leitores a reconsiderarem Carl von Clausewitz e deixarem de lado os mal-entendidos enquanto oferecem uma visão alternativa diferente de como a guerra deveria ser travada - uma visão que rejeita a importância da batalha e se concentra em alcançar a vitória com um mínimo derramamento de sangue.
Um estrategista das guerras mundiais.
Liddell Hart nasceu em Paris em 31 de outubro de 1895 para pais ingleses. Quando ele freqüentou Cambridge no alvorecer da Primeira Guerra Mundial, ele demonstrou em sua mente inquisitiva, mas estava entediado com estudos formais (Reid 2004). Quando o confronto começou em 1914, o jovem Liddell Hart se juntou à infantaria leve do próprio King's Yorkshire e passou a servir três turnês na Grande Guerra como oficial subalterno antes de começar a escrever sobre questões militares após o armistício. Como diz sua entrada no Dicionário Oxford de Biografia Nacional, ele ficou conhecido como um “intérprete aguçado da experiência operacional de 1918: destilando seus princípios essenciais para propósitos de treinamento e relacionando-os perceptivamente com mobilidade e comando de uma maneira nova”. (Reid 2004). Enquanto ele ganhou alguma notoriedade entre os influentes oficiais britânicos, mais notavelmente o general Sir Ivor Maxse e o coronel J. F. C. Fuller, sua carreira na farda foi interrompida após sofrer dois pequenos ataques cardíacos (Reid 2004). Aposentou-se do exército britânico em 1927 depois de ter sido pago pela metade desde 1923 e não ter recebido nenhuma responsabilidade militar significativa. Ele ocupou o posto de capitão.
Depois de experimentar várias carreiras, o capitão aposentado Liddell Hart tornou-se um jornalista e analista militar bem conceituado que correspondia regularmente a importantes estrategistas da época, incluindo Fuller e mais tarde T. E. Lawrence (Reid 2004). No final da década de 1920, a noção de Liddell Hart sobre a abordagem indireta da estratégia estava começando a tomar forma, e uma versão inicial foi publicada em seu livro de 1929, The Decisive Wars of History (Reid, 2004). A formulação mais completa da abordagem indireta foi finalmente oferecida em Estratégia, publicada pela primeira vez em 1954 e novamente como uma segunda edição revisada em 1967. O livro tornou-se amplamente lido nos círculos militares e acadêmicos e desempenhou um papel importante na reparação de Liddell Hart. A imagem, manchada durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, quando subestimou a capacidade marcial da Alemanha, convocou em certo ponto uma paz de compromisso com Hitler e criticou a estratégia de Winston Churchill para vencer a guerra (Reid, 2004).
Seu biógrafo Alex Danchev observa que Strategy é o mais próximo que Liddell Hart chegou a escrever um tratado sobre a guerra, mas foi “iniciado muito cedo, distendido demais e terminado (ou inacabado) tarde demais para produzir um todo verdadeiramente satisfatório” (Danchev 1998). , 157). Em vez de uma visão completa da estratégia, ela oferecia uma "sacola" de idéias, algumas das quais eram radicalmente novas e outras fundamentais e bem compreendidas (Danchev 1998, 157). Essas deficiências são prontamente aparentes para os leitores que pegam o volume; no entanto, por mais imperfeito que seja, a Estratégia de Liddell Hart oferece importantes considerações sobre a guerra moderna que ainda vale a pena considerar hoje. Em particular, sua estratégia de tratamento como um conceito, a abordagem indireta em si e as implicações de ataques mecanizados e aéreos valem a pena ponderar em detalhes.
Origens e Método.
As origens da abordagem indireta de Liddell Hart são duplas. De uma perspectiva teórica, ele está escrevendo em resposta a líderes militares e políticos que ele alega interpretar mal e mal aplicou a teoria do pensador militar prussiano do século 19 Carl von Clausewitz. De uma perspectiva empírica, ele está digerindo as experiências das Guerras Mundiais, especialmente a guerra de trincheiras paralisada da Grande Guerra e as batalhas mecanizadas e aéreas da luta contra Hitler. Liddell Hart argumenta vigorosamente que a aplicação da estratégia mal compreendida de Clausewitizian alimentou o banho de sangue que foi a Primeira Guerra Mundial e a lenta adaptação de alternativas durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, questionando a validade da velha teoria e exigindo reformular como a força militar poderia ser aplicado para alcançar objetivos políticos (Liddell Hart 1967, 357).
Especificamente, as perdas maciças e o esgotamento pós-guerra dos combatentes na Primeira Guerra Mundial, juntamente com a crescente importância do poder marítimo, do poder aéreo e das forças terrestres mecanizadas na Segunda Guerra Mundial, sugeriram a Liddell Hart que a interpretação de Clausewitz do passado deveria ser revisitado. O poder do mar havia sufocado a Alemanha durante a Grande Guerra; depois, durante o período entre as guerras, os responsáveis ​​pelos exércitos e forças aéreas não conseguiram apreciar as grandes mudanças na guerra que estavam ocorrendo graças à nova tecnologia (Liddell Hart 1967, 359). De fato, o poder aéreo oferecia agora a oportunidade de atacar centros econômicos e morais sem destruir o inimigo no campo. A guerra mecanizada, por sua vez, poderia não apenas causar ataques diretos, mas também poderia ajudar a induzir o colapso de um inimigo sem uma grande batalha “cortando suas linhas de suprimento, deslocando seu sistema de controle ou produzindo paralisia pelo choque penetração profunda em suas costas ”(Liddell Hart 1967, 358). Cada um deles representaria aspectos da abordagem indireta.
Além disso, esses insights sobre um campo de batalha em mudança não eram meramente especulativos. Nos meses de abertura da Segunda Guerra Mundial, um pequeno número de unidades mecanizadas apoiadas pelo poder aéreo criou um novo tipo de luta - blitzkrieg - ou guerra relâmpago. Tal luta foi relativamente sem sangue, mas foi bastante eficaz em permitir que os alemães superassem a Polônia e a França (Liddell Hart 1967, 360-361). Mais tarde, as operações aéreas da Allied contra as redes de comunicações ajudaram a tornar possível a invasão da Europa Continental, uma vez que impedia a capacidade da Alemanha de montar contra-ataques (Liddell Hart 1967, 361). No sentido mais geral, os novos desenvolvimentos terrestres e aéreos afetaram a formulação de objetivos militares; a saber, permitiu uma ação direta aumentada contra objetivos civis e expandiu a gama de opções para atacar objetivos militares, abrindo novas maneiras de aleijar militares sem destruí-los (Liddell Hart 1967, 359). Liddell Hart conclui que “o efeito somado do advento desta mobilidade multiplicada, tanto no solo como no ar, foi aumentar o poder e a importância da estratégia relativamente às táticas…”, o que exigiu um novo pensamento estratégico (Liddell Hart 1967, 359).
Embora essas ideias teóricas e experiências de primeira mão tenham fornecido as raízes intelectuais do estudo de estratégia e formulação de Liddell Hart da abordagem indireta, ele baseou seu pensamento em um corpo muito maior de análise histórica. Estratégia examina as guerras do século V a. C. em meados do século XX, incluindo as Guerras Gregas, Guerras Romanas, Guerras Medievais, Guerras Napoleônicas e ambas as Guerras Mundiais, entre outras, para apresentar seus argumentos. Do ponto de vista metodológico, cada um deles é tratado como um tipo de mini-estudo de caso, do qual Liddell Hart discerne padrões sobre como as guerras foram travadas com sucesso ao longo dos tempos. Ele observa que um único estudo de uma campanha provavelmente apresentará obstáculos analíticos na busca da verdade; no entanto, “se um efeito específico é visto a seguir uma causa específica em uma pontuação ou mais casos, em diferentes épocas e diversas condições, não há base para considerar essa causa como parte integrante de qualquer teoria da guerra” (Liddell Hart 1967, 25). Sua experiência como editor militar da Enciclopédia Britânica ofereceu-lhe uma oportunidade de avaliar longos períodos da história e conduzir o amplo levantamento da história militar que é finalmente apresentado na Estratégia (Liddell Hart 1967, 25). Nesse sentido, Liddell Hart e Clausewitz compartilham uma filosofia similar sobre a natureza dos estudos de guerra - não é um reino de busca humana adequado à teorização matemática abstrata, mas um esforço dominado pela compreensão da importância da psicologia e da experiência humana (Liddell). Hart 1967, 324).
Estratégia e Grande Estratégia.
Como em muitas coisas ao longo da estratégia, Liddell Hart se justapõe contra Clausewitz em como ele define a estratégia. O velho oficial prussiano, argumenta ele, via a estratégia meramente como "a arte do emprego de batalhas como meio de obter o objetivo da guerra" (Liddell Hart 1967, 333). Esta definição tem duas falhas. Primeiro, "se intromete na esfera da política, ou na conduta mais alta da guerra, que deve necessariamente ser responsabilidade do governo e não dos líderes militares que emprega como seus agentes no controle executivo das operações" (Liddell Hart 1967, 333). Além disso, a definição de Clausewitz enfatiza desnecessariamente a importância de envolver o inimigo como o único meio para alcançar um fim estratégico, o que leva à profunda heresia de que todos os esforços na guerra devem se concentrar na criação e na luta decisiva (Liddell Hart 1967, 333). . Embora essas visões e críticas do conceito de estratégia de Clausewitz ainda sejam debatidas, elas são pelo menos o entendimento contra o qual Liddell Hart dirigiu seus esforços.
Ao buscar o que ele considerava uma definição mais precisa de estratégia, Liddell Hart recorreu a Helmuth von Moltke, o Jovem, que afirmou que a estratégia é “a adaptação prática dos meios colocados à disposição de um general para a obtenção do objetivo em vista” (Liddell Hart 1967). , 334). De acordo com Liddell Hart, esta definição deixa claro que os militares são responsáveis ​​perante o governo que os emprega e permite ao governo intervir na estratégia, emendá-la e empurrá-la em uma direção que pode não ser simplesmente a derrubada das forças armadas de um inimigo (Liddell). Hart 1967, 334). Uma visão tão sutil do que a estratégia é e deveria ser oferece um começo para entender como Liddell Hart via a questão; ou seja, ele definiu estratégia como “a arte de distribuir e aplicar meios militares para cumprir os fins da política” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335). Ele passou a oferecer que “… a estratégia está relacionada não apenas com o movimento de forças - como o seu papel é freqüentemente definido - mas com o efeito” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335). Em contraste com as interpretações extremas de Clausewitz, Liddell Hart argumenta que a estratégia “… tem para o seu propósito a redução da luta para as proporções mais escassas possíveis… A perfeição da estratégia seria, portanto, produzir uma decisão sem qualquer luta séria” (Liddell Hart 1967, 338). Ele cita vários exemplos históricos para respaldar seu conceito ideal, entre eles a campanha Ilerda de Júlio César, o envolvimento de Moltke do exército de MacMahon em Sedan e o cerco às forças turcas do general Allenby em 1918 na Samaria (Liddell Hart 1967, 338).
Há um aspecto adicional da estratégia que distingue Liddell Hart de muitos estrategistas anteriores - a crença e a aplicação da grande estratégia. O estrategista britânico sugere que a grande estratégia é a “política que guia a condução da guerra” e pode ser concebida como “política em execução” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335). Ele prossegue argumentando que “… o papel da grande estratégia - estratégia superior - é coordenar e direcionar todos os recursos de uma nação, ou grupo de nações, para a consecução do objeto político da guerra - o objetivo definido pela política fundamental ”(Liddell Hart 1967, 335 -336). Além disso, separando-a dos entendimentos tradicionais de estratégia, a grande estratégia lida com aspectos econômicos, diplomáticos, comerciais, éticos e militares da guerra, além de questões sobre como garantir a paz após um conflito (Liddell Hart 1967, 335 -336). A grande estratégia prevê o que hoje é chamado de abordagem de todo o governo para travar a guerra e estabelecer e manter a paz. Embora decididamente separado da estratégia estritamente militar que compõe a maior parte do livro de Liddell Hart, o conceito de grande estratégia acaba se beneficiando da aplicação da abordagem indireta também.
O que da abordagem indireta? As sementes disso estão no entendimento da estratégia de Liddell Hart e sua revisão da história. Após cuidadoso estudo de guerras passadas, Liddell Hart estava convencido de que os conflitos geralmente são vencidos quando os meios de guerra são aplicados de uma forma que um oponente não está preparado para atender, isto é, empregado indiretamente (Liddell Hart 1967, 25). Uma estratégia não precisa superar a resistência, mas sim explorar os elementos do movimento e da surpresa para alcançar a vitória, desequilibrando o inimigo antes de um possível ataque (Liddell Hart 1967, 337). Liddell Hart argumenta que se um estrategista é acusado de ganhar a vitória militar, então ele tem:
“… A responsabilidade é procurá-lo sob a circunstância mais vantajosa, a fim de produzir o resultado mais lucrativo. Portanto, seu verdadeiro objetivo não é tanto buscar a batalha, mas sim buscar uma situação estratégica tão vantajosa que, se ela mesma não produz a decisão, sua continuação por meio de uma batalha é certa. Em outras palavras, o deslocamento é o objetivo da estratégia; sua sequência pode ser a dissolução do inimigo ou a sua perturbação mais fácil na batalha ”(Liddell Hart 1967, 339, ênfase no original; ênfase ousada adicionada).
Após o deslocamento, a situação deve ser explorada para garantir ganhos máximos da vitória. Por exploração, Liddell Hart significa que um comandante aproveita as novas oportunidades que surgem de um deslocamento bem-sucedido e explode contra um inimigo antes que ele tenha tempo de se recuperar (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). A abordagem indireta, então, é a aplicação de movimento e surpresa para deslocar um inimigo e obter e explorar vitórias militares para alcançar um objetivo político definido. Os estrategistas mais habilidosos que empregam essa abordagem não precisarão aplicar o máximo de violência, pois forçaram seu inimigo a uma posição da qual ele só pode se defender mal. “O negócio da guerra, portanto, não era posição e desgaste, e exaustão mútua, mas análise e paralisia, a preservação máxima”, pondera Danchiv sobre a abordagem indireta de Liddell Hart (1998, 161). A maioria dos exércitos e generais, no entanto, é treinada principalmente para o “golpe” militar, o período entre o deslocamento e a exploração quando a luta pode ocorrer; assim, poucos estão bem equipados para melhor se envolver em qualquer uma das duas atividades mais importantes (Liddell Hart 1967, 349).
Existem nuances para a atualização da abordagem indireta que são melhor captadas nos oito axiomas de Liddell Hart. Esses axiomas representam uma lista de verificação para assegurar a aplicação da abordagem indireta. Em suas palavras eles incluem:
Ajuste o seu objetivo aos seus meios Mantenha seu objeto sempre em mente Escolha a linha (ou curso) de menos expectativa Explore a linha de menor resistência Tome uma linha de operação que oferece objetivos alternativos Assegure-se de que tanto o plano quanto as disposições sejam flexíveis - adaptáveis ​​às circunstâncias Não jogue seu peso em um golpe enquanto seu oponente estiver em guarda. Não renove um ataque ao longo da mesma linha (ou da mesma forma) depois de ter falhado uma vez (Liddell Hart 1967, 348 - 349)
Liddell Hart afirma vigorosamente que, para que a abordagem indireta seja bem sucedida, de fato, para que qualquer estratégia na guerra seja viável, os fins políticos devem estar alinhados com os meios militares totais disponíveis para alcançá-los (Liddell Hart 1967, 336). Se esta condição fosse satisfeita, uma economia real de forças poderia ser realizada (Liddell Hart 1967, 336). Se as guerras são travadas para alcançar objetivos políticos, então esses objetivos não devem estar além dos meios militares acessíveis para alcançá-los. Se eles são, a perspectiva de se engajar em uma guerra fútil é realizada e certamente viola o objetivo de Liddell Hart de alcançar um resultado positivo com o mínimo de derramamento de sangue. Alguns fins simplesmente não podem ser alcançados usando os meios disponíveis, e aceitar essa realidade assegurará que os fins e meios sejam ajustados apropriadamente.
O segundo axioma está intimamente relacionado ao primeiro, mas requer algumas definições adicionais. Ou seja, há uma distinção entre os objetivos políticos e militares na guerra, embora essa diferença seja frequentemente perdida para a confusão que envolve o uso do termo "objetivo" para significar ambos ao mesmo tempo. Liddell Hart oferece uma alternativa. Em vez de usar a palavra “objetivo”, ele sugere que “o objeto” seja usado para o objetivo da política e que “o objetivo militar” seja usado para o modo como as forças são usadas para alcançar uma determinada política (Liddell Hart 1967, 351). . De um modo geral, o objeto da guerra é o que Liddell Hart chama de “melhor estado de paz”, ou a realização de uma meta política que torna a existência pacífica “melhor” para pelo menos um dos combatentes (Liddell Hart 1967, 351). Ele argumenta ainda que a vitória militar, que está ganhando batalhas, não garante automaticamente a obtenção do objeto. Em vez disso, o objetivo militar deve estar alinhado com o objeto político se a aplicação da força militar for, em última análise, a obtenção de um objeto político (Liddell Hart 1967, 351). Ao colocar o objeto sempre em sua mente, ele pode direcionar a atividade militar em vez de a atividade militar se tornar um fim em si mesma.
Os axiomas três e quatro caem geralmente no espírito de deslocar o inimigo. Ao escolher a linha ou o curso da menor expectativa, um inimigo pode ser desequilibrado em um sentido psicológico. Essas linhas ou cursos de ação começam com uma manobra física, no entanto. Um deslocamento físico:
“(A) perturba as disposições do inimigo e, ao forçar uma súbita 'mudança de front', desloca a distribuição e organização de suas forças; (b) separa suas forças; (c) põe em perigo seus suprimentos; (d) ameaça a rota ou as rotas pelas quais ele poderia recuar em caso de necessidade e se restabelecer em sua base ou pátria ”(Liddell Hart 1967, 339 - 340).
Deslocamento psicológico segue. É a impressão que a luxação física faz nas mentes dos comandantes e é mais forte quando repentina ou quando não aparece nenhuma maneira de contrariar o deslocamento (Liddell Hart 1967, 340). “O deslocamento psicológico vem fundamentalmente dessa sensação de estar preso” (Liddell Hart 1967, 340). Deslocar um inimigo dessa maneira requer que ele se coloque no lugar de um oponente, determine o curso de ação que ele menos suspeitaria e, em seguida, ataque exatamente dessa maneira (Liddell Hart 1967, 348).
A linha de menor resistência é o equivalente físico da linha de menor expectativa (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). "São as duas faces da mesma moeda", sugere Liddell Hart, e só quando combinada é a abordagem indireta totalmente empregada e o inimigo realmente deslocado (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). A linha de menor resistência equivale a mover-se contra o flanco traseiro ou fraco de um inimigo em vez de atacá-lo de frente (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). Antes de tentar a luxação, no entanto, devem ser feitos movimentos para distrair o inimigo e assim inibir sua “liberdade de ação” (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). Pode-se facilmente imaginar como as forças aéreas, capazes de voar sobre posições defendidas no solo, ou unidades mecanizadas, capazes de empurrar posições fortificadas, podem ser empregadas para encontrar a menor linha de resistência e assim alcançar a abordagem indireta (Liddell Hart 1967). , 358). Além disso, pode haver boas razões para não concentrar forças, já que distribuições alternativas podem ameaçar o inimigo de diferentes maneiras e oferecer novas abordagens para a linha de menor resistência, seja ela qual for (Liddell Hart 1967, 342). Contanto que a linha de menor resistência ofereça acesso a um objetivo congruente com a consecução do objeto político, ele deve ser perseguido sempre que possível (Liddell Hart 1967, 348).
Isso levanta o ponto do axioma número cinco. Ter múltiplos objetivos coloca um oponente “nas pontas de um dilema” (Liddell Hart 1967, 348). O que ele deveria defender? Onde você vai atacar? Como as forças devem ser distribuídas para garantir todos os objetivos possíveis? Isso distrai o inimigo do objetivo principal de seu oponente e, no mínimo, facilita a obtenção de algum objetivo (Liddell Hart 1967, 343). Desde que esses objetivos alternativos estejam todos alinhados com o objeto político, eles realmente colocam um inimigo em um beco sem saída. Além disso, impedem que um inimigo se consolide para encontrar uma concentração particular de forças opostas, já que a busca de múltiplos objetivos naturalmente desembolsará forças de ambos os lados em algum grau (Liddell Hart 1967, 347). Liddell Hart discute o nexo entre melhorias tecnológicas e avanços dispersos em alguns detalhes e os encara como centrais para a restauração da estratégia militar no século XX:
“Um renascimento do avanço estratégico distribuído foi necessário para reavivar a arte e o efeito da estratégia. Além disso, as novas condições - potência aérea e potência motora - apontam para o seu posterior desenvolvimento em um avanço estratégico disperso. O perigo de ataque aéreo, o objetivo da mistificação e a necessidade de extrair valor total da mobilidade mecanizada sugerem que as forças avançadas não devem ser distribuídas tão amplamente quanto compatível com a ação combinada, mas devem ser dispersas tanto quanto compatíveis com a coesão. ”(Liddell Hart 1967, 346).
Desta forma, múltiplos objetivos podem ser ameaçados e alcançados em apoio à realização do objeto político.
Quando os objetivos são alcançados ou perdidos, o axioma seis vem à tona. Liddell Hart salienta que um plano "deve prever e prever o próximo passo em caso de sucesso ou fracasso, ou parcial sucesso" (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). De fato, muito na guerra é incerto e as realidades estratégicas mudam rapidamente à medida que as marés de um conflito vão e voltam. O planejamento, tanto quanto possível, para essas eventualidades ajuda a garantir que a abordagem indireta possa ser aplicada em mais de uma direção, quer a acusação da guerra seja favorável ou insatisfatória.
Finalmente, os dois últimos axiomas são o que Liddell Hart considera lições “negativas” de sua pesquisa sobre a história militar, ou práticas desalinhadas com a aplicação bem-sucedida da abordagem indireta. O axioma sete parece óbvio, mas para os comandantes obcecados em se engajar na batalha como o único meio de derrotar seu inimigo, é muitas vezes esquecido. Liddell Hart lembra aos seus leitores que um inimigo deve primeiro ser "paralisado" antes de um ataque ser bem sucedido (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). Essa orientação flui da noção de que a luxação deve ocorrer antes de qualquer golpe contra um oponente. Finalmente, o último axioma apenas nos lembra que ataques sucessivos no mesmo ponto ou do mesmo tipo, se o primeiro falhar, são improváveis ​​de ter sucesso no futuro (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). Por mais que um comandante goste de pensar que sua saraivada inicial enfraqueceu um ponto particular que não se rompeu, é tolice pensar que o inimigo também não percebeu isso e não agiu para reforçar qualquer fraqueza ao longo das linhas anteriores de engajamento.
Embora esses oito axiomas e detalhes relacionados não examinem todas as implicações da abordagem indireta, eles oferecem ao estudante de estratégia uma porta de entrada útil para os insights fundamentais de Liddell Hart. A abordagem indireta é melhor capturada pelas noções de manobra e surpresa. Cada um é importante para o deslocamento do inimigo e a exploração de uma vitória. Cada um deles ajuda a preparar o campo de batalha de tal forma que faça a luta real, mesmo que haja qualquer deslocamento posterior, tão rápido e sem derramamento de sangue quanto possível. Esse é o objetivo da abordagem indireta de Liddell Hart. Por que forçar a batalha direta e desperdiçar tempo, energia e recursos, quando o objeto político pode ser alcançado usando meios mais clivados, indiretos?
Liddell Hart e Clausewitz.
O distanciamento de Liddell Hart para a aplicação da estratégia de Clausewitz na primeira metade do século XX é fácil de ver. Quase sangra as páginas da Strategy. Os leitores de Carl von Clausewitz levaram suas idéias longe demais, argumenta Liddell Hart, muito além do que o prussiano já pensou ser apropriado. Por causa de mal-entendidos em torno dos conceitos de Clausewitz, por “mais de um século, o principal cânone da doutrina militar foi que 'a destruição das principais forças inimigas no campo de batalha' constituía o único objetivo verdadeiro na guerra” (Liddell Hart 1967, 352). Como resultado, os méritos da abordagem indireta, que ao longo da história tinha sido tão central para o sucesso de uma guerra, foram perdidos em favor de uma visão que considerou a sangrenta destruição do inimigo pela batalha como a forma mais alta e mais eficaz. de guerra. De acordo com Liddell Hart, a má interpretação de Clausewitz é o resultado de seu “modo filosófico de expressão” e apresentação abstrata que tornou difícil entender a nuança associada a suas afirmações mais contundentes para a maioria dos estudantes de guerra (Liddell Hart 1967, 352-353). Particularmente confuso era que Clausewitz costumava escrever como se estivesse prestes a chegar a uma conclusão antes de voltar seu raciocínio prévio apenas para o final de um determinado ponto (Liddell Hart 1967, 353).
Liddell Hart cita muitos exemplos dessa confusão. Em um deles, enquanto discutia a tendência para o uso da força máxima, Clausewitz escreveu que a batalha era o único meio de alcançar um fim político através da guerra, apenas para admitir mais tarde em seu livro que esse era o ideal, aplicável apenas na guerra. resumo (Liddell Hart 1967, 354). Isto é facilmente intrigante para um leitor desacostumado ao estilo de Clausewitz ou que é incapaz ou não está disposto a ler o homem de perto. Ele também fala sobre uma questão mais ampla com a qual Liddell Hart fez exceção. Embora o próprio Clausewitz tenha sido capaz de diferenciar em seu pensamento e escritos entre o mundo perfeito da perseguição militar e o mundo imperfeito dessas atividades, essas sutilezas eram tão distorcidas em seu trabalho que se tornaram especialmente difíceis para os profissionais entenderem (Liddell Hart 1967, 354-355). Este foi o grande pecado de Clausewitz. Em última análise, "... foi o aspecto ideal, e não prático, de seu ensino sobre a batalha que sobreviveu ... ele fixou a distorção nas mentes de seus alunos martelando o ideal abstrato" (Liddell Hart 1967, 355). À medida que os discípulos de Clausewitz se concentravam no ideal abstrato, a ligação entre estratégia e política tornou-se dissociada, e os comandantes estavam dispostos a combater guerras em tais extremos e esgotar tanta força que não poderia haver benefícios pós-guerra (Liddell Hart 1967, 356). . Clausewitz pode não ter pretendido esta interpretação, mas foi seu legado segundo Liddell Hart.
O capitão britânico faz um pequeno esforço para colocar On War, o maciço estudo de guerra de Clausewitz, na perspectiva correta. Ele nos lembra que o livro foi escrito ao longo de doze anos, época em que as visões da Prússia evoluíram, e nunca foi terminado por seu autor, que morreu de cólera antes de completar as revisões (Liddell Hart 1967, 357). De fato, essas revisões geralmente abandonaram o conceito de guerra "absoluta", ou a tendência à mobilização extrema com o propósito de batalha, que Liddell Hart considerou especialmente temerária (Liddell Hart 1967, 357). Além disso, Liddell Hart cita uma nota que Clausewitz havia deixado com seu manuscrito inacabado. Dizia: "Se o trabalho fosse interrompido por minha morte, então o que é encontrado só pode ser chamado de uma massa de concepções não trazidas à sua forma ... abertas a equívocos infinitos" (Liddell Hart 1967, 357). Estes são precisamente os equívocos que Liddell Hart lamenta. No final, o capitão britânico afirma que o prussiano era um pensador codificador e não criativo (Liddell Hart 1967, 353). As grandes contribuições de Clausewitz para o estudo da guerra foram aquelas que enfatizaram a natureza psicológica do combate, questionaram a análise matemática da guerra que retira dele o fator humano e capturaram os efeitos de “perigo e fadiga” e o “valor da ousadia”. e determinação ”(Liddell Hart 1967, 353). Mesmo com esses elogios, Liddell Hart despreza as lições de Clausewitz. É contra o pano de fundo dessas lições ocorridas nas Guerras Mundiais que a Estratégia foi escrita.
Como Liddell Hart se encaixa na literatura?
O lugar da Estratégia entre as grandes análises da guerra e da paz é um debate calorosamente debatido. De muitas maneiras, Liddell Hart estava apenas reaprendendo e aplicando a abordagem indireta às novas tecnologias. Nas páginas iniciais de seu livro, Liddell Hart cita Sun Tzu detalhadamente e as muitas maneiras que esse antigo estrategista já defendeu para a abordagem indireta (Liddell Hart 1967, 11 - 12). Escritores que vão de Belisário e Shakespeare a Moltke e até Clausewitz também são citados como tendo vislumbres da visão estratégica de Liddell Hart séculos antes (Liddell Hart 1967, 12). Nesse sentido mais amplo, Liddell Hart estava avançando em uma posição bem estabelecida, enraizada na surpresa e na manobra que visava alcançar algum objetivo maior que a simples destruição das forças inimigas.
No entanto, estratégia não foi apenas uma reformulação de velhas idéias. Michael Howard, o conhecido historiador militar britânico, argumentou que a estratégia é “talvez a contribuição mais original para o pensamento estratégico desde Jomini e Clausewitz” (Howard, 1966, p. 59). Howard agrees with Liddell Hart’s analysis of World War I’s failed strategies and suggests that the interwar period in which the indirect approach was first proposed was ripe for new strategic thinking (Howard 1966, 59). Ultimately, as World War II hung in the balance, it was Liddell Hart’s notions of threatening multiple of alternative objectives that helped spread German forces and set up ultimate victory (Howard 1966, 59). Howard concludes that the legacy of Liddell Hart is that of the “man who, more than any other in this century, has shown us how to think clearly and sanely about war” (Howard 1966, 16). This is glowing praise indeed.
John Mearsheimer, meanwhile, attacks the notion that Liddell Hart really was some visionary with important new ideas for World War II or any war. The University of Chicago professor suggests that Liddell Hart’s concept of the indirect approach shifted several times; it was only in his memoirs published late in life that he attempted to show how these ideas were prescient and relevant to strategy during World War II (Mearsheimer 1988, 88 – 93). In a sense, Liddell Hart was retroactively fitting his early theories to explain history. Mearsheimer concludes that Liddell Hart’s earliest work, that which was produced during the early 1920s, used history in an analytically rigorous way to examine critically the roles of infantry and armor in warfare (Mearsheimer 1988, 220). However, by the late 1920s and certainly in the 1930s, the period of time where he was expanding on the indirect approach, Liddell Hart was so consumed with the “lessons” of World War I that he was no longer employing history as an objective guide; his ideas became less visionary than they were reactionary to a particular event in history (Mearsheimer 1988, 220 – 222). As such, their widespread adoption today should be taken quite carefully and their value not oversold.
Finally, a few comments on Liddell Hart’s understanding, or rather misunderstanding, of Clausewitz. Throughout Strategy the British strategist seems to confuse what Clausewitz actually said with how poorly people understood the Prussian. To be sure, Liddell Hart’s criticism of Clausewitz’s unclear writing style is fair, though the Clausewitz admitted himself that this problem was likely given the incomplete state of his book. What is ill founded is to blame on Clausewitz all of the faulty application of his strategy in the centuries after his death. While the juxtaposition of the theoretical, “absolute” type of war with the realities of actual war is sometimes difficult to follow, Book I of On War , which was the closest to completion at the time of its author’s death, is quite clear about the modifications to theoretical warfare in reality. If commanders reading these lines failed to appreciate their nuance, that fault is not on Clausewitz alone, and it surely does not undermine the quality of his arguments once properly understood. Informed analysis of On War offers important insights even today. Additionally, and perhaps most central, while Liddell Hart implies that Clausewitz’s definition of strategy allows for the privileging of military means over political ends, this flies in the face of Clausewitz’s own words. Repeatedly the older strategist stresses that war is “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz 1976, 87). By necessity it means war should be in the service of politics, military leaders in the service of their governments. Later readers may have mistaken Clausewitz, but Liddell Hart’s criticism oversteps its bounds and cheapens the actual insights provided by On War to a careful reader.
The Enduring Relevance of Strategy.
So why should we continue to read this book? What does Liddell Hart offer the student of strategy and diplomacy today? In short, the indirect approach matters. While scholars may argue about its influence in the past, the insights it provides are valuable grist for future debates on military strategy. While he may vilify Clausewitz too much, Liddell Hart is correct to criticize the faulty application and misunderstanding of Clausewitzian thinking. His focus on the importance of maneuver and surprise are timeless and may well be applied to new advances in technology and new strategic questions. Finally, Liddell Hart’s delineation of grand strategy and its domain are useful not just to military men and academics, but to practitioners across government who have a role to play during wartime. These are no small things, and they ought to be remembered.
Bond, Brian. Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought . Rutgers University Press, 1977.
This older work offers a survey of Liddell Hart’s military writings, including, but going well beyond, Strategy . Students looking for an outside take on Liddell Hart’s military thinking may benefit from this source, especially if they are attempting a more in-depth study of the man and his ideas.
Clausewitz, Carl von . On War . Translated and Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
This is the book against which Liddell Hart rails throughout Strategy . While unfinished, it has become the starting point for most scholars aiming to understand the evolution of Western military strategy. Given its major influence on the development of strategy and enduring relevance, it is still taught in most military schools of higher education and in a wide range of civilian international affairs programs. Sometimes difficult read and often a bit convoluted, it is still a must read for any serious student of strategy. Indeed, a careful reading of On War should be a natural companion to a reading of Liddell Hart’s Strategy since the latter book is so often engaged in a close dialogue with the earlier effort.
Danchev, Alex. Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart . London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998.
This is generally considered the most complete biographical work on Liddell Hart. While the style of its writing makes it sometimes difficult to follow, the many original sources, including writings and letters, which it cites help provide a clear glimpse into a man who aspired to greatness within the realm of military strategy. One chapter in particular examines Liddell Hart’s indirect approach in some detail.
Danchev, A. (1999). Liddell Hart and the indirect approach. & # 0160; The Journal of Military History, 63 (2), 313-337. Retrieved from search. proquest/docview/195628948?accountid=11752.
This article is essentially the portions of Danchev’s Alchemist that deal directly with Liddell Hart’s book Strategy , which makes it a useful starting point for students most interested in the strategic implications of Liddell Hart’s work, rather than his life or the body of his writings. Especially useful are the significant quotations from Strategy and other contemporaneous sources that help outline Liddell Hart’s views most clearly.
Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy, Second Revised Edition . New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967.
While not his first attempt at sharing his insights regarding the indirect approach to strategy, it is certainly Liddell Hart’s best known and most relevant. Assigned reading in many strategic studies programs, Strategy is a necessary companion to the study of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Moltke, Fuller, and a host of other well-known thinkers on military affairs. While not a perfect book or perfect conceptualization of military strategy, its clearly written style offers an easy entry point into larger debates on the use of military force.
Hart, Basil Henry Liddell.  The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart . Vol. 1 & amp; Vol. 2. GP, 1965.
This two volume set of memoirs comes from the hand of Liddell Hart himself. Published just five years before his death, they attempt to put into context his great mass of writings on military and strategic thought. Though some historical claims in them have been called into question, they offer a window into how Liddell Hart viewed his own life and the works he produced.
Howard, Michael. “The Liddell Hart Memoirs.” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution , 111, no. 641 (1966): 58 – 61.
Famed military historian Michael Howard reviews Liddell Hart’s memoirs in his brief journal article. He helps to put the work of Liddell Hart into wider perspective among that of other military strategists and offers a glowing review of the indirect approach.
Mearsheimer, John J.  Liddell Hart and the Weight of History . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Mearsheimer challenges the notion that Liddell Hart’s insights into military strategy and its application during World War II were either prescient or correct. This book challenges a good deal of the conventional wisdom surrounding Liddell Hart and is an important counterpoint to many of his champions.
Reid, Brian Holden. “Hart, Sir Basil Henry Liddell (1895–1970),”  Oxford Dictionary of National Biography . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [oxforddnb/view/article/33737, accessed 10 Jan 2016]
Reid’s excellent entry into the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography offers a quick and easily digestible account of Liddell Hart’s life and major works. While it does not address Strategy directly, it does make an effort to put the indirect approach into context and offers a pithy account of Liddell Hart’s rise, fall, and resurrection within the public eye, military establishment, and academy. Students should use this as a first reading for background of the experiences of Liddell Hart.
Posted by Roger Beckett on January 19, 2016 at 09:50 AM | Permalink.

Strategy university vol 1 the central approach

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page updated 8 Aug 2013.
Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimenstions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.
--- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at NDU, 29 Sep 2008.
Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustaphus Adolphus, Turenne and Frederick; take them as your model; that is the only way of becoming a Great Captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war.
The personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated to India but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European Powers by the Prussian soldiers but by Frederick the Great.
You should not have a favorite weapon.
--- Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings.
Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices ( local copy ), Fourth Edition, Joint Staff J7, March 2013 [previous versions were written by USJFCOM] This paper, written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD), provides an umbrella joint insights document that helps inform both the joint warfighters and key functions within the J7, notably lessons learned, doctrine, education, and future joint force development. In addition to this paper, the DTD has also developed more detailed "focus" papers that share insights and best practices for various specific challenges (such as mission command and cross-domain synergy, assessments, CCIR development and reporting, and lethal and nonlethal integration) observed at joint headquarters. All of these papers are unclassified for broad accessibility.
Organizational Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions ( local copy ), by DiBella, in Joint Force Quarterly , 2nd quarter 2013 The question remains as to what images will best fit national security organizations in an age that contains both evolving asymmetric threats and the potential for traditional threats. Do we shift from a machine to a network or do we alter the properties of the machine? Either way generates change, but one could argue that only the former represents true transformation. The larger question is how we make such a transformation. Given the political context of our national security apparatus, a dialectic framing of the task ahead seems appropriate. That means enlarging our capacity to resolve conflict. Both the opacity and multiplicity of organization theory contribute to the challenge of working in an interagency or joint environment. It is best to recognize that in those contexts military leaders and civilian managers will have diverse and potentially contradictory views about what organizations are and how they can be changed. Many of us are barely aware of our own theories much less those held by our counterparts who lead other organizations in an interagency or joint context.
James Stavridis: How NATO's Supreme Commander thinks about global security - a TED talk (you may need to watch it on YouTube if TED videos are blocked) "Imagine global security driven by collaboration -- among agencies, government, the private sector and the public. That's not just the distant hope of open-source fans, it's the vision of James Stavridis, a highly accomplished Navy Admiral. Stavridis shares vivid moments from recent military history to explain why security of the future should be built with bridges rather than walls." [title at TED site is "James Stavridis: A Navy Admiral's thoughts on global security"]
On Military Theory ( local copy ), by Vego, in Joint Force Quarterly , 3rd quarter 2011 All too often, the critical importance of military theory either is not well understood or is completely ignored by many officers. A reason for this is their apparent lack of knowledge and understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and the real purpose of military theory. Many officers are also contemptuous of theory because they overemphasize the importance of technology.
Military Theory, Strategy, and Praxis ( local copy ), by Kipp and Grau, Military Review , Mar-Apr 2011 The enemy will always have a vote. Praxis attempts to make it an insignificant one. Theory and strategy should be about the ends, ways, and means to counter that enemy and adapt to his changes. Praxis should direct future strategic choices, and technology should enhance the conduct of political and military conflict.
Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Pub 04, Understanding, Dec 2010 Understanding provides the context for the decision-making process which informs the application of national power. The purpose of understanding is to equip decision-makers at all levels with the insight and foresight required to make effective decisions as well as manage the associated risks and second and subsequent order effects. The human domain concerns the interaction between human actors, their activity and their broader environment. It is defined as the totality of the human sphere of activity or knowledge . This broad environment is shaped by 4 principal factors : the culture that affects how they interpret and orient themselves towards that environment; the institutions which embody cultural ideas as practices; the technology and infrastructure that people assemble to survive in their environment; and the physical environment in which people live. The human domain framework considers these 4 areas as environments (cultural, institutional, technological and physical) to capture the interaction between human actors and their wider environment. The framework takes the approach that considering the role of people as actors on the global stage - as states, non-state actors, populations, organisations, groups and individuals – provides insufficient depth to develop effective understanding. Actors must be set within their cultural, institutional, technological and physical environments to provide the appropriate context for developing understanding.
Military Adaptation in War ( local copy ), by Murray, for IDA, for OSD Office of Net Assessment, June 2009 History suggests that military organizations have been more committed to the ethos of the past than to preparing to meet the future. Most military organizations and their leaders attempt to impose prewar conceptions on the war they are fighting rather than adapting their assumptions to reality. They adapt only after great losses in men and national treasure. Effective military organizations adapt their prewar assumptions and concepts to reality. This inherent tension between the creation of disciplined, obedient military organizations, responsive to direction from above, and the creation of organizations adaptive to a world of constant change makes military innovation in peacetime and adaptation in war so difficult. examines WW I, WW II, and Yom Kippur War.
Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare ( local copy ), by Vego, in Joint Force Quarterly , 1st Qtr 2009 Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimenstions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.
--- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at NDU, 29 Sep 2008.
Since the mid-1990s, a systems (or sytemic) approach to warfare emerged gradually as the dominant school of thought in the U. S. military, most other Western militaries, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet U. S. and NATO experiences in the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Israeli experience in the second Lebanon war in 2006, have revealed not only serious limitations but also important flaws in the practical application of the systems view of war.
On Metaphors We Are Led By ( local copy ), by Paparone, in Military Review , Nov-Dec 2008 With the clever and often hidden use of metaphors, the most effective thought leaders indoctrinate others to grasp and communicate the intractable or instrutable. This essay proposes a framework that can help military practitioners judge the appropriate use of metaphor and be more reflective about how indoctrination can work to shape their "sensemaking" in important ways.
The Militant Ideology Atlas, ed. McCants, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, Nov 2006 . an in-depth study of the Jihadi Movement's top thinkers and their most popular writings. This is the first systematic mapping of the ideology inspiring al-Qaeda. The CTC’s researchers spent one year mining the most popular books and articles in al-Qaeda’s online library, profiling hundreds of figures in the Jihadi Movement, and cataloging over 11,000 citations. The empirically supported findings of the project are surprising: The most influential Jihadi intellectuals are clerics from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, two of the US’s closest allies in the Middle East. Among them, the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has had the most impact on other Jihadi thinkers and has been the most consequential in shaping the worldview of the Jihadi Movement. In contrast, the study finds that Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have had little influence on other Jihadi theorists and strategists.
Transition to the Information Age Demands Improvements to Professional Military Education System ( local copy ), Congressman Ike Skelton press release, 28 Sep 05 Imagine what might happen if a Rembrandt received a box of 16 crayons, and an average Joe was given a full palette of oil paints, easel, and canvas. Which one is more likely to produce a work of art? The analogy may not exactly fit, but the point is clear – the tools matter less than the talent, training, and dedication that create the art. You can’t have a masterpiece without a master. I think we forget that sometimes in the realm of warfare.
Changing Nature of Warfare, 25 May 2004 workshop papers from the National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2020 project.
From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War, by Evans, in Naval War College Review , Summer 2003.
The Immutable Nature of War, PBS, NOVA, interview with Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper The art of war and the science of war are not coequal. The art of war is clearly the most important. It's science in support of the art. Any time that science leads in your ability to think about and make war, I believe you're headed down a dangerous path. The art is the thinking. It is the intellectual underpinnings of war. It's understanding the theory and the nature. It's understanding how it is you want to bring combat power to bear, and what the operating concepts are. The science is represented by the weapons.
Study of War Conferences (summaries) - by Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) - UNC, Duke U., and NCSU.
The Roots of Modern American Operational Art ( local copy ), by Col Mike Matheny, Director (as of Aug 2003 download time) of the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP), US Army War College.
On Strategic Performance ( local copy ), by Colin S. Gray, in Joint Force Quarterly , Winter 1995-96 A holistic approach operates vertically and horizontally. Seen vertically, strategy includes all aspects of peace and security from political vision to tactical military performance. Horizontally considered, it includes the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space, together with strategic nuclear and special operations forces. It is important that this dual-axis appreciation should be accepted before challenges in detail are offered. Why is strategy difficult to achieve, let alone sustain? With some grateful borrowing and adaptation from Clausewitz, I find six connected reasons. [each is expanded in the article] First, competence in strategy requires mastery of a challenging complexity. Second, by its nature strategy is more demanding of the intellect and perhaps imagination than any structurally more simple activity—policy, operations, tactics, or logistics for prominent examples. Third, it is extraordinarily difficult to train competent strategists, let alone outstanding ones. Fourth, strategy is extraordinarily difficult to conduct with consistent excellence because of the unique physical and moral burdens it puts on would-be strategists. Fifth, it is worth citing what Clausewitz termed friction , although the previous point can be seen as encompassing aspects of this phenomenon. Finally, success in strategy calls for a quality of judgment that cannot be taught.
Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought ( local copy ), by Lopez et al, in Military Review , Sep-Oct 2004 - with diagrams/semantic webs of relations between actions, influences, and results.
Strategy and Theory Case Studies , Naval War College.
Warfare Theory ( local copy ), by Gattuso, in Naval War College Review , Autumn 1996 - compares attrition theory and maneuver theory, and when each is appropriate.
Peter Faber Strategy: Its Intellectual Roots and Its Current Status, by Faber, posted by the NATO Defense College Excerpted from “The Evolution of Airpower Theory in the United States - From World War I to John Warden’s The Air Campaign,” in Asymmetric Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Norwegian Air Force Academy Militaerteoretisk skriftserie Nr. 4, 2002). Four Questions and Answers on Asymmetric Warfare, by Faber, posted by the NATO Defense College Competing Theories of Airpower: a Language for Analysis, by Faber, in Aerospace Power Chronicles - short article Competing Visions of Aerospace Power: A Language for the 21st Century, by Faber, Naval War College, 1997 - 144 pages ". this report 1) describes the "prison house of language" that thwarted airpower theorists in the past, 2) provides a model to analyze airpower theory properly, and 3) reviews 15 different theories of airpower. "
The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions without Answers ( local copy ), Philip A. Crowl, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History , No. 20, October 6, 1977, pp. 1-14 - highlights below The first and most fundamental question to be asked of any prospective war or other military action is: "What is it about?" . What specific national interests and policy objectives are to be served by the proposed military action? How great is the value attached to those interests and objectives, and what is their fair price? The second question for strategists concerns not the decision to go to war, but the proper methods of fighting the war once it starts. Assuming that a nation at war has some rational objectives, the next question is: “Is the national military strategy tailored to meet the national political objectives?” What this question suggests is that there be a close correlation between the political ends of war and the military means employed to achieve those ends. A third and most difficult question that strategists must ask is: “What are the limits of military power?” This one more than any other sticks in the craw—especially in the craw of us Americans whose major national sin is grandiosity, and even more of American military officers whose professional creed is best expressed in two words: “Can do.” Yet there are many things that armed forces, no matter how powerful, cannot do. Question number four is simply: “What are the alternatives?” What are the alternatives to war? What are the alternative campaign strategies, especially if the preferred one fails? How is the war to be terminated gracefully if the odds against victory become too high? My fifth question is: “How strong is the home front?” Does public opinion support the war and the military strategy employed to fight it? What are the attitudes of influential elites both inside and outside the government in office? How much stress can civilian society endure under the pressures of the wartime sacrifices demanded? Is the war morally acceptable? Can it plausibly be explained as a “just war?” It also brings me to the sixth and final question for strategists, which is a paraphrase of Mahan’s warning already noted. “Does today’s strategy overlook points of difference and exaggerate points of likeness between past and present?” Has concern over past successes and failures developed into a neurotic fixation that blinds the strategist to changed circumstances requiring new and different responses? And one final warning to those of you who are on the threshold of your careers as strategic planners. After all your plans have been perfected, all avenues explored, all contingencies thought through, then ask yourself one final question: “What have I overlooked?” Then say your prayers and go to sleep—with the certain knowledge that tomorrow too will bring its share of nasty surprises.
On Target for Joint Theater Air Defense, 1996, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, U. S. Air Force chief of staff "The advent of the Global Positioning System, along with improving computer technology and miniaturization, has resulted in a rapid drop in the price of highly accurate cruise missiles. At the same time, sensor systems are proliferating and in the very near future it will be possible to find, fix and target virtually any surface force in the world."
MILITARY AIR POWER: The CADRE Digest of Air Power Opinions and Thoughts, military quotes book, by Lt Col CHARLES M. WESTENHOFF, 1990, (MS Word), searchable using the Find feature in Word or browser [ Zipped file ][ PDF file ] -- lots of quotes from theorists and leaders and strategists.
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power , by Victor Davis Hanson, New York and London: Doubleday. 2001 - uses nine representative battles of Western versus non-Western forces to illustrate his theories.
Battle of Salamis, 480 B. C. Battle of Gaugamela, 331 B. C. (aka Battle of Arbela) Battle of Cannae, 216 B. C. Battle of Poitiers, 732 (aka Battle of Tours) Battle of Tenochtitlan, 1521.
Battle of Lepanto, 1571 Battle of Rorke's Drift, 1879 Battle of Midway, 1942 Tet Offensive, 1968.
A Short History of War ( local copy ), online military history of past 5000 years, from Army War College, with some Air War College additions.
Sonshi library online works by Machiavelli, Teddy Roosevelt, Caesar, Mahan, Frederick the Great, Sherman, Xenophon, Marcus Aurelius, Clausewitz, . Great Leaders in the Art of War, list by Sonshi.
Hints to Young Generals , by an Old Soldier (BGen. John Armstrong), Kingston: J. Buel, 1812 - [Armstrong was a major in the Revolutionary War, was at the defeat of Burgoyne in 1777, and served as ambassador to France in 1804 and saw Napoleon's army firsthand.] "Books! and what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a Mack, but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick or a Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobler of Athens lecturing Hannibal on the art of war?" "True: but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobler. Xenophon, Caesar, Saxe and Frederick, have all thought well of books, and have even composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are but the depositories of maxims, which genius has suggested, and experience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render the labor and the genius of past ages, tributary to our own. These teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful war, is not to be found in mere legs and arms , but in the head , that shall direct them."
21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations ( local copy ), by Yarger, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Apr 2013 As USSOCOM confronts the challenges offered by the 21st century and policymakers continue to look at SOF as a preferred means to address numerous and complex security issues, theory is essential in determining and explaining the appropriate roles and missions for SOF in the 21st century and for building and sustaining the forces. It explains the strategic utility of SOF, bolsters the strategic art within SOF, and informs doctrine. This monograph offers a basis toward such a theory.
Chairman’s Corner: Three Principles for Use of Military ( local copy ), by Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 March 2010, referencing speech below (given at Kansas State University) The first is that military power should not, maybe cannot, be the last resort of the state. Sometimes, the military -- because of its unique flexibility and speed -- may be the first, best tool to use. But it should never be the only tool. The second is that to the maximum extent possible, force should be applied in a precise and principled way. Precisely applying force in a principled manner can help reduce those costs and actually improve our chances of success. My third principle is that -- in the very dynamic security environment we find ourselves in -- we should welcome a constant struggle between policy and strategy. Landon Lecture by Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( local copy ), at Kansas State University, 3 March 2010.
The Echo of Battle: The Army Way of War , book by Linn, Nov 2007 In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions--and errors--that underlie the army's many visions of warfare up to the present day. [from Harvard Universary Press summary]
Rage Against the Machines: Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare , by Lyall (Princeton) and Wilson (USMA), May 2007 (supercedes earlier version titled "The American Way of War and Peace in Comparative Perspective") Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U. S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime - and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.
Apolitical Astrategic Ahistorical Problem-solving, optimistic Culturally challenged Technology dependent Focused on firepower.
Large-scale Aggressive, offensive Profoundly regular Impatient Logistically excellent Highly sensitive to casualties.
The American Way of War ( local copy ), by Cebrowski and Barnett, Transformation Trends newsletter, 13 Jan 2003 The Global Transaction Strategy ( local copy ), by Barnett and Gaffney, Transformation Trends newsletter, 16 Dec 2002 NewRuleSets. Project The Top 100 Rules of the New American Way of War ( local copy ), by Barnett and Gaffney, 3 Jan 2003 Life After DoDth or: How the Evernet Changes Everything , by Barnett The Pentagon's New Map, by Barnett Thomas Barnett draws a new map for peace - a TED talk (you may need to watch it on YouTube if TED videos are blocked) "In this bracingly honest talk, international security strategist Thomas Barnett outlines a post-Cold War solution for the foundering U. S. military that is both sensible and breathtaking in its simplicity: Break it in two."
National Culture and Warfare - Whither Decisive Force ( local copy ), Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 1996 review essay by Andre, referencing Decisive Force: the New American Way of War by Hoffman.
U. S. Grand Strategy for Afghanistan/Pakistan, in MERLN - government statements/testimony compiled by the National Defense University Library - updated Dec 2010 or later.
Developing Air Force Strategists: Change Culture, Reverse Careerism ( local copy ), by Bethel et al, Joint Force Quarterly , 3rd Quarter 2010 The Air Force should seek out those officers who have a balanced brain—those who can not only intuit well and rapidly, but who also understand when it may be necessary to look for theories that can be generalized. Instead, the Service teaches “people, processes, and products” that make up the Air Operations Center at its command and staff college. There is no career path for strategists or strategic thinkers, and indeed there appears to be a trend away from intellectualism. Rather than disdaining intellectualism, senior leaders should be encouraged to read recent scholarship on strategic decisionmaking and ask themselves if they can learn something there. In addition to the long list of histories of command and leadership, Air Force senior leaders should have to read Scott Page’s The Difference , Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink and Outliers , James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds , and most importantly, Alec Fisher’s The Logic of Real Arguments .
New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict ( local copy ), by Kilcullen, in State Department eJournal , May 2007 Five Practical Steps Develop a new lexicon Get the grand strategy right Remedy the imbalance in government capability Identify the new "strategic services" Develop a capacity for strategic information warfare.
Reorienting Grand Strategy: The Promise of Single-equilibrium Defense Planning ( local copy ), by Junio and Protz, in Joint Force Quarterly , 3rd quarter 2010 Since the end of the Cold War, the U. S. defense community has focused its futures analysis on a “range of possible outcomes” approach. Planners assume that social behavior, such as that of states in the international system or individuals in markets, is so complex that it defies point prediction. The best one can hope for, goes this mindset, is for a creative mind to envision scenarios that might come to pass, and then to prepare capabilities and strategies to meet challenges in those notional worlds. This approach to planning neglects two key and undeniable facts. First, at a specified level of granularity, there will be only one outcome of social interactions under study—a single equilibrium—just as there will be only one state of reality 5 minutes, 5 hours, and 5 years from now. Understanding which equilibrium will result is an informational, not a logical, research problem. Second, the United States has enormous potential to affect and effect changes in its favor—that is, to drive social systems, such as the international system, toward the particular equilibrium that U. S. policymakers desire.
Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10 ( local copy ), Joint Advanced Warfighting School, NDU Chapter IX deals with "Grand Strategy as the basis for Operational Art" and "Military Campaigns within Grand Strategy"
Saving the World for Democracy: An Historical Analysis of America’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century ( local copy ), by Bassani, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, NDU This study looks at three separate and distinct historical examples of grand strategy: The post-Republican Era of the Roman Empire, the rise of the Mongol Empire under Genghis Kahn, and Great Britain after the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the wars of Spanish Succession. From these examples, we see the common threads that run through all grand strategies and the different approaches that nations take in pursuing their national interests. Next, it examines the American experience with the emergence of the so-called Monroe Doctrine (America’s first grand strategy), the move toward multilateralism as a result of the Second World War, and America’s 21st Century grand strategy that emerged post-9/11. Lastly, I discuss the conflict between America’s values and her national interests and the implications for America’s future at the end of the Century.
What Is Grand Strategy?, by Gaddis, 26 Feb 2009 Prepared as the Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture, Duke University, February 26, 2009, the keynote address for a conference on “American Grand Strategy after War,” sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy. John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History and Director of the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University.
Sun Tzu, Nuclear Weapons and China's Grand Strategy ( local copy ), by Rickard, in Strategic Insights , Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2008 This paper is not an historical review of China's nuclear weapons program. It is an attempt to provide a view into its future by suggesting answers to the question of: What is the Role of Nuclear Weapons in China's grand strategy? The paper will also discuss how the ancient writings of Sun Tzu have informed China's current strategy.
Strategic Studies Institute Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy ( local copy ), by Brands, Aug 2010 This monograph analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz Inбcio Lula da Silva. During Lula’s nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a multi-tiered grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from unipolarity to a multipolar order in which international rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft-balancing, coalition-building, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. This strategy has successfully raised Brazil’s profile and increased its diplomatic flexibility, but it has also exposed the country to four potent strategic dilemmas that could complicate or undermine its ascent. [from SSI synopsis] Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response ( local copy ), ed. Marcella, SSI, Mar 2010 Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict ( local copy ), by Gray, SSI, Nov 2009 American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment ( local copy ), by Marcella, Sep 2007 Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: the Little Book on Big Strategy ( local copy ), by Yarger, The Letort Papers , Feb 2006 American Grand Strategy after 9/11: an Assessment ( local copy ), by Biddle, Apr 2005 Grand Strategy for the United States in the 21st Century? (A Look at the National Security Document of 2002 and Beyond) ( local copy ), by Tinsley, Mar 2005 Planning for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations without a Grand Strategy ( local copy ), by Mangan, Mar 2005.
Containment to Integration A Grand Strategy for the 21st Century ( local copy ), by Gunderman, US Army War College, 15 Mar 2006 As containment was the grand strategic response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union to U. S. interests, an innovative approach is again needed in response to the threat posed by radical Islamists who seek to replace the U. S.-led secular, democratic, global system with an Islamic world order using jihadist Islamic terrorism as a tactic to achieve that end. This paper presents an examination of and proposal for the formulation and implementation of a grand strategy for the 21st century.
17.484 Comparative Grand Strategy and Military Doctrine, course taught at MIT in Fall 2004, with syllabus, readings list, lecture notes, and other class materials - posted online as part of MIT's Open Courseware program.
Design and Operational Art: A Practical Approach to Teaching the Army Design Methodology ( local copy ), by Graves and Stanley, Military Review , Jul-Aug 2013 In an effort to maintain relevance with the operational army and joint force, the SAMS faculty adjusted its design and operational art curriculum based on feedback from commanders and senior Army leaders. Thus, the updated curriculum increases the student officers’ understanding of Army design methodology and improves communication between graduates and their commanders. Previous versions of the SAMS design curriculum did not acknowledge the past application of critical and creative thinking from military practitioners. Instead, the design curriculum relied on theory and concepts from a variety of design disciplines, resulting in a heavy reliance on metaphor to reach understanding about design. This article describes the current SAMS design curriculum, highlights its relationship to the broader SAMS curriculum, and demonstrates a practical way to teach Army design methodology.
UFMCS Red Team Handbook, Apr 2012 ( local copy ) "Design inquires into the nature of a problem to conceive a framework for solving that problem. In general, planning is problem solving, while design is problem setting. Where planning focuses on generating a plan—a series of executable actions—design focuses on learning about the nature of an unfamiliar problem"
A Practical Guide to Design: a Way to Think About It, and a Way to Do It ( local copy ), by Perez, Military Review , Mar-Apr 2011 The structure that Design imparts is straightforward. Design merely asks the commander and his thinking partners to maintain and revise provisional answers to four questions. What is going on in the environment? What do we want the environment to look like? Where—conceptually—do we act to achieve our desired state? How do we act and speak in order to achieve our desired state?
Art of Design ( local copy, 12 Mb ), Student Text, Version 2.0, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
( low res local copy, 5 Mb ) The Art of Design Student Text, Version 2.0 is the next iteration of this understanding of design as the art of strategic thinking. The utility of this student text will not be limited to the classroom. It will also serve as a comprehensive resource for leaders in the field who are already designing exceptionally complex operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Design: Tools of the Trade ( local copy ), by Kem, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 2009 Design is the next step on a path to maturing our battle command model for the complexities of operations in an era of persistent conflict. It will provide future generations of leaders with the cognitive tools necessary to master our operations process at a time when our adversaries are adapting at a rate unprecedented in our history – forging an operational paradigm that is as flexible and adaptive as the leaders we are developing. Design is a way to help you think through handling problems – and to get others around you to help using collaboration and discourse to enable the commander’s visualization of a situation. In a collaborative environment, it is important that all – commanders as well as staff officers – bring in what they know and how they see things without being afraid to speak up. After all, even a commander doesn’t know everything, even though some might not be so sure. A learning organization consisting of people with different skills and backgrounds can really help you look at problems from different perspectives – thereby assisting the commander in his mission of leading that organization. . Design will help you take a complex problem and let you see it for what it is so you can adjust to make things better.
Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions ( local copy ), by de Czege, Military Review , Jan-Feb 2009 Nearly all missions this century will be complex, and the kind of thinking we have called “operational art” is often now required at battalion level. Fundamentally, operational art requires balancing design and planning while remaining open to learning and adapting quickly to change. Design is not a new idea. Command has always entailed responsibility for designing operations while penetrating complexity and framing problems that planners have to solve. Individual ability to learn effectively, adapt rapidly and appropriately, and to solve problems has always been self-evidently valuable to commanders. Yet, collectively, a command’s overall quality of design, learning, and adaptation is what determines results. Military leaders may value individual creativity, critical thinking, continuous learning, and adaptability in their staffs and subordinate commanders, but individual traits do not necessarily add up to collective abilities needed for the best outcomes.
Educating by Design: Preparing Leaders for a Complex World ( local copy ), by Banach, Military Review , Mar-Apr 2009 One of the primary objectives of AMSMSP’s Art of Design courseware is to enable students to gain systemic understanding of a situation when it is not clear what action is required and no consensus exists on the nature of the problem. The complex situations that the Army is confronting today defy checklists and templates. Instead a broad framework must be applied to describe the nature of the problem and the capabilities of the organization. These products should result in written and graphical products that clearly communicate the logic of the design.
The Art of Design: a Design Methodology ( local copy ), by Banach and Ryan, Military Review , Mar-Apr 2009 America’s International Technology Education Association defines design as an iterative decision-making process that produces plans by which resources are converted into products or systems that meet human needs and wants or solve problems. Once a design team has been formed by the commander to help him understand the situation, it needs to ask: Why has this situation developed? O que isso significa? What’s the real story here?
From Tactical Planning to Operational Design ( local copy ), by Davison, Military Review , Sep-Oct 2008 The three military decision-making models reflect a parallel progression in the evolution of systems thinking. Initially, rational military decisionmaking supported solving well-structured problems such as those found in a mechanistic system. Decision-making primed by recognition subsequently evolved to address problems occurring in natural settings with which the decision-maker had experience. An intuitive decision-making process then emerged to cope with those situations for which decision-makers had no previous experience.
Principles of War see also Future of War for ideas on challenges the principles might face, and might need to change to handle.
see also Cebrowski and Co. re: new rules and new map of warfighting.
see also Transformation of War at Center for Transformation Studies.
see also leadership competencies and skills for ideas on what principles will take advantage of the leadership skills of the future.
Future Warfare: Rethinking the Principles of War - project by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) Have the Principles of War changed? Some think it is an interesting question, and to that end we have put together a team to examine this subject. The group includes the Office of Force Transformation, the U. S. Naval Institute, the Royal Uniformed Services Institute, and Johns Hopkins University. In search of the answer, this group is hosting a summer seminar series followed by a national essay contest to produce a textbook on this subject. Speakers bios, notes, etc. from the seminar above, at Johns Hopkins University What Do We Know About Future Warfare? - 15 March 2005 notes by Dr Colin Gray.
Competition, War & Transformation: Interagency Framework for Operational Planning and Force Development ( local copy ), June 2004 briefing by Kiefer, Joint Staff J7 For full benefit, download the slideshow and view locally from your hard drive (and not using a browser) so you can view the notes which accompany many of the individual slides Purpose: discuss concept elements which are missing or not fully developed in current JOpsC family of concepts Agenda Freedom of Action Dimensions of Competition Fires & Maneuver Principles of War - several good slides about issues, shortfalls, & changes needed Legitimacy Definitions Principles of Transformation Sense-Making.
The Information-Based RMA and the Principles of War, by Litton, in Air & Space Power Chronicles - includes discussion of six of the traditional principles which may be influenced most by the emergence of information-based warfare.
Sailing New Seas, by Reason and Freymann, Newport Paper No. 13, Naval War College Appendix A - Fighting Principles "There are no new principles of war. However, different principles should receive different emphases in different environments. Some are especially appropriate to the Navy's current environment. This appendix highlights a few of those principles."
Threat Kingdom ( local copy ), by Flynt, in Military Review - examines emerging threats, targets, means, and ends The new principles of war are no longer "using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will," but rather are "using all means…to compel the enemy to accept one's interests. - from Unrestricted Warfare , by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.
A Fresh Look at Some Old Principles-Building a Framework for the Twenty-First Century ( local copy ), by Heinz, Naval War College paper - expands on Leonhard book above framework based on the independent Law of Humanity and the dependent Laws of Risk, Adaptability, and Duality of War new principles of war - Comparative vs. Exclusive Advantage, Knowledge vs. Estimates, Confrontation vs. Dislocation, Concentration vs. Distribution, Reaction vs. Opportunity, Security vs. Activity, Objective vs. Option Acceleration, Anarchy vs. Command.
No More Principles of War? ( local copy ) by Glenn, in Parameters , Spring 1998 - examines the traditional nine principles, the Principles of Operations Other than War, and the Principles of Operations.
Figure 1. Principles of War and Operations Other than War.
(as in 1993 FM 100-5, Operations ) and Principles of Operations as.
proposed in Initial Draft, 1998 FM 100-5, Operations .
[Ed. note: the 2004/2005 draft of Marine Small Wars manual uses the OOTW principles above, but lumps Legitimacy and Restraint together, and uses the word Persistence instead of Perseverance.]
- (alternate source at AF History Office, big PDF file, long load time) Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. Air Power is an inherently strategic force. Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon. In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension--time. Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously. Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass. Air Power's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen. Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related. Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.
Military Doctrine, by Drew and Snow, including Doctrine Tree and discussion of relationship between doctrine and strategy.
In Search of the Missing Link: Relating Destruction to Outcome in Airpower Application, by Williams, 1994 SAAS paper - examines destruction-outcome linkage model as applied to strategies from WW II, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf War.
Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China ( local copy ), by Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science, The Chinese People's Liberation Army.
John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973.
Wylie, Joseph C. Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control . Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989.
Military Review, has Spanish, Portuguese (Brazil), French, and Arab editions.
A Balkan Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War War & Society , Volume 13, Number 2, October 1995, Tim Hamlett, 'Hemisphericity and Reasoning Styles in Chinese and Western Thinkers: A Comparison of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu' Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared , by Michael Handel Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu ( local copy ), by Handel, in Naval War College Review , Autumn 2000.
Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U.
Sun Tzu vs. the NATO Clausewitz: A Tentative Interpretation of the Serbo - NATO War.
Thucydides and the Teaching of Strategy ( local copy ), a Joint Force Quarterly review essay by Bernstein, regarding The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War , by Strassler.
The Strategemata , by Frontinus - original Latin and English translation - a detailed examination of Roman strategy and tactics.
The Art of War [two sources] The Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli The Seven Books on the Art of War, by Niccolo Machiavelli, Citizen and Secretary of Florence, 1520.
Machiavelli's influence on Clausewitz mentioned in Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War, by Col Harry Summers, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1986 Hermann-Maurice comte de Saxe, 1696-1750 from Westenhoff quotes book Saxe, Hermann Maurice de , Marshal of France. Commissioned at age 12, a regimental commander of cavalry at 17; leading military commander of the early eighteenth century; author of My Reveries (1732).
"The ultimate object of mobility is to obtain superior power in battle." "Few orders are best, but they should be followed up with care."
other quotes It is not big armies that win battles, it is the good ones. Hope encourages men to endure and attempt everything; in depriving them of it, or in making it too distant, you deprive them of their very soul.
My Reveries upon the Art of War, by Marshal Herman Maurice de Saxe, Published posthumously in 1757.
Maurice de Saxe, "My Reveries upon the Art of War," in Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of all Time , ed. and trans. Thomas R. Phillips, (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940; reprinted by Stackpole Books, 1985), I do not favor pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one. I do not mean to say by this that when an opportunity occurs to crush the enemy that he should not be attacked, nor that advantage should not be taken of his mistakes. But I do mean that war can be made without leaving anything to chance. And this is the highest point of perfection and skill in a general.
"Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study them: theory facilitates practice. The lifetime of one man is not long enough to enable him to acquire perfect knowledge and experience." "It would further human knowledge if, instead of writing new books, we would apply ourselves to making decent extracts from those that are already in existence. Then one would hope to avoid wasting his time by reading." "The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy." "In order to have rest oneself it is necessary to keep the enemy occupied." "Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything; wise men hold fast to the key points." "Skepticism is the mother of security." "But since the best dispositions become useless if they are not executed, it is essential that the general should be industrious in seeing whether his orders are executed or not."
"If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation." "Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover; lost time, never." "War is composed of nothing but accidents, and though holding to general principles, a general should never lose sight of everything to enable him to profit from these accidents; that is the mark of genius." "A battle sometimes decides everything; and sometimes the most trifling thing decides the fate of a battle." "Fumblings, the middle course, lose all in war." "Nothing is more important in war than unity in command." "The whole art of war consists of a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by rapid and audacious attack." "The first quality for a commander-in-chief is a cool head, which receives a correct impression of things. He should not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad news." "Morale makes up three quarters of the game, the relative balance of manpower accounts for only the remaining quarter."
Quotations from Clausewitz Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war. In tactics the means are the fighting forces . . . the end is victory. The original means of strategy is victory -- that is, tactical success; its ends . . . are those objects which will lead directly to peace. Estratégia . . . confers a special significance . . . on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it. Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. . . . The aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it. In war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect. . . . Perseverance in the chosen course is the essential counterweight.
On War online, 1873 translation by Graham, posted at the Clausewitz Homepage On War online, 1873 translation by Graham, posted at Sonshi.
On War without the Fog ( local copy ), by Kiesling, in Military Review , Sep-Oct 2001 - pointing out that Clausewitz never uses "fog of war"
Definitions centers of gravity - (DOD Dictionary) Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. see also capability; decisive point. capability - (DOD Dictionary) The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) decisive point - (DOD Dictionary) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. see also center of gravity.
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning - Center of Gravity is in Chapter IV, on pages IV-8 (pdf page 132) thru IV-19 - key terms, diagrams, and discussion of how to analyze COGs and integrate them into planning, . A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. The COG is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change. key terms critical capability — a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such, and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). critical requirement — an essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. critical vulnerability — an aspect of a critical requirement, which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.
Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought ( local copy ), by Lopez et al, in Military Review , Sep-Oct 2004 - with diagrams/semantic webs of relations between actions, influences, and results - and addressing the strategic COG (SCOG)
Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.
culminating point - (DOD) The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. uma. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (from the DoD Dictionary)
decisive engagement - (DOD Dictionary) In land and naval warfare, an engagement in which a unit is considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand.
decisive point - (DOD Dictionary) A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. see also centers of gravity.
The Present Theory of War and Its Utility, by Jomini, 1838 - Jomini discusses almost all the military writers of the period Introductory Material to Summary of the Art of War ( local copy ), by Jomini, 1838 - different format and packaging of above material, with Jomini's letter to the Emperor Of all theories on the art of war, the only reasonable one is that which, founded upon the study of military history, admits a certain number of regulating principles, but leaves to natural genius the greatest part in the general conduct of a war without trammeling it with exclusive rules. On the contrary, nothing is better calculated to kill natural genius and to cause error to triumph, than those pedantic theories, based upon the false idea that war is a positive science, all the operations of which can be reduced to infallible calculations. In all the arts, as in all the situations of life, knowledge and skill are two altogether different things, and if one often succeed through the latter alone, it is never but the union of the two that constitutes a superior man and assures complete success. Meanwhile, in order not to be accused of pedantry, I hasten to avow that, by knowledge , I do not mean a vast erudition; it is not the question to know a great deal but to know well ; to know especially what relates to the mission appointed us.
To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:— Statesmanship in its relation to war. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion. Grand Tactics. Logistics, or the art of moving armies. Engineering,—the attack and defense of fortifications. Minor Tactics. It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering. Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.
Jomini, Antoine Henri, AU Library resources Cornell University Making of America (MoA) Collection (300+ hits when searched on "Jomini") Using advanced search can find the following: Baron de Jomini's Treatise on Military Operations, 1865 General Jomini ( local copy, a quick 15 pages ), bio article by G. B.M. in The Galaxy , published 1869 He said that it was while studying the accounts of the battle of Leuthen that the great principle which is the foundation of the art of war flashed upon him; and a careful study of Napoleon's early Italian campaigns proved to him that he had at last mastered the secret. . it was simply this -- to bring the greatest mass of troops to bear upon the decisive point of a field of battle or theatre of operations, at the opportune moment . Not long after [Austerlitz], the Emperor [Napoleon], when at Schцnbrunn, with more leisure than usual, directed Maret to read to him the portions of the work ["Treatise on Great Operations"] indicated in Jomini's letter. After listening to a few pages, he exclaimeed:
"They say the age does not advance! Why, here is a young major, a Swiss at that, who teaches us what my professors never taught me, and what very few generals understand!"
After hearing a little more, he said, much excited,
"Why did Fouchй allow such a work to be published? It teaches my whole system of war to my enemies. The book must be seized, and its circulation prevented."
After a few moments' reflection, he again said:
"But I attach too much importance to this publication. The old generals who command against me will never read it, and the young men who will read it do not command; nevertheless, such works must not be published hereafter without permission."
He then ordered Jomini's name be placed on the list of promotions for the campaign, as colonel on the general staff; and he was immediately assigned as senior aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney. Jomini conversed frankly about the modern changes and improvements in fire-arms, railways, telegraphs, etc. He freely acknowledged their advantages, and the changes they would bring about in war, but insisted that they could not modify its principles. "Woe to the general," said he, "who trusts in the modern inventions, and neglects the principles of strategy ; those principles will remain unchanged through all the improvements of the future, and can never be inconsistent with them; future history will show that under no circumstances can those principles be violated with impunity." Intro to Interpreting Modern War - Jomini, History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice, Command and General Staff College - excellent quick summary of Jomini by Thomas Huber ( local copy )
Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford, paper from meeting of Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, Ga. St. U. Dennis Hart Mahan, 1802-1871 from Westenhoff quotes book Mahan, Dennis Hart . Professor of military art and science at West Point; founder of professional military study in the United States; influenced many Civil War generals.
"Attack the enemy suddenly when he is not prepared to resist. Celerity is the secret of success."
McClellan, A Historian's View, with discussion of what he was taught by Professor D. H. Mahan at West Point -"It is doubtful that Professor Mahan ever had a more brilliant pupil than McClellan." -- "Professor Dennis Hart Mahan gave his students the practical lessons of the French Field Commander."
Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford . "[A. T.] Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, had been a devout Jominian, and so was he."
"All officers of this command must now study their books; ignorance of duty must no longer be pleaded. The commanding general has the power at any time to order a board to examine the acquirements and capacity of any officer, and he will not fail to exercise it. Should any officer, high or low, after the opportunity and experiences we have had, be ignorant of his tactics, regulations, or even of the principles of the Art of War (Mahan and Jomini), it would be a lasting disgrace." By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, from: HQ General Orders No.62 (24 July 1862)
To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the least exposure to ourselves, is a military axiom lost sight of only by ignorance of the true ends of victory. --Dennis Hart Mahan.
1826 Dennis Hart Mahan, highest ranking graduate in the U. S. Military Academy class of 1824, begins four years of study in France. 1830 Mahan becomes an instructor at USMA.
The Battle of Gettysburg: A Historical Perspective, 1995 ACSC research project including an interactive Asymetrix Toolbook product "The Toolbook examines the influences of Dennis Hart Mahan and the concept of the decisive battle. Mahan derived his teachings from the works of the Swiss officer, Antoine Henri Jomini. The leaders of both the Northern and Southern armies and the overwhelming majority of their generals were graduates of the United States Military Academy, West Point. An overriding influence in their military education was the teachings of Dennis Hart Mahan, who taught for many years at West Point." -- training of the military leaders at Gettysburg "was dominated by the actions of Napoleon, the writings of Jomini, and formulated by the teachings of Mahan. The advantages of rapidity of movement, invasion of the enemy's territory, and a deadly blow to his forces culminating in a decisive battle, were the tenets that shaped the Civil War decision makers' thinking. They fought as they were trained to fight. A decisive battle was exactly what the generals were expecting and what they were seeking at Gettysburg."
The History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice, Command and General Staff College -- "As the American Civil War progressed, most senior commanders continued to rely upon Jominian theory as interpreted by Dennis Hart Mahan and [Gen. Henry Wager] Halleck, even though it did not specifically address sweeping technological changes such as railroads and ironclad warships. A few commanders, like U. S. Grant, paid little attention to Jominian rules and adopted a more pragmatic approach that seemed to fit the changed conditions better than the Napoleonic model then in vogue." Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph Ardant du Picq, 1821-1870 from Westenhoff quotes book du Picq, Charles Ardant , Colonel, French Army. Military leader in the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars; author of the classic Battle Studies (1870).
"With equal or inferior power of destruction he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word, has the moral ascendancy."
"The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of the war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political." "The proverbial weakness of alliances is due to inferior power of concentration."
Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, by Bassford . "[A. T.] Mahan's father, military educator Dennis Hart Mahan, had been a devout Jominian, and so was he."
Mahan's Classical View and the Profession of Arms, by Chipman, in AU Review, about the enduring lessons which may even apply to air power The Reluctant Seaman, about Alfred Thayer Mahan Mahan, Alfred Thayer, AU Library resources Mahan Articles, posted at the Cornell University Making of America (MoA) Collection (700+ hits when searched on "Mahan") Using advanced search you can find many articles, including the following: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, unsigned review of Mahan's major work, Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1890) The United States Looking Outward, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (Dec. 1890) Admiral the Earl of St. Vincent, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (March 1893) Admiral Saumarez, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (May 1893) Admiral Lord Exmouth, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (July 1893) The Isthmus and Sea Power, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Atlantic Monthly (Oct. 1893) Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Nov. 1894) Lessons from the Yalu Fight, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Aug. 1895) The Future in Relation to American Naval Power, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Oct. 1895) Nelson at Cape St. Vincent, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Feb. 1896) The Engineer in Naval Warfare, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Dec. 1896) Nelson in the Battle of the Nile, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Jan. 1897) The Battle of Copenhagen, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (Feb. 1897) Nelson at Trafalgar, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (March 1897) Preparedness for Naval War, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (March 1897) A Twentieth-Century Outlook, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Sept. 1897) The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, by Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (Oct. 1897) The Spanish Armada: Introduction, by Alfred T. Mahan, in The Century (June 1898) Current Fallacies Upon Naval Subjects, by Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, in Harper's Magazine (June 1898) The Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of the War, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Oct. 1899) The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (March 1900) Effects of Asiatic Conditions Upon International Policies, by Alfred T. Mahan, in North American Review (Nov. 1900) Julian Stafford Corbett, 1854-1922 Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory ( local copy ), by Klein, in Naval War College Review , Winter 2004.
Strategy in the Navy, 1909, by Spenser Wilkinson, an attack on Corbett's views/influence Corbett, Julian Stafford, AU Library resources Maj Gen Emory Upton, 1839-1881 The Military Policy of the United States from 1775 , GPO 1904 (from 1878 manuscript), by Maj Gen Emory Upton.
Making Do with Less, or Coping with Upton's Ghost ( local copy ), by Cohen, SSI "More than one generation of American military professionals have inherited and perpetuated Civil War Major General Emory Upton’s distrust of -- and disdain for -- civilians in general and politically elected or appointed civilian leaders in particular."
"You will usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of these he will adopt the fourth ." "Remember, gentlemen, an order that can be misunderstood will be misunderstood." "The offensive knows what it wants, whereas the defensive is in a state of uncertainty." - S. T. Das paraphrasing Moltke, The Elder.
Moltke listed Homer's works, the Bible, and On War among three of the five books which most influenced him. Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957), 108 - [this from the notes to Echevarria's Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature Before the Great War ]
Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War, by Echevarria, in War and History - includes discussion "the Schlichting controversy, at the core of which was the issue of the high casualty rates, especially among infantry and cavalry units, experienced in the Wars of Unification"
Rules of Success in Air Combat (aka "Dicta Boelcke"), by Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke, 1916 - basic rules for visually-based air combat success.
"Because of its independence of surface limitations and its superior speed the airplane is the offensive weapon par excellence." "The guiding principle of bombing actions should be this: the objective must be destroyed completely in one attack, making further attack on the same target unnecessary." "In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary-- and sufficient --to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air." "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur."
Douhet, Giulio, AU Library resources Hugh Montague Trenchard, 1st Viscount, 1873–1956 from Westenhoff quotes book Trenchard, Hugh Montague , British Air Marshal, Viscount. Commander of the Royal Flying Corps in the field in World War I; chief of Air Staff from 1919 to 1929; single-minded advocate of air progress.
"It may be said that Douhet was the theorist of air power, Mitchell the publicist and catalytic agent, and Trenchard the organizational genius." - Harry H. Ransom "The four principles of air power that I set out were:" To obtain mastery of the air, and to keep it, which means continually fighting for it. To destroy the enemy's means of production and his communications by strategic bombing. To maintain the battle without any interference by the enemy. To prevent the enemy being able to maintain the battle.
The Thread of Doctrine, by Pauly, in Air University Review , May-June 1976 - discusses ACTS and its predecessors, as well as the documents of the period The basic documents produced during this period that reflected the evolution of these early ideas include: War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, "Fundamental Principles for Employment of the Air Service" (1926) Air Corps Tactical School, "Employment of Combined Air Force" (1926) War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, "Employment of the Air Forces of the Army" (1935) WDFM 1-5, "Employment of the Aviation of the Army" (1940) AWPD-1, "Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces" (1941) FM 31-35, "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces" (1942) WDFM 100-20, "Command and Employment of Air Power" (1943) - superseded FM 1-5.
The Development of US Strategic Bombing Doctrine in the Interwar Years: Moral and Legal?, by Faber, in Journal of Legal Studies , 1996/1997 Regarding Employment of Combined Air Force , Air Service Tactical School, 1924-1925 The text provides a series of working propositions that establish an intellectual foundation for the follow-on work of the ACTS Bomber Mafia from roughly 1928-1935. In particular, the Combined Air Force text codified five crucial propositions of air warfare for Army airmen.
1 ) The goal of an air attack is "to undermine the enemy’s morale, [or] his will to resist."
2 ) Airmen can best destroy morale, however, by attacking the interior of an opponent’s territory. Attacks against vital points or centers will not only terrorize populations into submission, they will also save lives. (In the future, for example, the Army will not have to gradually wear down and overcome enemy forces interposed between itself and an opponent’s territory.)
3 ) Air power is an inherently offensive weapon that is impossible, in absolute terms, to stop.
4 ) Since air power is the only military tool that can hit centers of concentration and sources of supply, and since it is the only tool that can undermine national morale with minimum effort and materiel, combatants should use it extensively in strategic operations. Strategic targets, after all, are typically more important than tactical ones.
5 ) Last, "In any scheme of strategical operations the object is to cause complete destruction or permanent and irreparable damage to the enemy which will have a decisive effect."
Principles of Warfare Culminating Seminar, by Schneider, 13 Apr 2005, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) - quick summary of Lawrence's ideas and their application today.
Twenty-Seven Articles, by Lawrence, reprinted from The Arab Bulletin , 20 August 1917, reproduced in Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present - see PDF page 11.
from his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom (various editions during the 1920's and 1930's) .. [red highlight added by AWC] full text available online full text available online, second source "However it was, things in the Hejaz went from bad to worse. No proper liaison was provided for the Arab forces in the field, no military information was given the Sherifs, no tactical advice or strategy was suggested, no attempt made to find out the local conditions and adapt existing Allied resources in material to suit their needs." "As I have shown, I was unfortunately as much in command of the campaign as I pleased, and was untrained. In military theory I was tolerably read, my Oxford curiosity having taken me past Napoleon to Clausewitz and his school, to Caemmerer and Moltke, and the recent Frenchmen. They had all seemed to be one-sided; and after looking at Jomini and Willisen, I had found broader principles in Saxe and Guibert and the eighteenth century. However, Clausewitz was intellectually so much the master of them, and his book so logical and fascinating, that unconsciously I accepted his finality, until a comparison of Kuhne and Foch disgusted me with soldiers, wearied me of their officious glory, making me critical of all their light. In any case, my interest had been abstract, concerned with the theory and philosophy of warfare especially from the metaphysical side." "Here was a pompous, professorial beginning. My wits, hostile to the abstract, took refuge in Arabia again. Translated into Arabic, the algebraic factor would first take practical account of the area we wished to deliver, and I began idly to calculate how many square miles: sixty: eighty: one hundred: perhaps one hundred and forty thousand square miles. And how would the Turks defend all that? No doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if we came like an army with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapour, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugati ng only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at. "
The Evolution of a Revolt, by Lawrence, in Army Quarterly and Defence Journal , Oct 1920 - with mention of Foch, Saxe, Moltke, Hannibal, Mohammed, and others .. [red highlight added by AWC] Tactically the only campaigns I had studied step by step were the ancient affairs of Hannibal and Belisarius, Mohammed and the Crusades! My interests were only in pure theory and I looked everywhere for the metaphysical side, the philosophy of war, about which I thought a little for some years. Now I was compelled suddenly to action, to find an immediate equation between my book-reading and our present movements. While we were training the regulars (of course not sending officer or light machine guns to Feisal in the hills meanwhile), the Turks suddenly put my appreciation to the test by beginning their advance on Mecca. They broke through my "impregnable" hills in twenty-four hours, and came forward from them towards Rabegh slowly. So they proved to us the second theorem of irregular war - namely, that irregular troops are as unable to defend a point or line as they are to attack it. My own personal duty was command, and I began to unravel command and analyse it, both from the point of view of strategy, the aim in war, the synoptic regard which sees everything by the standard of the whole, and from the point of view called tactics, the means towards the strategic end, the steps of its staircase. In each I found the same elements, one algebraical, one biological, a third psychological. The third factor in command seemed to be the psychological, that science (Xenophon called it diathetic) of which our propaganda is a stained and ignoble part. Some of it concerns the crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement of a changing opinion to a certain end. Some of it deals with individuals, and then it becomes a rare art of human kindness, transcending, by purposeful emotion, the gradual logical sequence of our minds. It considers the capacity for mood of our men, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation of what in them profits the intention. We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other officers arranged their bodies: and not only our own men's minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing-line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on. It was the ethical in war, and the process on which we mainly depended for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander . In Asia we were so weak physically that we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused. We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter. It was an irony of fate to entrust this side-show of a side-show, with its opportunity of proving or disproving the theory, to an outsider like myself, not qualified technically to make the best of it. I would have given so much to show that Saxe was the greatest master of his kind of war, but now all I can say is that we worked by his light for two years, and the work stood. This is a pragmatic argument that cannot be wholly derided. The experiment was a thrilling one, which took all our wits. We believed we would prove irregular war or rebellion to be an exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and if pursued along certain lines. We did not prove it, because the war stopped: but here the thesis is:- It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfil the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyse the enemy's organized communications, for irregular war is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not. In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, 1895-1970 from Westenhoff quotes book Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry , Captain, British Army. Military theorist and historian; advocate of combined arms warfare and the indirect approach; author of numerous books, including Paris, or the Future of War (1925) and Strategy (1954).
"A modern state is such a complex and interdependent fabric that it offers a target highly sensitive to a sudden and overwhelming blow from the air." "Air power is, above all, a psychological weapon--and only short-sighted soldiers, too battle-minded, underrate the importance of psychological factors in war." "Loss of hope, rather than loss of life, is the factor that really decides wars, battles, and even the smallest combats." "War and truth have a fundamental incompatibility." "While the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace." "True economy of force is using the indirect approach to effect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat." "To strike with strong effect, one must strike at weakness." "If the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding himself-and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and forces." "Originality is the most vital of all military virtues as two thousand years of history attest." "The principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word: concentration."
Clausewitz and the Indirect Approach… Misreading the Leader, by Davison, in Aerospace Power Journal , Winter 1988 - discusses Liddell Hart's attack on Clausewitz.
Mao's 1928 formula of 16 Chinese characters when the enemy advances, we retreat; when he camps, we harass him; if he tires, we attack; when he retreats, we pursue.
Guerrilla Warfare , by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, written in 1961 - posted at the Small Wars Center of Excellence.
Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare , by Ernesto Guevara, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1961.
Ryan, Henry Butterfield. The Fall of Che Guevara: a story of soldiers, spies, and diplomats . New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Mary-Alice Waters Edited volumes containing Ernesto Che Guevara's essays and field notes from the Cuban (1957-1959) and Bolivian (1967) campaigns The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara (1994) and Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War, 1956-58 (1996) Vo Nguyen Giap, 1911- Giap, Nguyen Vo. How We Won The War . Philadelphia: Recon Publications, 1995.
Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap . Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., , 1997.
[book review in Air Power Chronicles] from Chapter Eleven And he learned from Ho the need for perseverance. So also did Giap learn from Communist Party theorists, most importantly from Mao Tse-tung and Lenin. From Lenin, Giap came to understand that the goal toward which one strives is much more important than the means one uses to achieve it. Both followers and their welfare could be sacrificed without hesitation if by so doing one furthered the revolutionary struggle. Giap learned the value of the ideas of Karl von Clausewitz, who also insisted on the close relationship between politics and armed struggle. Giap also studied carefully the writings of Mao Tse-tung, then the foremost philosopher of people's wars. Mao believed that all of life was governed by uniform and unchanging laws. Although the similarity of Sun Tzu's doctrine to those developed by Giap is plain, when asked if he had been influenced by the aphorisms in The Art of War , Giap replied, "Sun Tzu has interesting ideas. I once studied him and found that he said that . if enemy forces are ten times larger, then we should not fight. If I had followed him we would still be in the jungle." In 1946, in a conversation with General Raoul Salan of France, Giap reportedly informed him, "My fighting gospel is T. E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom . I am never without it." . Lawrence noted . "Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force and 98 per cent passively sympathetic."
"Air power had a mighty vindication in World War II. But it was Mitchell's conception of it--anything that flies--rather than Douhet's that was vindicated." "Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, but rarely are they students of strategy and practically never of war." "Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument on which it relies will not be called to function at all." "In wars throughout history, events have generally proved the pre-hostilities calculations of both sides, victor as well as loser, to have been seriously wrong." "The bias toward the offensive creates special problems in any technologically new situation where there is little or no relevant war experience to help one reach a balanced judgment."
Strategy as an Art and a Science, by Bernard Brodie, in Feb 1959 Naval War College Review, discusses strategists from Clausewitz to RAND ( local copy ) John Boyd (1927-1997) and the OODA Loop How orientation works, by Chet Richards, 27 June 2008.
Boyd and Military Theory, includes Discourse on Winning and Losing, at Defense and the National Interest website Discourse on Winning and Losing - the complete Boyd briefings.
Boyd, Metcalfe and Amdahl - Modelling Networked Warfighting Systems, presentation by Kopp, Monash University - includes discussion of combining Metcalfe's Law, of exponential improvement in power, with the limiting effect of Amdahl's Law.
War in the Pits: Marine-Futures Traders Wargame ( local copy ), NDU Strategic Forum 61, by West Marine generals and colonels vs futures traders in decisionmaking wargame "The traders' OODA loop, executed at much higher speed, is ISAA: Information, Sort by Priority, Act, Assess" Virtual Stress ( local copy ), in Marines Online , senior Marines vs futures traders in decision making wargame.
Romjue, John L. "AirLand Battle: The Historical Background." Military Review , Mar 1986, pp. 52-55.
Galloway, Archie. "FM 100-5: Who Influenced Whom?" Military Review , Mar 1986, pp. 46-51 - discusses the combined influences of Clauswitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu on the 1982 manual.
Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5, by Kagan, in Parameters , Spring 1997 AirLand Battle doctrine, epitomized by FM 100-5/1986, was and still is a very good doctrine for industrial age warfare. Had subsequent editions of FM 100-5 retained it and improved on it, the US Army might now have a sound basis for reviewing its core operational doctrine. Unfortunately, AirLand Battle became one of the casualties of the end of the Cold War; FM 100-5/1993 eliminated it in favor of a generalized doctrine which is antithetical to the key elements of AirLand Battle. The Army's most forward-looking doctrinal piece, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, has subsequently consigned AirLand Battle to the dustbin of history along with other legacies of the industrial age.
Weinberger Doctrine, 1984 (as recounted in the above speech) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed — their size, composition and disposition — must be continually reassessed and readjusted if necessary. Fifth, before the U. S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. Finally, the commitment of U. S. forces to combat should be a last resort.
Force-Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions, by Record, in Aerospace Power Journal , Summer 2000 Force-protection fetishism is rooted in Vietnam—specifically in the resultant Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which is the intellectual construct of the strategic lessons that many military professionals drew from the war. Caspar Weinberger, President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, proposed six “tests” for using force, later amended by Gen Colin Powell’s emphasis on overwhelming force. These tests effectively deny the legitimacy of force as a tool of coercive diplomacy by restricting its use to circumstances involving clear and present threats to manifestly vital national interests.
Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine," Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1988.
The Enemy as a System, by Warden, for Airpower Journal - the Five-Ring Model We cannot think strategically if we start our thought process with individual aircraft, sorties, or weaponsor even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must focus on the totality of our enemy, then on our objectives, and next on what must happen to the enemy before our objectives become his objectives. When all of this is done rigorously, we can begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy -- the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means we will use. As strategists and operational artists, we must rid ourselves of the idea that the central feature of war is the clash of military forces. In strategic war, a clash may well take place, but it is not always necessary, should normally be avoided, and is almost always a means to an end and not an end in itself. If we are going to think strategically, we must think of the enemy as a system composed of numerous subsystems. Thinking of the enemy in terms of a system gives us a much better chance of forcing or inducing him to make our objectives his objectives and doing so with minimum effort and the maximum chance of success.
The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat , by Warden, published in hard copy by NDU Press Electronic copy courtesy of Air War College Nonresident Studies. The Air Campaign, viewable by chapter, faster loading, includes front material The Air Campaign, single file (300 Kb), useful for word/phrase searches.
The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack, by Conversino, in Parameters "Strategic bombing doesn't matter." With that, Dartmouth political scientist Robert Pape dismissed an entire airpower mission as essentially irrelevant to contemporary, non-nuclear warfare.[1] His book, Bombing to Win , a comprehensive examination of the employment of "strategic" airpower, is, however, undermined by his reliance on a flawed and outdated paradigm. Pape continues to view "strategic" in obsolescent terms that relate to the platform employed or the target attacked. He is hardly alone in holding this view.
With the above goals in mind, let us look at a conceptual framework (and air-centered "language") that anyone can use to analyze multiple theories of airpower. The framework is the creation of Dr. Robert Pape, who deliberately attempts to link military means with political ends. .
Question #1 : according to Dr. Robert Pape and Colonel Pat "Doc" Pentland, USAF, all theorists must answer a key question before they begin air operations. Pape's question asks the following : should I adopt a punishment strategy, which tries to push a society beyond its economic and psychological breaking point, a denial strategy , which tries to neutralize an opponent's military ability to wage war, or a decapitation strategy , which destroys or isolates an opponent's leadership, national communications, or other politico-economic centers? (Note that punishment and denial strategies try to translate military effects into political change. A decapitation strategy, in contrast, does the opposite.)
Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework, SAAS paper by Ehrhard This study analyzes and builds on Dr. Robert Pape’s framework for analyzing airpower strategies. The analysis shows the underlying value of his Targets and Timing, Mechanism, Outcomes construct as well as the considerable clarification and expansion it requires in order to perform comprehensive air strategy analysis for the broad range of strategic air and space tasks.
The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second Order Change?, SAAS paper by Sullivan from the abstract Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force. First, Robert Pape’s Denial Theory is based on the assumption that states make decisions as if they are rational, unitary actors attempting to maximize the utility of their choices. Essentially, nations perform a cost-benefit evaluation to determine the best course of action. Theoretically, one may be able to coerce a target nation by raising the expected costs to a prohibitive level, but Pape advocates that this is generally ineffective in conventional conflicts. Instead, coercion requires that the target nation be denied the probability of achieving the sought-after benefits. Denial Theory proposes that the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy denies him the probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.
Huba Wass de Czege & Positive Ends strategy Biographical Sketch (from SSI) HUBA WASS DE CZEGE is a retired U. S. Army brigadier general. During his career as an infantry officer, he served two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at all levels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational concept known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and first director of the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies where he also taught applied military strategy. After retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavily involved in the Army After Next Project and served on several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency v advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.
Towards a Strategy of Positive Ends ( local copy ), by Wass de Czege and Echevarria, SSI paper, 2001 Defense planners and strategists have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America’s role in what many see as a dramatically different international situation. Most of those proposals, though, continue with a Cold War paradigm of trying to foresee what the next threat might be and how the United States might best prepare itself to respond to it. Consequently, the possibility of taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment in order to create conditions that might promote positive ends-long-term peace, stability, and prosperity-has remained largely overlooked.
The team's findings have countered some assumptions of traditional economic theory--that people make rational choices based on their self-interest--by showing that people frequently fail to fully analyze situations where they must make complex judgments. Instead, people often make decisions using rules of thumb rather than rational analysis, and they base those decisions on factors economists traditionally don't consider, such as fairness, past events and aversion to loss.
For example, they found that people's decisions can be swayed by how the situation is framed. When Kahneman and Tversky asked people to hypothetically decide what procedure to take to cure a disease, most preferred a procedure that saved 80 percent of people to one that killed 20 percent.
War, Chaos, and Business, includes excerpts from John Boyd, Chet Richards, and others.
Complexity Theory ( local copy ), Appendix C of Newport Paper No. 13 - Sailing New Seas, by Reason and Freyman, Naval War College.
War in the Pits: Marine-Futures Traders Wargame ( local copy ), NDU Strategic Forum 61, by West Marine generals and colonels vs futures traders in decisionmaking wargame "The traders' OODA loop, executed at much higher speed, is ISAA: Information, Sort by Priority, Act, Assess" Virtual Stress ( local copy ), in Marines Online , senior Marines vs futures traders in decision making wargame.
More complexity theory resources at dotmil locations Jihadist Ideology Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework for Assessing al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement ( local copy ), by Shultz, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), May 2012 More than a decade after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda and a year after the death of Osama bin Laden, Dr. Richard Shultz offers an innovative analysis of that organization’s strategic culture. His analysis upends the conventional wisdom that only nation-states can have a strategic culture, an internal process through which issues of strategic significance and intent are discussed, debated, refined, and executed.
Combating Terrorism Center, West Point The Militant Ideology Atlas The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is pleased to announce the release of The Militant Ideology Atlas, an in-depth study of the Jihadi Movement's top thinkers and their most popular writings. This is the first systematic mapping of the ideology inspiring al-Qaeda. The CTC’s researchers spent one year mining the most popular books and articles in al-Qaeda’s online library, profiling hundreds of figures in the Jihadi Movement, and cataloging over 11,000 citations. The empirically supported findings of the project are surprising: The most influential Jihadi intellectuals are clerics from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, two of the US’s closest allies in the Middle East. Among them, the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has had the most impact on other Jihadi thinkers and has been the most consequential in shaping the worldview of the Jihadi Movement. In contrast, the study finds that Osama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have had little influence on other Jihadi theorists and strategists. Counterinsurgency & Irregular Warfare see also lessons learned page for extensive resource list.
see also nation building on International Studies page.
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, by Paul et al, a RAND report, 2010 "Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to “run in packs” and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (s uch as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U. S. engagement in and support for COIN operations. A companion volume, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, presents in-depth profiles of each of the insurgencies. "
Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, by Paul et al, a RAND report, 2010 "A collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, covering the period 1978 to 2008 and a bank of 76 factors and approaches that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case supplement an analysis of historical and contemporary insurgencies, providing valuable lessons for U. S. engagement in and support for COIN operations. The cases are also broken down by phase, allowing an analysis of the progress of the COIN force on its way to victory or defeat. Each case includes a scorecard to associate these factors with the overall case outcome. "
Irregular Warfare Is Warfare ( local copy ), by Coons and Harned, in Joint Force Quarterly , 1st Qtr 2009 DOD needs to implement the options identified in the Joint Staff assessment of GPF IW capabilities and capacity. The general purpose forces need a new COIN and CT paradigm; the current paradigm of U. S.-based joint expeditionary forces organized into JTFs is inappropriate for steady-state IW requirements. DOD should embrace a return to the Cold War paradigm of large numbers of empowered MILGRPs operating under the direction of U. S. Chiefs of Mission and collaborating regionally to defeat transnational adversaries.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work? ( local copy ), by Malkasian and Meyerle, a Letort Paper, SSI, Mar 2009 Field research over two months in 2007 and two months in 2008 with four different PRTs—Khost, Kunar, Ghazni, and Nuristan—plus interviews with the leadership of 10 others, suggests that PRTs do make a difference. They strengthen governance and contribute to security. Civilian development agencies—USAID, NGOs, the United Nations (UN), the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program — cannot do the same job as the PRTs. Each plays a role in reconstruction, but none match the PRTs’ capacity to complete projects in contested areas.
New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict ( local copy ), by Kilcullen, in State Department eJournal , May 2007 Five Practical Steps Develop a new lexicon Get the grand strategy right Remedy the imbalance in government capability Identify the new "strategic services" Develop a capacity for strategic information warfare Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency ( local copy ), by Kilcullen, in Military Review , May-June 2006 -- many apply to higher levels as well.
Know your turf. Diagnose the problem. Organize for intelligence. Organize for interagency operations. Travel light and harden your combat service support (CSS). Find a political/cultural adviser. Train the squad leaders—then trust them. Rank is nothing; talent is everything. Have a game plan.
Be there. Avoid knee-jerk responses to first impressions. Prepare for handover from day one. Build trusted networks. Start easy. Seek early victories. Practice deterrent patrol­ling. Be prepared for setbacks. Remember the global audi­ence. Engage the women, beware of the children. Take stock regularly.
Exploit a “single narra­tive.” Local forces should mirror the enemy, not the Americans. Practice armed civil affairs. Small is beautiful. Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces. Build your own solution—only attack the enemy when he gets in the way.
Keep your extraction plan secret.
Whatever else you do, keep the initiative.
Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare ( local copy ), from USMC and USSOCOM The Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare broadly describes how future US military forces will conduct irregular warfare in support of unified action on a regional or global scale against both state and non-state adversaries. It is meant as a guide for enhancing and improving US military irregular warfare capabilities and capacities. It also is meant as a guide toward closer integration of US military and US civilian agencies in meeting the varied challenges of irregular warfare. Finally, it will provide the basis for experimentation intended to influence subsequent concepts and capabilities development. This concept seeks to fulfill its purpose by accomplishing three objectives: (1) Describe the nature of irregular warfare, its emergence as the "warfare of choice" by our adversaries, and the strategic and operational opportunities and challenges of irregular warfare,
(2) describe the importance of a comprehensive US Government approach to irregular warfare, and.
(3) describe the unique considerations required of commanders in planning, conducting, and responding to irregular warfare.
Future of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the war on terror ( local copy ), testimony by Max Boot, before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, 29 June 2006.
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges ( local copy ), by Hoffman, in Joint Force Quarterly , 1st Qtr 2009 DOD needs to implement the options identified in the Joint Staff assessment of GPF IW capabilities and capacity. The general purpose forces need a new COIN and CT paradigm; the current paradigm of U. S.-based joint expeditionary forces organized into JTFs is inappropriate for steady-state IW requirements. DOD should embrace a return to the Cold War paradigm of large numbers of empowered MILGRPs operating under the direction of U. S. Chiefs of Mission and collaborating regionally to defeat transnational adversaries. Conflict in the 21 st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Hoffman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Dec 2007 "How marines are preparing for hybrid wars,". by Hoffman, in Armed Forces Journal , March 2006.
Hybrid Wars ( local copy ), by McCuen, Military Review , Mar-Apr 2008 The critical point is that to win hybrid wars, we have to succeed on three decisive battlegrounds: the conventional battleground; the conflict zone's indigenous population battleground; and the home front and international community battleground.
'Decisive Force' Now Measured By Speed, by Scarborough, in The Washington Times , 7 May 2003 - posted by Office of Force Transformation.
National Culture and Warfare - Whither Decisive Force ( local copy ), Joint Force Quarterly Autumn 1996 review essay by Andre, referencing Decisive Force: the New American Way of War by Hoffman.
Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder. These parts of the world I call the Functioning Core, or Core. But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and-most important-the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap.
Globalization’s “ozone hole” may have been out of sight and out of mind prior to September 11, 2001, but it has been hard to miss ever since. And measuring the reach of globalization is not an academic exercise to an eighteen-year-old marine sinking tent poles on its far side. So where do we schedule the U. S. military’s next round of away games? The pattern that has emerged since the end of the cold war suggests a simple answer: in the Gap.
Thomas Barnett draws a new map for peace - a TED talk (you may need to watch it on YouTube if TED videos are blocked) "In this bracingly honest talk, international security strategist Thomas Barnett outlines a post-Cold War solution for the foundering U. S. military that is both sensible and breathtaking in its simplicity: Break it in two."
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Annual Reports.
U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) Annual Report to Congress.
Sawyer The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China , by Sawyer, pub. by Basic Books, Jan 2007 "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections," by Sawyer, in Journal of Military and Strategic Studies , Winter 2006/07, Vol. 9, Issue 2. Chinese Warfare: the Paradox of the Unlearned Lesson, by Sawyer, in American Diplomacy.
The Science of Military Strategy , English edition, published by Military Science Publishing House, 2005 "The book contains the major Chinese military theories, including the basics of strategic science and laws of modern warfare and strategy, featuring the new experience and guidelines of the PLA combat since 1990s, as well as issues on future warfare.
The book's Chinese version was first published in 2001. It took more than 20 military translators two years to finish the English version, the sources said. " - Xinhua News Agency, 10 Oct 2005.
Unrestricted Warfare , by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999 FBIS Editor's Note: The following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare," a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics for developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military inferiority vis-а-vis the United States during a high-tech war. "In terms of beyond-limits warfare, there is no longer any distinction between what is or is not the battlefield. Spaces in nature including the ground, the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but social spaces such as the military, politics, economics, culture, and the psyche are also battlefields. And the technological space linking these two great spaces is even more so the battlefield over which all antagonists spare no effort in contending. [3] Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military, or it can be non-military. It can use violence, or it can be nonviolent. It can be a confrontation between professional soldiers, or one between newly emerging forces consisting primarily of ordinary people or experts. These characteristics of beyond-limits war are the watershed between it and traditional warfare, as well as the starting line for new types of warfare." [3] The battlefield of beyond-limits war differs from those of the past in that it encompasses all natural spaces, such as the social realm, and the continually developing sphere of technology where space is now measured in nanometers. Today, these spaces are interlocked with each other. For example, outer space can be seen as a natural space, and also as a technological space, because each step in the militarization of outer space requires a technological breakthrough. In the same way, the interdynamics between society and technology are to be seen constantly. There is no more typical example of this than the effect of information technology on society. From these things we can see that the battlefield is ubiquitous, and we can only look upon it with "omnidirectionality."
Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China ( local copy ), by Lieutenant General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science, The Chinese People's Liberation Army, Aug 1997.
see also psychology of terror at Center for Terrorism Studies - includes psychology of terrorists, victims, and society.
Milgram Obedience Experiment, aka Milgram Experiment, examined how far folks would go in obeying orders that may have conflicted with their consciences.
Stanford Prison Experiment, classic examination of the psychology of imprisonment - for both prisoners and guards.
The Tipping Point: How military occupations go sour, by Swidey, in Boston Globe , 27 Apr 2003 A tipping point is a concept drawn from epidemiology, where it describes the moment at which an infectious disease becomes a public health crisis. The idea is that small changes will have little or no effect on a system until a critical mass is reached. Then just one additional small change ''tips'' the system, producing dramatic consequences. The concept has been applied to human behavior to describe everything from the breakout of bestsellers to the spread of buzzwords. ''A tipping point is a reflection of a set of structural conditions that allow any match that's lit to set off a grass fire,'' says Lustick. A pigeon-hunting fracas between a few British soldiers and some peasants midwifed the Egyptian independence movement. A traffic accident between Israeli soldiers and a couple of Palestinians sparked the first Intifada. In both cases, the occupier was caught off-guard. Being alert to the underlying conditions requires solid, on-the-ground information about how people are feeling, and an awareness of the cultural codes and networks connecting various parts of society. That's hard to come by for an occupying power.
see also research and theory page on Behavioral Influences Analysis site.
see also research and theory page on Socio-Cultural and Language Resources site.
see also game theory on Thinking Skills page.
Military Theory and Information Warfare, by Henry and Peartree, in Parameters , Autumn 1998 - includes comparison of theories from Sun Tzu through Arquilla, Stein, and Libicki.
General Robert E. Lee and Modern Decision Theory, by Gilster, in AU Review , Mar-Apr 1972, including discussion of battle of Chancellorsville, and brief discussion of Lanchester Equations Bayes’ Theorem Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theorem.
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.
Every time a major power, even for the noblest of reasons, considers intervention, that power must confront the politico-military equivalent of Werner K. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: to inject yourself into the situation is to change the situation and, at least temporarily, will probably mean some liberal idealistic principles taking the proverbial back seat to realpolitik.
--- from Lost in the Snow: the US Intervention in Siberia during the Russian Civil War , by Stamp, CSI, Leavenworth.
No matter how well designed and statistically reliable our study may be, the fact that we are doing a study influences the data we collect. . Heisenberg, an atomic physicist, posited we cannot measure anything without altering it or its environment and we cannot know the extent of our disruptions with certainty. Whenever we measure, we must consider the effect that the act of collecting data has on the data itself.
Metcalfe's Law: "The power of a networked system grows exponentially with the number of devices in the network." - from Evolution or Revolution: Tracing Outsourcing's Controversial Path, by Hamblen, in Chips , Jan 1998.
Moore's Law . Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors per square inch on a chip, a measure of computing power, doubles every year—now actually every 18 months.
Parkinson's Law - after Cyril Northcote Parkinson (1909-1993), British historian Any of several satirical observations propounded as economic laws, especially “Work expands to fill the time available for its completion.” [from The American Heritage® Dictionary]
Peter Principle - after Laurence Johnston Peter (1919-1990) The theory that employees within an organization will advance to their highest level of competence and then be promoted to and remain at a level at which they are incompetent. [from The American Heritage® Dictionary]
--- Sir John Woodward.
In Praise of Attrition, by Peters, in Parameters , Summer 2004 There is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood.
Virtuous Destruction, Decisive Speed ( local copy ), by Peters, May 2004, for National Intelligence Council NIC2020 project The next two decades will challenge us with technologies we cannot anticipate, with implacable, anti-Western enemies we cannot dissuade and with no shortage of regional crises we cannot discourage. Yet, the greatest military obstacles facing the United States are, and likely will remain, of our own making: Misconceptions about the nature and demands of warfare as morally obtuse as they are intellectually lazy. The lessons of recent wars, which we willfully misread, are many. Among them are that there is no substitute for shedding the enemy’s blood in adequate quantities; that an enemy must be convinced practically and graphically that he is defeated; and that speed of resolution in tactical encounters has emerged as a crucial determinant in strategic success. We have entered a new age of attrition warfare which we refuse to recognize. Attrition is the essence of warfare, not something to be avoided—and no rule says that attrition must be fairly distributed.
Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement ( local copy ), by Reimer, in Joint Force Quarterly , Winter 1996-1997 Many believe that precision strike weapons can win all future wars. Yet history has shown that the human dimension of warfare cannot be countered by technology alone. War is essentially an expression of hostile attitudes. Technology cannot overcome the greed, fear, hate, revenge, or other emotions that cause wars.

Aligning with new digital strategy: A dynamic capabilities approach.
Destaques.
Digital strategy’s dynamic and complex nature requires us to focus on the process of aligning.
Our study explicates a set of organizational actions that enables aligning.
Tensions that emerge during the aligning process shape and are shaped by the aligning actions.
Organizations embrace digital strategy by adapting to the tensions between strategy and resources.
Digital department – a fusion of business and IT – is critical in aligning digital strategy.
Prior IS research has not fully addressed the aligning process in the highly dynamic context of digital strategy. To address this gap, we conduct a longitudinal analysis of a B2B company's journey to enact its B2C digital strategy, using the dynamic capabilities approach. We found that as an organization shifts towards a digital strategy, misalignments between the emergent strategy and resources give rise to tension. Our study resulted in the development of an aligning process model that is comprised of three phases (exploratory, building, and extending) and generalizable organizational aligning actions that form the organization's sensing, seizing, and transforming capacities. These aligning actions iteratively reconfigured organizational resources and refined strategy in order to respond to both changes in the environment and internal tensions. We also recognized that there are challenges to alignment, and conceptualized them as paradoxical tensions. This provided insights as to how such tensions are triggered and how they can be addressed. Finally, by applying the dynamic capabilities approach to aligning, we also show that alignment is not separate from such capabilities, but that aligning is enacted through the sensing, seizing and transforming capacities and their attendant aligning actions.
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Strategy university vol 1 the central approach

Addresses: School of Mechanical Engineering, Iran University of Science & Technology, Narmak, Tehran, Iran.
Zip Code: 16846-13114.
Mail Box: 16765-163.
Tel : +98(21) 77491228-29.
Fax : +98(21) 77240488.
Date of Birth: August 6, 1960.
Address: School of Mechanical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, 16846-13114, Iran.
· Ph. D., Mechanical Engineering Department, McGill University, (1995).
· M. Eng., Mechanical Engineering Department, McGill University (Jan. 1991).
· B. Sc., School of Mechanical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, (1984).
· Professor, Iran University of Science and Technology, (2006-now).
· Associate Professor, Iran University of Science and Technology, (2002-2006).
· Assistant Professor, Iran University of Science and Technology, (1996-2002).
· Member of Professors Promotion Committee of Iran University of Science and Technology, (2014-now).
· Member of Professors Recruitment Committee of Iran University of Science and Technology, (2004-now).
· Member of Trustee Council of Technology Studies Research Center, (2013-now).
· President of Iran Scientific Composites Association, (2012-now)
· Member of Coordination Commission of Science, Research and Technology Council, (2010-now).
· Director of Composite Materials and Technology Center, (2009-now)
· Chairman of Mechanical Engineering Department, (2006–2008)
· Member of Professors Promotion Committee of Iran University of Science and Technology, (2004-2009).
· Member of Professors Promotion Committee of Semnan University, (2007-2009).
· President of Iran Industrial Composites Association, (2004-2009)
· Chairman of Iran Composites Institute, (1999-now).
· Research Deputy of Mechanical Engineering Dept., Iran University of Science and Technology, (1999-2001).
· Scientific Consultant of Presidency Technology Cooperation Office, (1996-Now).
· Scientific Consultant of Fajr Aviation and Composite Materials Center, (1996-2002).
· R & D Manager, Sap Institute, (1997–2004).
· Member of Editorial Board of Basparesh Magazine (2012–now).
· Member of Editorial Board of International Journal of Composite Materials, (2012-now)
· Member of Editorial Board of Journal of Mechanical Research and Application Azad University, (2008–now)
· Member of Editorial Board of Modares Technical and Engineering Journal, (2007–now)
· Member of Editorial Board of Journal of High Energy Materials, (2006–now)
· Chief Editor of Composites Bulletin, Iran Composites Institute, (2001-now).
· Editor of Journal of Iranian Mechanical Engineering, (1998-2000).
· Distinguished Professor of School of Mechanical Engineering (first rank of non-industrial research), Iran University of Science and Technology, 2014.
· Distinguished Professor of the University (second rank of non-industrial research), Iran University of Science and Technology, 2014.
· Distinguished Professor of the University (second rank of high cited author), Iran University of Science and Technology, 2014.
· Distinguished Professor of the University, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2013.
· Distinguished Professor of the School of Mechanical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2013.
· Distinguished Professor of the University, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2012.
· Distinguished Professor of the University, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2010.
· Supervision of the Best Bachelor Thesis of the year 2010, Iranian Society of Mechanical Engineers.
· Distinguished Professor of the University, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2009.
· Supervision of the Best Bachelor Thesis of the year 2008, Iranian Society of Mechanical Engineers.
· Distinguished Professor of the Country, Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007.
· Distinguished Professor of the University, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2007.
· Khawrazmi International Festival Award (the most prestigious scientific award in Iran,), 2007.
· Best Reviewer of the Iranian Aerospace conference, Iran, 2006.
· TICME2005, Best Paper Prize, Tehran International Congress on Manufacturing Engineering, 2005.
· Supervision of the Best Bachelor Thesis of the year 2005, Iranian Society of Mechanical Engineers.
· Best Research Project, National Iranian Gas Company, 2004.
· Scientific Development Award, Khatam Festival, Iran University of Science and Technology, (2004).
· Best Research Project, Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Co (Panha Co), 2003.
· Supervision of the Best Master’s Thesis of the year 2002, Iranian Society of Mechanical Engineers.
· Supervision of the Best Master’s Thesis of the year 2002, Khawrazmi Festival.
· Distinguished paper of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Conference, 2001.
· Distinctive Researcher, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, 2000.
· Selected Professor, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, 1999.
· Selected Professor, Iran University of Science and Technology, 1998.
· Post Doctorate, National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada, 1995-1996.
· Chair of the Fourth International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication and Application, 2014.
· Scientific Chair, 1 st Conference on Oil and Gas Storage Tanks, 2013.
· Chair of the International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics and Dynamics (X-Mech 2014)
· Chair of the Third International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication and Application, 2012.
· Chair of the International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics and Dynamics (X-Mech 2012)
· Chair of the Second International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication and Application, 2010.
· Chair of the First International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication and Application, 2008.
· The Third International Conference: Characterization, Fabrications and Application, Tehran, Iran, 2012.
· The International Conference in Experimental Solid Mechanics and Dynamics, 2012.
· The First International Symposium in Commercialization and Export of High Technology Products, 2010.
· The Second International Conference: Characterization, Fabrications and Application, Kish Island, Iran, 2010.
· The First International Conference: Characterization, Fabrications and Application, Kish Island, Iran, 2009.
· International Conference on Composite Material Nano Structure, IC2MS08, Malaysia, 2008.
· First International Conference in Zeolite, Amirkabir University, Iran, 2008 .
· The 7 th Conference of Iranian Aerospace Society, Sharif University , Iran, 2008.
· 1st CNG Composite Cylinder Symposium, Iran, May 26, 2007.
· International Conference on Composite Materials and Nano-Structures (IC2MS-06), Malaysia, 2006.
· Tehran International Congress on Manufacturing Engineering (TICME2005), December 12-15, 2005, Tehran, Iran .
· Sixth Scientific and Student Conference on Materials and Metallurgy in Iran, 2004.
• Establishment and Membership of Associations.
· Founder of Iran Composites Scientific Association, 2010.
· Founder of Iran Composites Industrial Association, 2003.
· President of Iran Composites Association, from 2004 to 2009.
· Founder of Iran Inventors Association, 2002.
· Founder of Iran Association Management of Technology, 2004.
· Member of Composite Fabricator Association, (CFA), from 2004.
· Member of International Institute for FRP in Construction, (IIFC), From 2004.
· Design and manufacturing of a displacement control fatigue tester, 2013, Iran.
· Anticorrosion composites using nanoparticles, 2012, Iran.
· Nano graphene/vinyl ester anticorrosion nanocomposites, 2012, Iran.
· Electrically conductive polymeric composite material, United States Patent, US 8,105,505 B2, USA, 2012.
· Automatic measurement of crack length and cark opening displacement of laminated composites using image processing method, 2011, Iran.
· Repair of a perforated metallic pipe using polymer composites, 2011, Iran .
· Measurement of residual stresses in polymeric composites using slitting method, 2011, Iran.
· Design and manufacturing of glass fiber production system using indirect melting method, 2011, Iran.
· Manufacturing of a system for measuring of the length and the location of delamination crack front of laminated composites, 2011, Iran.
· Full-scale and full-stochastic multi-scale process to predict elastic properties of CNT/Polymer Composites, 2011, Iran.
· Polymer concrete composite water distillation slab, 2010, Iran.
· Repair and reinforcement of Corroded metallic pipes under internal pressure using composite materials, 2010, Iran.
· Design and manufacturing of an electrically conductive and chemically resistant polymer composite, 2008, Iran.
· Replacement of the lead grid in lead-acid battery with carbon/vinyl ester resin, 2008, Iran.
· A fixture for determining the mechanical property degradation of polymer composites in bending loading condition under stress corrosion, 2008, Iran.
· Design and manufacturing of a fixture for measurement of specific surface and volume resistance, 2008, Iran.
· Manufacturing of a light polymer concrete with glass fibers and sand, 2006, Iran.
· Weaving of Fiberglass woven fabric, 2005, Iran.
· Internal reinforcement of concrete with waste of polymer composites, 2004, Iran.
· Design and manufacturing of an impact tester, 2004, Iran.
· Reinforcement of aluminum plates with composite materials, 2003, Iran.
· Design and manufacturing of composite flat spring, 2002, Iran.
· Measurement of residual stresses in composite materials, 2002, Iran.
· Reinforcement of concrete using composite materials, 2001, Iran.
· Strategy development of composite materials technology in Iran, Iranian Science and Technology Deputy of Presidency, 2010.
· Strategy development of composite materials technology in Iran, Iranian Ministry of Industries and Mining, 2005.
· Strategy development of investment on polymer composite materials in Iran, Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran, 2005.
• Some of the Research and Industrial Projects.
· Reinforcement of desalter tank using composite materials, National Iranian South Oilfields Company, 2014.
· Reinforcement of concrete structures of water distillation plant of Bandar Abbas, 2013.
· Reinforcement of the Corroded acid transportation pipes, Zobe Ahan Esfahan Co., 2012.
· Design and Manufacturing of the Composite Dome for the School of Computer Engineering of Iran University of Science and Technology, 2012.
· Reinforcement of Damaged Concrete, Zobe Ahan Esfahan Co., 2012.
· Design and Manufacturing of Water Distillation Slab using Polymer Concrete, Zobe Ahan Esfahan Co., 2012.
· Design and Manufacturing of Water Distillation Slab using Polymer Concrete, Jalalieh Water Organization Co., 2010.
· Reinforcement of Oil Tanks, Siri Island, NIOC, 2010.
· Reinforcement of Corroded Pipes, Abadan Oil Refinery Plant, 2009.
· Design and Manufacturing of a Fire Distinguisher for a helicopter, Havanirooz, 2009.
· Design and Manufacturing of Fiberglass Pilot plant, Ministry of Industry, 2008.
· Design and Manufacturing of a Melting Guide using Composite Materials, Kani Mes Co., 2007.
· Design of a Composite Boat, Jolaee Co., 2007.
· Reinforcement of Concrete Structure of Abadan Oil Refinery Plant, 2006.
· Design and manufacturing of the floating system for a helicopter, Havanirooz, 2006.
· Design and manufacturing of the structure of a helicopter simulator with composite material, Havanirooz, 2006.
· Reinforcement of two Concrete Rail Road Bridges with Composite Materials, 2006.
· Design and manufacturing of a composite shell under external pressure, Satari Co., 2005.
· Design and manufacturing of composite pressure vessel, Eslami Co., 2005.
· Reinforcement of the heritage buildings, Iranian Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, 2005.
· Design and manufacturing of Composite belts of fiber optic manufacturing machine, Ghandi Co., 2004.
· Reinforcement of corroded gas pipes, National Iranian Gas Co., 2003.
· Reinforcement of the engine hood of Toyota car with composites, Fath Automaker Co., 2002.
· Reinforcement of the engine hood of Land Rover car with composites, Moratab Car Manufacturer Co., 2002.
· Design and manufacturing of the canopy of a helicopter, Havanirooz, 2002.
· Design and manufacturing of an electrical switch box, Tavanir Co., 2002.
· Technology transfer of composite wind turbine blade from Vestas Co. to Sadid Sabaniroo, 2002.
· Design and manufacturing of wind shield of a helicopter, 2001.
· Residual stresses in composite materials, Fajr Aviation and Composites Industry, 2001.
· Design and manufacturing of a drop weight impact tester, National Research Projects, 2001.
· Design and manufacturing of a composite helicopter Radom, Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Co. (Panha Co.), 2000.
· Establishment of a design and standardization office, Sap Co., 1999.
· Design of a composite pressure vessel, Karimi Co., 1999.
· Sensitivity analysis of composite materials, Karimi Co., 1999.
· Theory of Elasticity, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, (2005 - Now)
· Engineering Mechanics, Statics, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, (1998 - Now)
· Introduction to Mechanics of Composite Materials, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, (1996-Now)
· Design of Aircraft Structures, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, (1996-Now)
· Mechanics of Materials, Mechanical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, (1996-Now)
· Finite Element Analysis, Saba Research Center, Tehran, Iran, (1986-1990).
· Bachelor of Engineering: 70 Theses.
· Masters of Engineering: 79 Theses.
· Mechanics of Composite Materials.
· Mechanics of Nano-Composites.
· Stress and Failure Analysis of Composite Materials.
· Fatigue Analysis of Composite Materials.
· Experimental Methods in Composite Materials.
· Finite Element Analysis.
· Rafiee, R. , Shokrieh, M. M., “Prediction of Mechanical Properties of CNT Based Composites Using Multi - Scale Modeling and Stochastic Analysis,” (2014) Springer Series in Materials Science.
· Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Residual Stresses in Composites Materials,” Woodhead Publisher, 2013.
· Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Fathollah Taheri B ., Fatigue Life Prediction of Composites and Composites Structures, Chapter 8, Fatigue Life Prediction of Composite Materials based on Progressive Damage Modeling," Woodhead Publisher, 2010.
· Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Roham Rafiee, Fatigue Life Prediction of Composites and Composites Structures, Chapter 14, Fatigue Life Prediction of Wind Turbine Rotor Blades manufactured from Composites," Woodhead Publisher, 2010.
· Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Larry B. Lessard , Fatigue under Multiaxial Stress Systems, Chapter 3, Fatigue in Composites, Woodhead Publisher, 2004.
1. M. M. Shokrieh, S. Rezvani, R. Mosalmani, Manufacturing and Characterization of a Polymer Concrete and Estimation of Compressive Strength Using a Two-Phase Micromechanical Model, Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology , in Persian, Accepted, 2015.
2. Mohammad Mehdi Elhamian, Hossein Karami, Mansour Alizadeh, Mahmood Mehrdad Shokrieh, and Alireza Karimi, “ Model for analyzing the mechanical behavior of articular cartilage under creep indentation test, Journal of Applied Physics, 116 , 184702 (2014).
3. Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Elhamian, Alireza Karimia, Mansour Alizadeh, Mahmood Mehrdad Shokrieh "An innovative Three-Dimensional Biphasic Laminated Composite Model for Articular Cartilage Tissue" Journal of Thermoplastic Composite Materials, accepted, 2014.
4. Lesani, M., Bahaari, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “ FRP wrapping for the rehabilitation of circular hollow section (CHS) tubular steel connections Thin-Walled Structures,” Journal of thin walled structures, accepted, 2014.
5. Seyed Mohammad Mehdi Elhamian, Mansour Alizadeh, Mahmood Mehrdad Shokrieh, and Alireza Karimi, “A depth dependent transversely isotropic micromechanics model of articular cartilage”, Journal of Materials Science: Materials in Medicine, accepted, 2014.
6. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Reza Mosalmani, Ali Reza Shamaei, “ A combined micromechanical-numerical model to simulate shear behavior of carbon nanofiber/epoxy nanocomposites,” Material and Design, Volume 67, 15 February 2015, Pages 531–537.
7. M. M. Shokrieh, I. Zibaei, “Application of Strain Gradient Elasticity in Analysis of Elastic Properties of Single Walled Carbon Nanotubes,” Amirkabir Journal of Science and Technology, (in Persian), Accepted, 2014.
8. Shokrieh M. M., Esmkhani M. and Haqiqatkhah A. R. , " Mechanical Properties of Graphene Nanoplatelet/Epoxy Nanocomposites under Static and Flexural Fatigue Loadings,” Journal of Mechanics of Advanced Composite Structures, Accepted, 2014.
9. Shokrieh M. M., Esmkhani M., “Experimental investigation on fatigue behavior of epoxy resin under load and displacement controls,” Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology , in Persian, Accepted, 2014.
10. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Mahmoudi and H. R. Shadkam, “Hybrid polyvinyl alcohol and cellulose fiber pulp instead of asbestos fibers in cement based composites, a laboratory investigation,” Mechanics of Composite Materials, Accepted, 2014.
11. S. M. M. Elhamian, M. Alizadeh, M. M . Shokrieh, A. Karimi, S. P. Madani "The effect of collagen fibers volume fraction on the mechanical properties of articular cartilage by micromechanics models,” Perfusion, Accepted, 2014.
12. M. M. Shokrieh, V. A. Joneidi, " Characterization and simulation of impact behavior of graphene/polypropylene nanocomposites using a novel strain-rate dependent micromechanics model," Journal of Composite Materials, Accepted, 2014.
13. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Daneshvar, “Reduction in deformation of unsymmetrical cross-ply laminated composite using carbon nanofibers,” Sharif Journal of Science and Technology , in Persian, Accepted, 2014.
14. M. M. Shokrieh, H. Jarrah, M. Heidari-Rarani, “ Effect of stacking sequence on mode II strain energy release rate of composite ENF specimens,” Journal of Computational Methods in Engineering, In Persian, Accepted, 2014.
15. M. M. Shokrieh, Z. Daneshjoo, M. Fakoor, “Simulation of initiation and propagation of mode I delamination in laminated composites considering fracture process zone effects,” Sharif Journal of Science and Technology , in Persian, Accepted, 2014.
16. H. Ahmadi, G. H. Liaghat, M. M. Shokrieh, H. Hadavinia, A. Ordys, A. Aboutorabi “Quasi-static and Dynamic Compressive Properties of Ceramic Microballoon filled Syntactic Foam,” Journal of Composite Materials, Accepted, 2014.
17. S hokrieh, M. M., and Mosalmani R., and Majid Jamal Omidi “ Strain rate dependent micromechanical modeling of reinforced polymers with carbon nanotubes,” Journal of Composite Materials, Accepted, 2014.
18. F. Vahedi, H. R. Shahverdi, M. M. Shokrieh and M. Esmkhani, “ Effects of Carbon Nanotubes on Mechanical and Electrical Properties of Epoxy Resin,” New Carbon Materials, Accepted, 2014.
19. M. M. Shokrieh, Z. Shokrieh, M. Davarpanah, “Design, Analysis, Manufacturing and Testing of Composite Folded Plates,” Journal of Modeling in Engineering, Semnan University, In Persian, Accepted, 2014.
20. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Afshin Zeinedini, “Modeling of delamination fracture toughness of I and II mixed mode of a laminated composite asymmetric double cantilever beam,” Journal of Modeling in Engineering, Semnan University, In Persian, 2014.
21. Shokrieh M. M., Esmkhani M. and Taheri-Behrooz F. "A Novel Model to Predict the Fatigue Life of Thermoplastic Nanocomposites", Journal of Thermoplastic Composites, Accepted, 2013.
22. M. M. Shokrieh, V. A. Joneidi, R. Mosalmani , “Characterization and simulation of tensile behavior of graphene/polypropylene nanocomposites using a novel strain-rate dependent micromechanics model,” Journal of Thermoplastic Composites, Accepted, 2013.
23. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Reza Mosalmani, Ali Reza Shamaei, “ A combined micromechanical-numerical model to simulate shear behavior of carbon nanofiber/epoxy nanocomposites,” Material and Design, Volume 67, 15 February 2015, Pages 531–537.
24. M. M. Shokrieh, R. Madoliat, B. Bostani, A. Ghasemi Ghalebahmani, V. Mahmoodian, “A new inverse method for determination of unidirectional ply mechanical properties of a laminated composite,” In Persian, Modares Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 352-360, 2015.
25. S hokrieh, M. M., and Mosalmani R., and Majid Jamal Omidi , “A strain-rate dependent micromechanical constitutive model for glass/epoxy composites,” Composite Structures, 121 (2015) 37–45.
26. Taheri-Behrooz F., Memar Maher B. and Shokrieh M. M., “Mechanical properties modification of a thin film phenolic resin filled with nano silica particles,” Computational Material Science, Volume 96, Part B, January 2015, Pages 411–415.
27. M. Alizadeh, S. M. M. Elhamian, M. M. Shokrieh, “ A transversely isotropic micromechanics model to determine the effect of collagen fibers angle in the mechanical properties of articular cartilage,” Materials Technology: Advanced Performance Materials, Volume 29, Issue 6, pp. 377-383, November 2014.
28. M. Alizadeh, S. M. M. Elhamian, M. M. Shokrieh, "An Innovative Random Oriented Laminated Composite Model for Articular Cartilage Tissue", Journal of Biomaterials and Tissue Engineering, Volume 4, Number 8, pp. 645-650(6), August 2014.
29. Heidari-Rarani M, Aliha M. R.M., Shokrieh M. M., Ayatollahi M. R., “Mechanical durability of an optimized polymer concrete under various thermal cyclic loadings - An experimental study,” Construction & Building Materials, Volume 64, pp. 308–315, 14 August 2014.
30. H. Ahmadi, GH. Liaghat, M. M. Shokrieh, A. Aboutorabi, H. Havavinia, A. Ordys, “Compressive Properties of Nanoclay Reinforced Syntactic Foams at Quasi-Static and High Strain Rate Loading,” Polymer-Plastics Technology and Engineering, 53: 990–999, 2014.
31. M. M. Shokrieh, S. M. Ghoreishi, M. Esmkhani and Z. Zhao, "Effects of graphene nanoplatelets and graphene nanosheets on fracture toughness of epoxy nanocomposites", Fatigue & Fracture of Engineering Materials & Structures, Volume 37, Issue 10, pages 1116-1123, October 2014.
32. H. Ahmadi, Gh. Liaghat, M. M. Shokrieh, “Volume fraction and microballoon size effects on the compressive properties of epoxy/ceramic microballoon syntactic foam,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 37-44, in Persian, 2014.
33. H. Ahmadi, Gh. Liaghat, M. M. Shokrieh, “Experimental investigation of fabrication parameters` effects on the mechanical properties of epoxy/ceramic microballoon syntactic foams,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 47-54, in Persian, 2014.
34. M. M. Shokrieh, S. Soveiti, R. Mosalmani, “An investigation on effects of aspect ratio of representative volume element on elastic modulus of a carbon nanotubes reinforced polymer,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 14, No. 9, pp. 107-116, 2014.
35. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani, F. Taheri-Behrooz and A. R. Haqiqatkhah , "Displacement Controlled Flexural Bending Fatigue Behavior of Graphene/Epoxy Nanocomposites" Journal of Composite Materials, 2014, Vol. 48(24) 2935–2944.
36. M. M. Shokrieh, Z. Shokrieh, S. M. Hashemianzadeh, “A novel combined molecular dynamics-micromechanics method for modeling of stiffness of graphene/epoxy nanocomposites with randomly distributed graphene, Materials and Design, Volume 64, December 2014, Pages 96–101.
37. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Afshin Zeinedini, “A Novel Method for Calculation of Strain Energy Release Rate of Asymmetric Double Cantilever Laminated Composite Beams,” Applied Composite Materials, (2014) 21:399–415.
38. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani, Z. Shokrieh and Z. Zhao, “Stiffness prediction of graphene nanoplatelet/epoxy nanocomposites by a combined molecular dynamics-micromechanics method,” Computational Material Science, Volume 92, September 2014, Pages 444–450.
39. Shokrieh M. M., Karamnejad A. “ Strain Rate Effects on Dynamic Response of Glass/Epoxy Composite Plate under Blast Loading Using Finite Difference Method,” Mechanics of Composite Materials, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 295-310, July 2014 (Russian Original Vol. 50, No. 3, May-June, 2014).
40. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani, A. R. Haghighatkhah and Z. Zhao , “Flexural Fatigue Behavior of Synthesized Graphene/Carbon-Nanofiber/Epoxy Hybrid Nanocomposites, Materials and Design, Volume 62, October 2014, Pages 401–408.
41. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Afshin Zeinedini, “A Novel procedure for Prediction of Mixed Mode I/II of Fracture Toughness of Laminate Composites,” Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology , in Persian, Vol. 28, No. 2, 111-120, 2014.
42. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Reza Mosalmani, “Modeling of SMC compression molding under non-isothermal conditions,” Journal of Reinforced Plastics and Composites, 2014, Vol. 33(13) 1183–1198.
43. M. Heidari-Rarani, S. Khalkhali Sharifi and M. M. Shokrieh, “ Effect of ply stacking sequence on buckling behavior of E-glass/epoxy laminated composites,” Computational Materials Science, Volume 89, 15 June 2014, Pages 89–96.
44. I. Zibaei, H. Rahnama, F. Taheri-Behrooz and M. M. Shokrieh, “First Strain Gradient Elasticity Solution for Nanotube-Reinforced Matrix Problem”, Composite Structures, Volume 112, June 2014, Pages 273–282, 2014.
45. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani and A. R. Haqiqatkhah, "Flexural Fatigue Behavior of CNF/Epoxy Nanocomposites", Fatigue and Fracture of Engineering Materials & Structures, 2014, 37, 553–560.
46. M. Heidari-Rarani, M. M. Shokrieh, “ Effect of curved crack front on interlaminar fracture toughness of composite DCB specimens,” Sharif Journal of Science and Technology, In Persian, Volume 29, Issue 2, Page 81-86, 2013.
47. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani and F. Taheri-Behrooz, “ Fatigue modeling of chopped strand mat/epoxy composites,” Structural Engineering and Mechanics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2014) 231-240.
48. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Fakoor, Z. Daneshjoo, “ Design and Analysis of Sandwich Panels as Main Structure for Mounting the Solar Cells of a Communication Satellite,” journal of space science and technology (JSST), Vol. 6, No.4, pp. 13-22, 2014.
49. M. M. Shokrieh and S. Akbari R., "Isolation of residual shear stresses effects in slitting measurement of residual normal stresses in laminated composites", Journal of Composite Materials, Volume 48 Issue 7, March 2014.
50. Taheri, F., Ghasemi A. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “Determination of Non-uniform Residual Stresses in Laminated Composites Using Integral Hole Drilling Method, Experimental Evaluation,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 48(4) 415–425, 2013.
51. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Zeinedini, “Prediction of Strain Energy Release Rate of Asymmetric Double Cantilever Composite Beam in Mixed-mode I/II Delamination using Equivalent Lay-up,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 13, No. 13, pp. 214-225, 2014.
52. S hokrieh, M. M., and Mosalmani R., and Majid Jamal Omidi " Strain-rate dependent micromechanical method to investigate the strength properties of glass/epoxy composites,” Composite Structures 111 (2014) 232–239.
53. Akbari, S. Taheri, F., and S hokrieh, M. M., Characterization of Residual Stresses in a Thin-Walled Filament Wound Carbon/Epoxy Ring Using Incremental Hole Drilling Method, Composites Science and Technology, Volume 94 , 9 April 2014, Pages 8–15.
54. F. Taheri - Behrooz, I. Yahyapour, M. M Shokrieh “ Effect of Stacking Sequence on Failure Mode of Fiber Metal Laminates under Low Velocity Impact,” Iranian Polymer Journal, February 2014, Volume 23, Issue 2 , pp 147-152, 2014.
55. S. Akbari, F. Taheri Behrooz, and M. M. Shokrieh, "Slitting Measurement of Residual Hoop Stresses Through the Wall-Thickness of a Filament Wound Composite Ring,” Experimental Mechanics, November 2013, Volume 53, Issue 9 , pp 1509-1518.
56. Lesani, M., Bahaari, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “ Experimental Investigation of FRP-Strengthened Tubular T-Joints under Axial Compressive Loads Construction & Building Materials,” Construction and Building Materials 53 (2014) 243–252.
57. M. M. Shokrieh, Z. Shokrieh, S. M. Hashemianzadeh, “Modeling of Stiffness of Graphene/Epoxy Nanocomposites with Randomly Distributed Graphene using a Combined Molecular Dynamics-Micromechanics method,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 13, No. 11, pp. 25-35, 2014.
58. M. M. Shokrieh and V. Ahmadi Joneidi, “ Manufacturing and experimental characterization of Graphene/Polypropylene nanocomposites,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 13, No. 11, pp. 55-63, 2014.
59. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Saeedi, M. Chitsazzadeh, “ Evaluating the effects of multi-walled carbon nanotubes on the mechanical properties of chopped strand mat/polyester composites,” Materials and Design, Vol. 56, April 2014, Pages 274–279.
60. Shokrieh M. M., Salamat-Talab M., Heidari-Rarani M., "Effect of initial crack length on the measured bridging law of unidirectional E-glass/epoxy double cantilever beam specimens" Materials and Design, Vol. 55 , March 2014, Pages 605–611.
M. M. Shokrieh and S. Akbari R ., “Investigation of Important Parameters in Residual Stress Determination in Isotropic plates and Laminated Composites by Slitting Method,” in Persian, Journal of Solid Mechanics in Engineering (JSME), Islamic Azad Univ., Khomeinishahr Branch, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 35-45, 2011.
62. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Daneshvar, and Chitsazzadeh, M., “A Novel Method to Decrease Micro-residual Stresses of Fibrous Composites by Adding Carbon Nanotube,” Journal of Ultrafine Grained and Nanostructured Materials, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2013, pp. 61-66.
F. Taheri, M. M. Shokrieh, H. R. Abdolvand, “ Designing and manufacturing of a drop weight impact test machine,” Engineering Solid Mechanics, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2013), 69-76. Shokrieh, M. M. Mazloomi M. S., " An Analytical Investigation on the Stiffness of 3-Dimensional Four-directional Braided Composites by Multi-unit Cell Model , " In Persian, Sharif Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 29-3, No. 1 , pp. 11-21, 2013. Shokrieh, M. M., Askari, A., "Similitude study of impacted composite laminates under buckling loading", Journal of Engineering Mechanics, Oct 2013, Vol. 139, No. 10, pp. 1334-1340 .
66. M. Tehrani Dehkordi, H. Nosraty, M. M. Shokrieh , “Analytical Investigation on the Tensile Behavior of Hybrid Plain-woven Fabrics,” Journal of Textile Science and Technology, Vol. 2, No.2, 115-122, Summer 2012.
67. M. Tehrani Dehkordi, H. Nosraty, M. M. Shokrieh , “Low Velocity Impact Simulation of Intraply Hybrid Composites Reinforced with Brittle and Ductile Fibers,” in Persian, Esteghlal Journal, Computational Methods in Engineering, 32, No. 1, pp. 115-124, 2013.
68. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani, F. Vahedi, H. R. Shahverdi , “Improvement of Mechanical and Electrical Properties of Epoxy Resin with Carbon Nanofibers,” Iranian Polymer Journal, (2013) 22:721–72.
69. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Daneshvar, and S. Akbari R . , “ Reduction of Thermal Residual Stresses of Laminated Polymer Composites by Addition of Carbon Nanotubes,” Materials and Design, 53 (2014) 209–216 .
M. M. Shokrieh, A. Saeedi, M. Chitsazzadeh, “Effects of Multi-walled Carbon Nanotubes on the Mechanical Properties of Glass/Polyester Composites,” Journal Ultrafine Grained and Nanostructures Materials, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, pp. 19-22. M. M. Shokrieh and M. Esmkhani, “Effect of graphene nano sheets (GNS) and graphite nano platelets (GNP) on mechanical properties of epoxy nanocomposites,” Science of Advanced Materials, Volume 5, Number 3, March 2013 , pp. 260-266 (7). M. M. Shokrieh, A. Saeedi, “ Mechanical Properties of Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotube/Polyester Nanocomposites,” Journal of Nanostructure in Chemistry, 2013, 3:20 doi:10.1186/2193-8865-3-20. M. M. Shokrieh A. Daneshvar, S. Akbari R . , and Chitsazzadeh, M., " The use of carbon nanofibers for thermal residual stress reduction in carbon fiber/epoxy laminated composites,” CARBON, 59 (2013) 255–263 . M. M. Shokrieh, A. Parsaee, “ Measuring the Optimum Fiber Content Ratio of E-Glass/Epoxy Composite through Microbuckling,” Advanced Materials Research, Vol. 548 (2012), pp. 7-11. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Elahi, “A new model to estimate the Young's modulus of polymer concrete using micromechanical relations,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, pp. Vol. 12, No. 2, 153-162, 2012. M. M. Shokrieh, Z. Shokrieh, S. M. Hashemianzadeh , “Effective parameters in modeling of graphene sheet Young’s modulus,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 147-155, 2012.
77. Zakeri, M. Shayanmehr, and M. M. Shokrieh, “Interface modeling of nanotube reinforced nanocomposites by using multi-scale modeling method,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 1-12, 2012.
M. M. Shokrieh, S. Akbari R. , “ Extension of Sitting Method for Simultaneous Measurement of Residual Normal and Out-of-plane Shear Stresses in Polymer Composites,” Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology , in Persian, Vol. 25, No. 4, 301-313, Oct. – Nov. 2012. M. M. Shokrieh, V. Nasir, “An Estimation of Longitudinal Strength Reduction of Unidirectional E-glass/Epoxy Composites Exposed to Sulfuric Acid using a Micromechanics Model,” Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology , in Persian, Vol. 25, No. 2, 91-101, June - July 2012. Ahmadi, M., Moghbeli, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “ Shrinkage and mechanical properties of unsaturated polyester reinforced with clay and core–shell rubber,” Iranian Polymer J, Dec. 2012, Volume 21, Issue 12, pp. 855-868. Ahmadi, M., Moghbeli, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “ Unsaturated polyester-based hybrid nanocomposite: fracture behavior and tensile properties,” J Polymer Research, Volume 19, Number 9 (2012), 9971.
82. Lesani, M., Bahaari, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “Numerical Investigation of FRP-Strengthened Steel Tubular T-Joints under Axial Compressive Loads’ Composite Structures 100 (2013) 71–78.
M. M. Shokrieh, S. Akbari R. , “ Application of Pulse Method to Incremental Slitting Measurement of Residual Stresses in Laminated Composites,” Journal of Mechanical Research and Application, JMRA, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2012, 9-15 Shokrieh M. M., Salamat-Talab M., Heidari-Rarani M., “Numerical analysis of mode I delamination growth in laminated DCB specimens using cohesive zone models,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 38-48, 2013. Shokrieh, M. M., Esmkhani, M., “Fatigue life prediction of nanoparticle/fibrous polymeric composites based on the micromechanical and normalized stiffness degradation approaches,” J. Material Science, February 2013, Volume 48, Issue 3, pp 1027-1034.
86. Lesani, M., Bahaari, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “Detail investigation on un-stiffened T/Y tubular joints behavior under axial compressive loads,” Journal of Constructional Steel Research, Volume 80, January 2013, Pages 91-99.
87. Tehrani Dehkordi, M., Nosraty, H., Shokrieh, M. M., Minak, G., Ghelli, D. , “The influence of hybridization on impact damage behavior and residual compression strength of intraply basalt/nylon hybrid composites,” Materials and Design, Volume 43, 2013, Pages 283-290.
Heidari-Rarani, M., Shokrieh, M. M., Camanho, P. P. , “Finite element modeling of mode I delamination growth in laminated DCB specimens with R-curve effects,” Composites B: Volume 45, Issue 1, February 2013, Pages 897-903. M. M. Shokrieh, V. Nasir, “ A study on the strength behavior and crack formation mechanism in E-glass fiber under corrosion conditions,” Sharif Journal of Science and Technology , in Persian, Vol. 38 -3 No. 1, pp. 101-107, 2012. S. Shadlou, M. R. Ayatollahi and M. M. Shokrieh, “Fracture behavior of epoxy/DWNT nanocomposites using molecular dynamics simulation,” in Persian, Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology, Vol. 25, No. 4, 315-322, October - November 2012.
91. M. M. Shokrieh, S. Akbari R. , “ Effect of Post-Cure Time on Residual Stress Distribution in Carbon/Epoxy Laminated Composites,” International Journal of Advanced Design and Manufacturing Technology, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 13-18, Aug. 2012.
M. M. Shokrieh, S. Akbari, A. Daneshvar, “ A comparison between the slitting method and the classical lamination theory in determination of macro-residual stresses in laminated composites,” Composite Structures 96 (2013) 708–715. M. M. Shokrieh, A. Daneshvar, “ A Novel Method to Decrease Macro-Residual Stresses of Laminated Composites by Adding Carbon Nano-Fibers,” In Persian, Modares Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 147-155, 2012. Shokrieh, M. M., Hosseinkhani, M. R., Naimi-Jamal, M. R., and Tourani, H., “Nanoindentation and nanoscratch investigations on Graphene-based nanocomposites,” Polymer Testing 32 (2013) 45–51. Aliha M. R.M., Heidari-Rarani M., Shokrieh M. M., Ayatollahi M. R., “ Experimental determination of tensile strength and K Ic of polymer concretes using semi-circular bend (SCB) specimens,” Structural Engineering and Mechanics, Vol. 43, No. 6 (2012) 823-833. Ahmadi, M., Moghbeli, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., “Rubber modification of unsaturated polyester resin with core-shell rubber particles: Effect of shell composition” polymer engineering and science, Volume 52, Issue 9, pages 1928–1937, September 2012. V. Nasir, H. Karimipour, F. Taheri-Behrooz, M. M. Shokrieh , “Corrosion behaviour and crack formation mechanism of basalt fibre in sulphuric acid,” Corrosion Science 64 (2012) 1–7. M. M. Shokrieh, M. A. Torabizadeh, A. Fereidoon “ Progressive Failure Analysis of Glass/Epoxy Composites at Low Temperature ” Strength of Materials, Vol. 44, No. 3, May, 2012 . M. M. Shokrieh, H. Rajabpour-Shirazi, M. Heidari-Rarani, M. Haghpanahi, “Simulation of mode I delamination propagation in multidirectional composites with R-curve effects using VCCT method,” Computational Material Science, 65 (2012) 66–73 . M. M. Shokrieh, M. A. Torabizadeh, A. Fereidoon “ Dynamic failure behavior of glass/epoxy composites under low temperature using Charpy impact test method,” Indian Journal of Engineering & Materials Sciences, Vol. 18, pp. 211-220, June 2011. Shokrieh, M. M., Safarabadi, M. Ghaanee, A. R., “A New Three-Dimensional Analytical Model to Simulate Micro-Residual Stresses in Polymer Matrix Composites,” Mechanics of Composite Materials, Vol. 48, No. 3, 273-284, July, 2012. Shokrieh, M. M., Rafiee, R. , “ Development of a Full Range Multi-scale Modeling to Obtain Elastic Properties of CNT/Polymer,” Iranian Polymer Journal, 21:397–402, 2012. Shokrieh, M. M., Kefayati A. R., Chitsazzadeh M., “Fabrication and mechanical properties of clay/epoxy nanocomposite and its polymer concrete,” Materials and Design 40 (2012) 443–452. Shokrieh, M. M., Nasir, V. and Karimipour, H., “ Strength Behavior and Crack Formation Mechanisms of E-Glass Fiber Exposed to Sulfuric Acid Environment,” Journal of Composite Materials, April 2012 vol. 46 no. 7 765-772, 2012. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohammad Heidari Rarani, Ayatollahi M. R., “ Delamination R-curve as a material property of unidirectional glass/epoxy composites,” Materials and Design, Volume 34, February 2012, Pages 211-218. Shokrieh, M. M., Heidari, R. M., Rahimi, S ., “Numerical Determination of delamination Onset in Laminated Symmetric DCB Specimen,” Journal of Solid Mechanics in Engineering, In Persian, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 47-56, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M. and Akbari R ., S. , “Simulation of slitting method for calculation of compliance functions of laminated composites,” Journal of Composite Materials, Volume 46 No. 9, pp. 1101-1109, May 2012. Shokrieh, M. M. and Akbari R ., S. , “ Effect of Residual Shear Stresses on Released Strains in Laminated Composites Measured by Slitting Method” Journal of Engineering Materials and Technology , Vol. 134, pp. 011006-1 to 011006-9, 2011. Shokrieh, M. M. Torabizadeh, M. A, and Fereidoon, A. “A new method for evaluation of mechanical properties of glass/epoxy composites at low temperatures" Strength of Materials, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp.87 – 99, January, 2012. Shokrieh, M. M., and Safarabadi, M., “ Influence of Physical, Thermal and Mechanical Parameters on Micro Residual Stresses in Polymeric Composites,” in Persian, Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology , Vol. 24, No. 5, 355-368, December 2011 - January 2012. Shokrieh, M. M., and Safarabadi, M., “Three-Dimensional Analysis of Micro-Residual Stresses in Fibrous Composites Based on the Energy Method: A Study Including Interphase Effects,” Journal of Composite Materials, 46(6) 727–735, 2012. M. Tehrani Dehkordi, H. Nosraty, M. M. Shokrieh, “A Study on the Effect of Basalt and Nylon Yarns Hybridization on the Tensile Properties of their Weaved Fabrics,” In Persian, Journal of Textile Science and Technology, Vol. 1, No.2, 2012. Shokrieh M. M., Heidari-Rarani M., Rahimi S., “Influence of curved delamination front on toughness of multidirectional DCB specimens,” Composite Structures, 94 (2012) 1359–1365. M. M. Shokrieh, S. M. Mahdavi, “Micromechanical Model to Evaluate the Effects of Dimensions and Interphase Region on the Elastic Modulus of CNT/Polymer Composites,” Modares Mechanical Engineering, in Persian, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 13-25, 2011. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mazloomi, M. S., “ A new analytical model for calculation of stiffness of three-dimensional four-directional braided composites,” Composite Structures, Volume 94, Issue 3, February 2012, pp. 1005-1015. Behzad Babaei , Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Kamran Daneshjou, “The ballistic resistance of multi-layered targets impacted by rigid projectiles,” Materials Science and Engineering A, 530 (2011) 208–217. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, and M. Fakhar N., “ Experimental, Analytical and Numerical Studies of Composite Sandwich Panels under Low Velocity Impact Loadings," Mechanics of Composite Materials, Vol. 47, No. 6, December, 2011 . M. M. Shokrieh, A. M. Aghdami, “ A dynamic transient model to simulate the time dependent pultrusion process of glass/polyester composites,” Applied Composite Materials (2011) 18:585–601. Shokrieh, M. M., and Majid J. Omidi, "A Review on Impact Resistance of Fiber Reinforced Polymer Composites," Iranian Journal of Polymers Science and Technology, In Persian, Vol. 24, No. 4, 255-277, October-November 2011 . M. M. Shokrieh and M. Safarabadi " Effect of fiber transverse isotropy on micro-residual stresses in polymeric composites,” Journal of Strain Analysis for Engineering Design, Vol. 46, pp. 817-824, 2011. M. M. Shokrieh, V. Nasir and H. Karimipour, “ A micromechanical study of longitudinal strength of unidirectional E-glass/epoxy composites exposed to sulfuric acid environment,” Journal of Materials and Design, 35 (2012) 394–403 . Ayatollahi, M. R., Shokrieh, M. M., Shadlou, S., Kefayati, A. R., Chitsazzadeh, M. , “ Mechanical and Electrical Properties of Epoxy/Multi-walled Carbon Nanotube/Nanoclay Nanocomposites ,” Iranian Polymer Journal, 20 (10), 2011, 835-843. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohammad Heidari Rarani, Ayatollahi M. R., “Interlaminar fracture toughness of unidirectional DCB specimens: a novel theoretical approach,” Polymer Testing, 31 (2012) 68–75. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Heidari Rarani, "Effect of stacking sequence on delamination toughness of glass/epoxy DCB laminates with 0 o //0 o crack interface", Materials Science & Engineering A, 529 (2011) 265– 269. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mazloomi, M. S., “ A Theoretical Method for Caculating the Stiffness of Three-Axial, Two Diemensiojnal Braided Composites ,,” In Persian, Sharif Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 27-3, No. 1 , pp. 75-81, 2011. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohammad Heidari Rarani, Ayatollahi M. R., “Calculation of G I for a multidirectional composite double cantilever beam on two-parametric elastic foundation,” Aerospace Science and Technology , 15 (2011) 534–543. Shokrieh M. M. and Abdolvand, H., " Three-dimensional modeling and experimental validation of heat transfer in polymer matrix composites exposed to fire, ” Journal of Composite Materials, 45 (19) 1953-1965, 2011. Ayatollahi M. R., Shadlou S., Shokrieh M. M., “Fracture toughness of epoxy/multi-walled carbon nanotube nano-composites under bending and shear loading conditions,” Materials and Design, 32 (2011) 2115–2124. Ayatollahi M. R., Shadlou S., Shokrieh M. M., “Mixed mode brittle fracture in epoxy/multi-walled carbon nanotube nanocomposites,” Engineering Fracture Mechanics, 78, 2011, 2620-2632. Shokrieh, M. M., and Askari, A., “Consecutive Structural Similitude for Composite Plates under Buckling after Impact,” Journal of Ferdowsi Mashhad University, In Persian, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 1-16, 2011. M. M. Shokrieh, and M. Safarabadi " Effects of imperfect adhesion on thermal micro-residual stress of polymer matrix composites,” J Adhesion & Adhesives, 31(2011) 490-497. Ayatollahi M. R., Shadlou S., Shokrieh M. M., “ Correlation between aspect ratio of MWCNTs and mixed mode fracture of epoxy based nanocomposites,” Materials Science & Engineering A 528, (2011) 6173-6178. Ayatollahi M. R., Shadlou S., Shokrieh M. M., M. Chitsazzadeh , “Effect of multi-walled carbon nanotube aspect ratio on mechanical and electrical properties of epoxy-based nanocomposites,” Polymer Testing, 30, 548-556 2011. Ayatollahi M. R., Shadlou S., Shokrieh M. M., “Multiscale modeling for mechanical properties of carbon nanotube reinforced nanocomposites subjected to different types of loading,” Composite Structures, 93 (2011) 2250–2259. Chitsazzadeh, M., Shahverdi, H. and Shokrieh, M. M., “Fabrication of Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotube/Vinyl Ester Nanocomposites: Dispersion and Stabilization,” Journal of Defect and Diffusion Forum Vols. 312-315, pp 460-465, 2011. Shokrieh, M. M., Heidari Rarani, M., Shakouri M. and Kashizadeh, “ Effects of Thermal Cycles on Mechanical Properties of an Optimized Polymer Concrete," Construção & amp; Building Materials, 25, pp. 3540-3549, 2011. M. M. Shokrieh, M. A. Torabizadeh, A. Fereidoon “ Progressive damage modeling of Glass/Epoxy laminated composites under static load at low temperature ” Journal of Modeling in Engineering, in Persian, Vol.8, No.21, pp. 33-43, Summer 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Niakan, S., “Calculation of Elastic Modulus of CNT/Epoxy Composites , using Averaging Method,” In Persian, Majlesi Journal of Mechanical Engineering , Vol. 4, No.1, pp. 1-9, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., Asadi, A., “Determination of maximum negative Poisson’s ratio for laminated fiber composites,” Phys. Status Solidi B, 248, No. 5, 1237–1241 (2011). S hokrieh, M. M., and Mosalmani R., "Friction Forces between Sheet Molding Compound Charge and Mold Cavity Surface in Compression Molding,” Key Engineering Materials, Vol. 471-472, (2011), PP. 733-738. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Ashkan M. Aghdami, “Simulation of Pultrusion Manufacturing Process of Glass/Polyester Composites,” Iranian Journal of Polymers Science and Technology, in Persian, Vol. 23, No. 4, 323-333, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohammad Heidari Rarani, "A Comparative study for beams on elastic foundation models to analysis of Mode I delamination in DCB specimen,” Structural Engineering and Mechanics, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2011) 149-162 . Shokrieh, M. M., Ghajar, M., “ Simulation of mode I strain energy release rate for laminated composite using a simple finite element model,” in Persian, Majlesi Journal, Vol. 3, No.4, 2010, pp. 1-8. Shokrieh M. M. and Roham Rafiee, " Stochastic Multi-Scale Modeling of CNT/Polymer Composites," Computational Materials Science, 50 (2010) 437-446. Shokrieh M . M., Jamal Omidi, M., “Investigating the transverse behavior of glass-epoxy composites under intermediate strain rates” Composite Structures, 93, (2011), pp. 690-696. M. M. Shokrieh, M. J. Omidi, “ Progressive Dynamic Damage Modeling of Fiber-Reinforced Composite Structures under Different Loading Rates,” Journal of Composite Materials, November 2010, Vol. 44 no. 23 2723-2745 . Daneshjoo, K., Shokrieh, M. M., Ghorbani Moghaddam, M. and Telebitooti, R., “Analytical Model of Sound Transmission through Relatively Tick FGM Cylindrical Shells Considering Third Order Shear Deformation Theory,” Composite Structures, 93 (2010) 67-78. Shokrieh, M. M., and Pooneh Haj Mahmood Attar, "A New Method for Modeling of Initiation and Propagation of Delamination between [0/ q o ] Layers of Laminated Composites", Applied Composite Materials, 2010, 17:441–452. M. Tehrani Dehkordi, H. Nosraty, M. M. Shokrieh, G. Minak, D. Ghelli, “Low Velocity Impact Properties of Intra-ply Hybrid Composites Based on Basalt and Nylon Woven Fabrics,” Journal of Materials and Design, 2010, Volume 31, Issue 8 , September 2010, Pages 3835-3844. Shokrieh, M. M., and Atashipour, S. R., "Analysis of Filling Step in Vacuum Assisted Resin Transfer Molding by Considering the Effects of Injection Tube," Mechanical and Aerospace Journal, in Persian, Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 2009, pp. 41-54. Shokrieh M. M., Nouri A. , “Progressive Failure Modeling of Laminated Composite Plates with Cut-Out,” in Persian, Modern Processes of Manufacturing Engineering, No. 1, Spring 2010, pp. 11-16. Shokrieh M. M., Mazloomi S. , “An Analytical Method for Calculating Stiffness of Two-Dimensional Tri-Axial Braided Composites,” Composite Structures, 92, (2010), pp. 2901-2905. Shokrieh M. M. and Roham Rafiee, " A review of mechanical properties of isolated carbon nanotubes and carbon nanotube composites," Mechanics of Composite Materials, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 155-172, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Rafiee, R. "Investigation of nanotube length effect on the reinforcement efficiency in carbon nanotube based composites,” Composite Structures, 2010, 92 (2010) 2415–2420. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohammad Heidari Rarani, "Comparison of Concrete Slabs Behavior reinforced with Steel Rebars and FRP Pultruded Gratings," Journal of Structures and Steel, in Persian, 5, No. 5, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., Taheri-Behrooz, F. "Progressive Fatigue Damage Modeling of Cross-Ply Laminates, I: Modeling Strategy" Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 44, No. 10, pp. 1217-1231, 2010. Taheri-Behrooz, F., Shokrieh, M. M., Lessard, L. B., "Progressive Fatigue Damage Modeling of Cross-Ply Laminates, II: Experimental Evaluation" Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 44, No. 10, pp. 1261-1277, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Memar, M., “ Stress Corrosion Cracking of Basalt/Epoxy Composites,” Applied Composite Materials, 17, pp. 121-135, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Rafiee, R. , “Prediction of mechanical properties of an embedded carbon nanotube in polymer matrix based on developing an equivalent long fiber,” Mechanics Research Communications, 37, pp. 235-240, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Rafiee, R. "Prediction of Young’s Modulus of Graphene Sheets and Carbon Nanotubes Using Nano-scale Continuum Mechanics Approach," Journal of Materials and Design, 31 (2), pp. 790-795, 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Rafiee, R. "On the tensile behavior of an embedded carbon nanotube in polymer matrix with non-bonded interphase region,” Composite Structures 92 (2010) 647–652. Shokrieh M. M. and Abdolvand, H., "Three Dimensional Thermo-dynamical Modeling of Fire Effect on Polymer Composites, Considering the Variation of Thermal Properties" in Persian, Mechanical and Aerospace Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 15-32, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., Toozandehjani, H. and Jamal Omidi, M., "Fiber Orientation and Cross Section Effects on Energy Absorbing of Composite Tubes under Axial Dynamic Loading,” Mechanics of Composite Materials, Vol. 45, No. 6, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohammad Heidari Rarani, "Experimental and analytical studies on one-way concrete slabs reinforced with GFRP molded gratings,” Steel and Composite Structures, Vol. 9, No. 6, pp. 439-454, (2009). Shokrieh, M. M., and Asadi A., "Design of Modified Tabs for Testing of Symmetric Composite Thin Walled Tubes under Pure Torsional and Tensile Loadings," Experimental Mechanics, 2010, 50: 307-320. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Majid Jamal Omidi, “Investigation of strain rate effects on in-plane shear properties of glass/epoxy composites,” Composite Structures, 91 (2009) 95–102. Shokrieh, M. M., and Karamnejad, A., “Dynamic Response of Strain Rate Dependent Glass/Epoxy Composite Beams Using Finite Difference Method,” International Journal of Mechanical, Industrial and Aerospace Engineering,” pp. 50- 56, 4:1 2010. Shokrieh, M. M., and Memar, M., “Mechanical Properties of Basal Epoxy Composites,” In Persian, Majlesi Journal of Mechanical Engineering, In Persian, pp. 65-72, 2009, Vol. 2, No. 1, Autumn 2008. Yazdchi K., Salehi M., Shokrieh M. M., "Analytical and Numerical Techniques for Predicting the Interfacial Stresses of Wavy Carbon Nanotube / Polymer Composites,” Mechanics of Composite Materials, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., and Safari Dinalchi S., " Optimization of the manufacturing process of Natural Fibre Thermoplastic Composites in order to minimize Warpage,” In Persian, Majlesi Journal of Mechanical Engineering , Volume 2, No. 3, Page 9-15, 2009 Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Majid Jamal Omidi, “Tension behavior of unidirectional glass/epoxy composites under different strain rates,” Composite Structures, 88 (2009) 595–601 Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Majid Jamal Omidi, “Compressive response of glass–fiber reinforced polymeric composites to increasing compressive strain rates,” Composite Structures, 89 (2009) 517–523. Fathollah Taheri-Behrooz, Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Larry B., Lessard , " Residual stiffness in cross-ply laminates subjected to cyclic loading," Composite Structures, 85 (2008) 205–212. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mojtaba Haghighi, " Fatigue Damage Modeling of Composite Laminates with Stress Concentration: Regional Elements Model," Iranian Polymer Journal, 18 (3) , pp. 233-246, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., and Safari Dinalchi S., "Residual Stresses in Thermoplastic Composites," Iranian Journal of Polymers Science and Technology, 25, No. 6, pp. 477-493, in Persian, 2009. Ghasemi, A. and Shokrieh, M. M., "Measurement of Released Strains and Calculation of Residual Stresses in Laminated Composites using Integral Method," Esteghlal Journal, Computational Methods in Engineering, 28: 2, pp. 81-93, in Persian, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., and Atashipour, S. R., Resin Flow in Fiber Preform in Vacuum Assisted Resin Transfer Molding with Flexible Tools," Iranian Journal of Polymers Science and Technology, in Persian, 21, No. 4, pp. 329-338, 2008. Shokrieh, M. M., and Ali Najafi, “ An Experimental Evaluation of Micromechanical Approaches for Damping Characterization of Polymer Matrix Composites,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 42, No. 24, pp. 2599-2613, 2008. Shokrieh, M. M., and Jamal Omidi, M., "Tension Behavior of Unidirectional Glass/Epoxy Composites under Different Strain Rates," 88, pp. 595-601, Composite Structures, 2009. Shokrieh, M. M., and Jamal Omidi, M., "Compressive response of glass-fiber reinforced polymeric composites to increasing compressive strain rates, Composite Structures, Composite Structures, 89 (2009), 517–523. Ghasemi, A. and Shokrieh, M. M., "Determination of Integral Method for Determining of Non-Uniform Residual Stresses in Laminated Composites," Iranian Journal of Polymers Science and Technology, in Persian, 21, No. 4, pp. 347-355, 2008. Shokrieh, M. M., and A. Bayat, “Simulation of Ultraviolet Radiation Effects on Mechanical Properties of Glass/Polyester Composites," Sharif Journal of Science and Technology , No. 42, pp. 49-57, in Persian, 2008. Shokrieh, M. M., and Taheri Behrooz, F., “ Fatigue life evaluation of unidirectional composites by using residual strain energy," Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology, in Persian, 21, No.1, pp. 19-26, 2008 Shokrieh, M. M., and Taheri Behrooz, F., “Modeling of Fatigue Behavior of Unidirectional Carbon/Epoxy Composites,” Engineering Journal of Tehran University, pp. 451-457, in Persian, 2008. Akhbari, M., Shokrieh, M. M., and Nosraty H., “A study on Buckling Behavior of Composite Sheets Reinforced by Hybrid Woven Fabrics,” Transaction of Canadian Society of Mechanical Engineers, Transaction of the CSME, Vol.32, No. 1, pp. 81-89, 2008.
186. Shokrieh, M. M., and Javadpor, Gh., “Penetration Analysis of a Projectile in a Ceramic Composite Armor,” Composite Structures, 82, pp. 269-276, 2008.
Shokrieh, M. M., and Heidari Rarani, M. , "Analysis of Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Molded Grating," Iranian Polymer Journal, 16 (8) 2007, pp. 511-520. Shokrieh, M. M., Toozandehjani, H. and Jamal Omidi , M., "Considering the Effects of Cross Section and fiber orientation of Composite Tubes under Axial Loading in Energy Absorption," Iranian Journal of Polymers Science and Technology, in Persian, Year 20, No. 3, pp. 289-296, 2007. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Larry B. Lessard and Adnan Golubovic "Adhesively Bonded Carbon/Titanium Joints under In-Plane and Bending Loads,” Iranian Polymer Journal, 16 (5), 2007, pp. 291-307. Shokrieh, M. M., and Ghasemi, M. R., “Effects of Free Edge Interlaminar Shear Stress on the Residual Stresses of Polymer Composites Using Hole Drilling Method," Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology, in Persian, 20, No. 4, pp. 337-347, 2007. Shokrieh M. M. and Najafi Ali, "Damping Characterization and Viscoelastic Behavior of Laminated Polymer Matrix Composites Using A Modified Classical Lamination Theory", Experimental Mechanics, (2007) 47:831–839 Shokrieh, M. M., and Ghasemi, M. R., “ Simulation of Central Hole Drilling Process for Measurement of Residual Stresses in Isotropic, Orthotropic and Laminated Composites Plates,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2007. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Meysam Rahmat , “Effects of Young’s Modulus on Fundamental Diagrams of a Sleeper on an Elastic Foundation," Applied Mathematical Modeling, 31, pp. 700-711, 2007. Shokrieh, M. M., and Sonbolestan, S. E., "Effects of Structural Parameters on Mechanical Properties of Nanoclay/Polymer Composites," Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology, in Persian, Year 20, No. 2, pp. 187-195, 2007. Shokrieh, M. M., and Zakeri, M. “Generalized Technique for Cumulative Damage Modeling of Composite Laminates,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 41, No. 22, pp. 2643-2656, 2007. Alipour, M. and Shokrieh, M. M., “ Design and Weight Optimization of Pin Loaded Composite Plates," In Persian, Majlesi Journal of Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 16, 2007. Shokrieh, M. M., and Ali Najafi , "Experimental evaluation of dynamic behavior of metallic plates reinforced by polymer matrix composites," Composite Structures, 75 (2006) 472-478. Shokrieh, M. M., and Fathollah Taheri B., " A unified fatigue life model based on energy method," Composite Structures, 75 (2006) 444-450. Shokrieh, M. M., and A. Bayat, “Effects of Ultraviolet Radiation on Mechanical Properties of Glass/Polyester Composites,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 41, No. 20, pp. 2443-2455, 2007. M. M. Shokrieh and Roham Rafiee , "Simulation of Fatigue Failure in a Full Composite Wind Turbine Blade," Composite Structures, 74, (2006), pp. 332-342. Shokrieh, M. M., and Ghasemi, M. R., “ Determining Calibration Factors of the Hole Drilling Method for Orthotropic Composite using an Exact Solution,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 14, No. 19, pp. 2293-2311, 2006. Shokrieh, M. M., and Ghasemi, M. R., “An Exact Solution for Determining Calibration Factors of the Hole Drilling Method for an Orthotropic Plate,” Iranian Journal of Polymer Science and Technology, in Persian, No. 6, pp. 437-448, 2007. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Ahmad R. Ghasemi K., “ Simulation of Hole Drilling Process in Isotropic, Orthotropic, and Laminated Composite Materials,” Engineering Journal of Tehran University, in Persian, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2006, pp. 825-837. Shokrieh, M. M., and Ghasemi, A. R., “ Simulation of Central Hole Drilling Process for Determining of Residual Stresses in Isotropic Materials” in Persian, International Journal of Engineering Science No. 1, Vol. 17, Spring 2006, pp. 1-8 . Shokrieh, M. M., and Rafiee, R., “Mechanical Properties of Biaxial and Triaxial Composites Based on Limited Experimental Data,” International Journal of Engineering Science, Vol. 17, No.3-4, 2006, Page 29-35, 2006. Mahmood M. Shokrieh and Meysam Rahmat, “ On the Reinforcement of Concrete Sleepers by Composite Materials,” Composite Structures, 76, p.326-337, 2006. Shokrieh, M. M., and Kamali Shahri, S. M “Theoretical and Experimental Studies on Residual Stresses in Laminated Polymer Composites,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 39, No. 24, pp. 2213-2225, 2005. R . Hosseinzadeh, M . M . Shokrieh and L . B. Lessard , "Damage Behavior of Fiber Reinforced Composite Plates Subjected to Drop Weight Impacts" Journal of Composites Science and Technology, 66, pp/ 61-68, 2006. Shokrieh, M. M., and Jamal Omidi, M., “Reinforcement of Metallic Plates with Composite Materials,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp. 723-744, 2005. Hosseinzadeh, R. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “ Parametric Study of Automotive Composite Bumper Beams in Low-Velocity Impacts,” Composite Structures, 68 (2005) 419-425. Shokrieh, M. M., and Rezaee, D., “Replacement of a Metallic Leaf Spring With a Composite Materials,” Mechanical Engineering, Vol. 12, No. 23, March 2004, pp. 10-13. Shokrieh, M. M., and Hasani, A., “Study of Shear Buckling of Composite Shafts under Torsion,” Composite Structures, Vol. 64/1 pp. 63-69, 2004. Shokrieh, M. M., and Rezaee, D., “Analysis and Optimization of a Composites Leaf Spring,” Composite Structures, 60, (2003), pp. 317-325. Hassani, F., Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “A Fully Non-Linear 3-D Constitutive Relationship for the Stress Analysis of a Pin-Loaded Composite Laminate,” Composites Science and Technology, 62 (2002), pp. 429-439. Shokrieh, M. M., and Sokhanvar H. R., “Optimum Fiber Volume Fraction of Composite Materials, using Compressive Properties,” in Persian, International Journal of Engineering Science,.No. 3, Vol. 14, pp. 59-74, 2003. Shokrieh, M. M., and Mozafari, M., “Study of Residual Compressive Strength of a Glass/Epoxy Plate under Low Velocity Impact,” Engineering Journal of Tehran University, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 409-416, 2002. Shokrieh, M. M., and Bohlool, A., “Sensitivity of Classical Laminated Plate Theory to Variation of Mechanical Properties of Unidirectional plies,” International Journal of Engineering Science, No. 5, Vol.13, Fall 2002, pp. 81-91. Shokrieh, M. M., and Haghiri, K., “Design and Failure Analysis of Composite Pressure Vessels using Effective Parameters,” International Journal of Engineering Science, In Persian, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp.71-80, 2002. Shokrieh, M. M., and Taheri Behrooz, F., “Wing Instability of a Full Composite Aircraft,” Composite Structures, 54, pp. 335-340. 2001. Shokrieh, M. M., and Taheri Behrooz, F., “Study on Bending-Torsion Flutter of wing of a Full Composite Aircraft,” International Journal of Engineering Science, In Persian, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp.11-22, 2001. Shokrieh, M. M., and Taheri Behrooz, F., “Study on Wing Bending-Aileron Rotation Flutter of a Full Composite Aircraft,” International Journal of Engineering Science, In Persian, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.153-162, 2001. Shokrieh, M. M., and Bohlool, A., “Sensitivity of Finite Element Method to Variation of Mechanical Properties of Unidirectional plies,” in Persian, International Journal of Engineering Science, No. 3, Vol. 13, pp. 135-143, 2002. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “Progressive Fatigue Damage Modeling of Composite Materials, Part I: Modeling,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 34, No. 13, pp. 1056-1080, (2000). Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “Progressive Fatigue Damage Modeling of Composite Materials, Part II: Material Characterization and Model Verification,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 34, No. 13, pp. 1081-1116, (2000). Shokrieh, M. M., and Mohamadi-Rad H., “The Effect of Sealing Liner on Mechanical Behavior of Composite Vessels under Internal Pressure,” International Journal of Engineering Science, In Persian. Vol. 10, No. 7, pp. 59-72, 1999. Diao, X., Lessard, L. B., and Shokrieh, M. M., “Statistical Model for Multiaxial fatigue Behavior of Unidirectional Plies,” Composites Science and Technology, 59, (1999), pp. 2025-2035. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “An Assessment of the Double-Notch Shear Test for Interlaminar Shear Characterization of Unidirectional Graphite/Epoxy Under Static and Fatigue Loading,” Applied Composite Materials, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1998, pp. 46-63. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “Modification of the Three-Rail Shear Test for Composite Materials under Static and Fatigue Loading,” 13th Symposium on Composite Materials: Testing and Design, ASTM STP 1242, pp. 217-233,1997. Shokrieh, M. M., Eilers, O., and Lessard, L. B., “Characterization of a Graphite/Epoxy Composite under In-Plane Shear Fatigue Loading,” High Temperature & Environmental Effects on Polymeric Composites: Second Symposium, STP 1302, pp. 133-148, 1997. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “Multiaxial Fatigue Behaviour of Unidirectional Plies Based on Uniaxial Fatigue Experiments I. Theory,” International Journal of Fatigue, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 201-207, 1997. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “Multiaxial Fatigue Behaviour of Unidirectional Plies Based on Uniaxial Fatigue Experiments II. Experimental Evaluation,” International Journal of Fatigue, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 209-217, 1997. Shokrieh, M. M., and Lessard, L. B., “Effects of Material Nonlinearity on the Three-Dimensional Stress State of Pin-Loaded Composite Laminates,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 30, No. 7, pp. 839-861, 1995. Lessard, L. B., Schmit, A. S., and Shokrieh, M. M., “Three-Dimensional Stress Analysis of Free-Edge Effects in a Simple Composite Cross-Ply Laminate,” Int. Journal of Solids and Structures, Vol. 33, No. 15, pp. 2243-2259, 1996. Lessard, L. B., Shokrieh, M. M., “Two-Dimensional Modeling of Composite Pinned/Bolted Joint Failure,” Journal of Composite Materials, Vol. 29, No. 5, 1995, pp. 671-697. Lessard, L. B., Eilers, O. P., and Shokrieh, M. M., “Testing of In-plane Shear Properties Under Fatigue Loading,” Journal of Reinforced Plastics and Composites, Vol. 14, No. 9, 1995, pp. 965-987.
1. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Ghajar, and R. Madoliat, “Progressive damage modeling of open-hole laminated composites,” The 4 th International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication & Application (CCFA-4), Tehran-Iran, December, 16-17, 2014.
2. M. M. Shokrieh, H. Olia, A. R. Haghighatkhah and M. Esmkhani “The effect of sea water aging on quasi-static and fatigue behaviors of glass/epoxy composites,” The 4 th International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication & Application (CCFA-4), Tehran-Iran, December, 16-17, 2014.
3. M. M. Shokrieh, A. R. Shamei, R. Mosalmani, “ A novel micromechanical constitutive model to predict the shear behavior of neat and nano-phased epoxy under dynamic loadings,” The 4 th International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication & Application (CCFA-4), Tehran-Iran, December, 16-17, 2014.
4. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Danesh, M. Esmkhani, “A novel model to predict the fatigue life of hybrid carbon nanofiber/glass short fiber/epoxy composites based on energy method,” The 4 th International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication & Application (CCFA-4), Tehran-Iran, December, 16-17, 2014.
5. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani, A. Haqiqatkhah, “F flexural bending fatigue model for carbon nanofiber/chopped strand glass mat/epoxy nanocomposites,” The 4 th International Conference on Composites: Characterization, Fabrication & Application (CCFA-4), Tehran-Iran, December, 16-17, 2014.
6. M. M. Shokrieh, S. Rezvani, R. Mosalmani, “An investigation of Behavior of Polyester Resin and Polymer Concert under Dynamic Loading,” 22 nd International Conference of Mechanical Engineering (ISME 2014), April. 22-24, 2014.
7. M. M. Shokrieh, S. Soveiti, R. Mosalmani, “Numerical and Analytical Analyses on the Effect of Interphase and the Aspect Ratio of the Representative Volume Element in Calculation of Elastic Modulus of the Nanotube Reinforced Polymer,” 22 nd International Conference of Mechanical Engineering (ISME 2014), April. 22-24, 2014.
8. M. M. Shokrieh, A. R. Shamaei Kashani, R. Mosalmani, “Presenting a Novel Dynamic Constitutive Model for Predicting of Mechanical Behavior of Polymers,” 22 nd International Conference of Mechanical Engineering (ISME 2014), April. 22-24, 2014.
9. M. M. Shokrieh, A. R. Shamaei Kashani, R. Mosalmani, “Presenting a Novel Dynamic Constitutive Model for Predicting of Mechanical Behavior of Polymers,” 22 nd International Conference of Mechanical Engineering (ISME 2014), April. 22-24, 2014.
10. M. M. Shokrieh, Z. Daneshjoo, M. Fakoor, “Presenting a Novel Model for Simulating of Mode I Delamination Propagation of Composite DCB Specimens Considering the Effects of R-Curve,” 22 nd International Conference of Mechanical Engineering (ISME 2014), April. 22-24, 2014.
M. M. Shokrieh, A. Daneshvar, “Decreased out of Plane Shape of Unsymmetrical Laminates using Carbon Nanotubes,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. M. Shokrieh, R. Mosalmani, M. Chitsazzadeh, “Viscosity as a Measure of Dispersion State of Carbon Nano Fibers in Epoxy Matrix,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Esmkhani, A. Haqiqatkhah “Experimental Investigation of Felexural fatigue For Graphene/Carbon-nano-fiber Hybrid Nanocomposite,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. M. Shokrieh, R. Mosalmani, M. Jamal Omidi, “The Effects of Loading Rate on Shear Mechanical Behavior of Carbon Nano Fiber/Epoxy Nanocomposites,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. Heidari-Rarani, M. R. M. Aliha, M. M. Shokrieh, M. R. Ayatollahi, “Effect of Thermal Cycle on the Fracture Properties of Epoxy Polymer Concrete,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. A. Torabizadeh, M. M. Shokrieh, A. Fereidoon, “Shear Response of Glass-Fiber Reinforced Unidirectional Composites at Low Temperature,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. Sedighi, M. M. Shokrieh, M. Tahmasbi, J. Joudaki, “Effect of Increments Quantity on Determination of Residual Stresses in Incremental Hole Drilling Technique,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014. M. M. Shokrieh, R. Mosalmani, “A Comparison between Tensile and Shear Mechanical Behaviors of Epoxy and Epoxy Reinforced with Carbon Nano Fibers,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014.
19. M. M. Shokrieh, M. Olia, M. Fasihi, “Designing and Manufacturing of an Intumescent Fire Retardant Coating System for Polymer Composites,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014.
20. M. M. Shokrieh, M. A. Kamangar, “On the Estimation of Residual Stresses by the Crack Slitting Method using Eigen strain,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014.
21. Mahmood M. Shokrieh, Arash Shafiee Sabet, “Analysis of Mechanical Behaviors of a Carbon/Epoxy Composite Artificial Foot Prosthesis,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014.
22. Taheri-Behrooz F., Shokrieh M. M. Akbari H., Memar Maher B., “The mechanical and tribological behaviors of phenolic polymers modified with silica nanoparticles,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014.
23. M. M. Shokrieh, B. Memar Maher, A. Fereidoon, “Effects of SiO2 and TiO2 nanoparticles on the mechanical and tribological behaviors of epoxy resin,” The Bi-Annual International Conference on Experimental Solid Mechanics (X-Mech 2014), Tehran, Iran, Feb. 18-19, 2014.

A Comprehensive Immunization Strategy to Eliminate Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United States.
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) Part II: Immunization of Adults.
Please note: An erratum has been published for this article. To view the erratum, please click here.
Eric E. Mast, MD 1.
Cindy M. Weinbaum, MD 1.
Anthony E. Fiore, MD 1.
Miriam J. Alter, PhD 1.
Beth P. Bell, MD 1.
Lyn Finelli, DrPH 1.
Lance E. Rodewald, MD 2.
John M. Douglas, Jr., MD 3.
Robert S. Janssen, MD 4.
John W. Ward, MD 1.
1 Division of Viral Hepatitis, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed)
2 Immunization Services Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (proposed)
3 Division of STD Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed)
4 Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed)
The material in this report originated in the National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed), Kevin A. Fenton, MD, PhD, Director; the Division of Viral Hepatitis, John W. Ward, MD, Director; the Division of STD Prevention, John M. Douglas, Jr., MD, Director; and the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Robert S. Janssen, MD, Director; the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Anne Schuchat, MD, Director; and the Immunization Services Division, Lance E. Rodewald, MD, Director.
Corresponding preparer: Eric E. Mast, MD, Division of Viral Hepatitis, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed), 1600 Clifton Road, NE, MS G-37, Atlanta, GA 30333. Telephone: 404-718-8500; Fax: 404-718-8595; E-mail: emast@cdc. gov.
Hepatitis B vaccination is the most effective measure to prevent hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection and its consequences, including cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, liver failure, and death. In adults, ongoing HBV transmission occurs primarily among unvaccinated persons with behavioral risks for HBV transmission (e. g., heterosexuals with multiple sex partners, injection-drug users [IDUs], and men who have sex with men [MSM]) and among household contacts and sex partners of persons with chronic HBV infection.
This report, the second of a two-part statement from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), provides updated recommendations to increase hepatitis B vaccination of adults at risk for HBV infection. The first part of the ACIP statement, which provided recommendations for immunization of infants, children, and adolescents, was published previously (CDC. A comprehensive immunization strategy to eliminate transmission of hepatitis B virus infection in the United States: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. Part 1: immunization of infants, children, and adolescents. MMWR 2005;54[No. RR-16]:1--33).
In settings in which a high proportion of adults have risks for HBV infection (e. g., sexually transmitted disease/human immunodeficiency virus testing and treatment facilities, drug-abuse treatment and prevention settings, health-care settings targeting services to IDUs, health-care settings targeting services to MSM, and correctional facilities), ACIP recommends universal hepatitis B vaccination for all unvaccinated adults. In other primary care and specialty medical settings in which adults at risk for HBV infection receive care, health-care providers should inform all patients about the health benefits of vaccination, including risks for HBV infection and persons for whom vaccination is recommended, and vaccinate adults who report risks for HBV infection and any adults requesting protection from HBV infection. To promote vaccination in all settings, health-care providers should implement standing orders to identify adults recommended for hepatitis B vaccination and administer vaccination as part of routine clinical services, not require acknowledgment of an HBV infection risk factor for adults to receive vaccine, and use available reimbursement mechanisms to remove financial barriers to hepatitis B vaccination.
Introdução.
Hepatitis B is a disease caused by the hepatitis B virus (HBV), which is transmitted through percutaneous (i. e., puncture through the skin) or mucosal (i. e., direct contact with mucous membranes) exposure to infectious blood or body fluids. HBV can cause chronic infection, resulting in cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, liver failure, and death. Persons with chronic infection also serve as the main reservoir for continued HBV transmission. Although chronic infection is more likely to develop in persons infected as infants or young children, rates of new infection and acute disease are highest among adults.
Hepatitis B vaccination is the most effective measure to prevent HBV infection and its consequences. Since recommendations for hepatitis B vaccination were first issued in 1982, a comprehensive strategy to eliminate HBV transmission in the United States has evolved ( 1--5 ). This strategy includes 1) universal vaccination of infants beginning at birth, 2) prevention of perinatal HBV infection through routine screening of all pregnant women for hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg) and postexposure immunoprophylaxis of infants born to HBsAg-positive women or to women with unknown HBsAg status, 3) vaccination of all children and adolescents who were not vaccinated previously, and 4) vaccination of previously unvaccinated adults at risk for HBV infection (Box 1).
To date, immunization strategies for infants, children, and adolescents have been implemented with considerable success. Recent estimates indicate that approximately 95% of pregnant women are tested for HBsAg and that case management has been effective in ensuring high levels of initiation and completion of postexposure immunoprophylaxis among infants born to HBsAg-positive women ( 6 ). Hepatitis B vaccine has been integrated successfully into the childhood vaccination schedule, and infant vaccination coverage levels now are equivalent to those of other vaccines in the childhood schedule ( 7 ). Vaccination coverage among adolescents also has increased substantially; preliminary data from 2003 indicated that approximately 50%--60% of adolescents aged 13--15 years have records indicating vaccination (with 3 doses) against hepatitis B ( 8 ). During 1990--2005, incidence of acute hepatitis B in the United States declined 78%. The greatest decline (96%) occurred among children and adolescents, coincident with an increase in hepatitis B vaccination coverage. This success can be attributed in part to the established infrastructure for vaccine delivery to children and to federal support for perinatal hepatitis B prevention programs.
Among adults, ongoing HBV transmission occurs primarily among unvaccinated adults with risk behaviors for HBV transmission (e. g., heterosexuals with multiple sex partners, injection-drug users [IDUs], and men who have sex with men [MSM]) and among household contacts and sex partners of persons with chronic HBV infection. During 2000--2004, self-reported hepatitis B vaccination coverage among adults at risk for HBV infection increased from 30% to 45% ( 9 ); this increase in vaccination coverage likely contributed to the 35% decline in acute hepatitis B incidence that occurred during this period (from 3.7 to 2.4 per 100,000 population). However, incidence of acute hepatitis B remains highest among adults, who accounted for approximately 95% of an estimated 51,000 new HBV infections in 2005. Although acceptance of vaccination is high among adults offered vaccination ( 10 ), the low adult vaccination coverage reflects the lack of hepatitis B vaccination services in settings in which a high proportion of adults have risk factors for HBV infection (e. g., sexually transmitted disease [STD]/human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] testing and treatment facilities, drug-abuse treatment and prevention settings, health-care settings targeting services to IDUs, health-care settings targeting services to MSM, and correctional facilities) and missed opportunities to vaccinate adults at risk for HBV infection in primary care and specialty medical settings. Although hepatitis B incidence among adults is expected to continue to decline during the next decade as successive cohorts of persons vaccinated in infancy, childhood, and adolescence reach adulthood, new implementation strategies are needed to protect unvaccinated adults at risk for HBV infection.
This report provides updated guidance from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) to increase hepatitis B vaccination coverage among adults. It includes recommendations regarding which adults should receive hepatitis B vaccine and outlines implementation strategies to ensure that those adults are vaccinated. The first part of this statement, which provided recommendations for immunization of infants, children, and adolescents, was published previously ( 11 ).
In response to continuing low rates of hepatitis B vaccination among adults at risk for HBV infection, ACIP's Hepatitis Vaccines Work Group met multiple times during October 2004--September 2005 to review previous guidelines and make recommendations for improving vaccination coverage in adults. The work group examined the progress made since 1991 in implementing the U. S. strategy to eliminate HBV transmission (e. g., vaccination coverage data and hepatitis B disease rates), surveillance data on missed opportunities for hepatitis B vaccination among adults with acute hepatitis B, and results of cost-effectiveness analyses. In addition, demonstration projects conducted in settings in which a high proportion of clients were at risk for HBV infection identified the components of successful adult hepatitis B vaccination programs and ongoing challenges to implementing adult hepatitis B vaccination.
In January 2005, the proposed recommendations were posted online for public comment. In May 2005, CDC convened a meeting of external consultants, including researchers, physicians, state and local public health professionals, immunization program directors, and directors of viral hepatitis, STD, and HIV/AIDS prevention programs, to obtain input into the draft recommendations and consider the feasibility of the recommended strategies. In October 2005, the revised recommendations were approved by ACIP.
Major Updates to the Recommendations.
This report updates ACIP recommendations published previously for hepatitis B vaccination of adults ( 3 ). The primary changes from previous recommendations are as follows:
In settings in which a high proportion of persons are likely to be at risk for HBV infection (e. g., STD/HIV testing and treatment facilities, drug-abuse treatment and prevention settings, health-care settings targeting services to IDUs, health-care settings targeting services to MSM, and correctional facilities), ACIP recommends universal hepatitis B vaccination for all adults who have not completed the vaccine series. In primary care and specialty medical settings, ACIP recommends implementation of standing orders to identify adults recommended for hepatitis B vaccination and administer vaccination as part of routine services. To ensure vaccination of adults at risk for HBV infection who have not completed the vaccine series, ACIP recommends the following implementation strategies:
--- Provide information to all adults regarding the health benefits of hepatitis B vaccination, including risk factors for HBV infection and persons for whom vaccination is recommended.
--- Help all adults assess their need for vaccination by obtaining a history that emphasizes risks for sexual transmission and percutaneous or mucosal exposure to blood.
--- Vaccinate all adults who report risks for HBV infection.
--- Vaccinate all adults requesting protection from HBV infection, without requiring them to acknowledge a specific risk factor.
Fundo.
Clinical Features and Natural History of HBV Infection.
HBV is a 42-nm DNA virus classified in the Hepadnaviridae family. The liver is the primary site of HBV replication. After a susceptible person is exposed, the virus enters the liver via the bloodstream; no evidence exists indicating that the virus replicates at mucosal surfaces. HBV infection can produce either asymptomatic or symptomatic infection. The average incubation period is 90 days (range: 60--150 days) from exposure to onset of jaundice and 60 days (range: 40--90 days) from exposure to onset of abnormal serum alanine aminotransferase (ALT) levels ( 12,13 ).
The onset of acute disease typically is insidious. Infants, children aged <5 years, and immunosuppressed adults with newly acquired HBV infection typically are asymptomatic, whereas 30%--50% of children aged > 5 years and adults have initial clinical signs or symptoms ( 14 ). When present, clinical symptoms and signs can include anorexia, malaise, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and jaundice. Extrahepatic manifestations of disease (e. g., skin rashes, arthralgias, and arthritis) also can occur ( 15 ). The fatality rate among persons with reported cases of acute hepatitis B is 0.5%--1.0%, with the highest rates in adults aged >60 years; however, because a substantial number of infections are asymptomatic and therefore are not reported, the overall fatality rate among all persons with HBV infection likely is lower ( 16 ).
Approximately 95% of primary infections in adults with normal immune status are self-limited, with elimination of virus from blood and subsequent lasting immunity to reinfection. Chronic infection occurs in <5% of infected persons aged > 5 years, approximately 30% of infected children aged <5 years, and approximately 90% of infected infants, with continuing viral replication in the liver and persistent viremia ( 14,17--19 ). Primary infections become chronic more frequently in immunosuppressed persons (e. g., hemodialysis patients and persons with HIV infection) ( 19,20 ) and persons with diabetes ( 21 ). Overall, approximately 25% of persons who become chronically infected during childhood and 15% of those who become chronically infected after childhood die prematurely from cirrhosis or liver cancer; the majority remain asymptomatic until onset of cirrhosis or end-stage liver disease ( 22 ).
No specific treatment exists for acute hepatitis B; supportive care is the mainstay of therapy. Persons who have chronic HBV infection require medical evaluation and regular monitoring ( 23--25 ). Therapeutic agents approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for treatment of chronic hepatitis B can achieve sustained suppression of HBV replication and remission of liver disease in certain persons ( 24 ). Periodic screening with ultrasonography and alfa-fetoprotein has been demonstrated to enhance early detection of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) ( 25 ). Certain chronically infected persons with HCC have experienced long-term survival after resection of small hepatocellular carcinomas, and persons who were screened had HCC detected at an earlier stage and had a substantial survival advantage compared with historical controls ( 25 ); however, data from controlled studies are lacking. Guidance for the diagnosis and management of hepatitis B is available ( 26 ).
Interpretation of Serologic Markers of HBV Infection.
Antigens and antibodies associated with HBV infection include HBsAg and antibody to HBsAg (anti-HBs), hepatitis B core antigen (HBcAg) and antibody to HBcAg (anti-HBc), and hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg) and antibody to HBeAg (anti-HBe). At least one serologic marker is present during each of the different phases of HBV infection ( 13,27 ). The serologic markers typically used to differentiate between acute, resolving, and chronic infection are HBsAg, anti-HBc, and anti-HBs (Table 1). HBeAg and anti-HBe screening typically is used for the management of patients with chronic infection. Serologic assays are available commercially for all markers except HBcAg because no free HBcAg circulates in blood.
The presence of a confirmed HBsAg-positive result in serum indicates active HBV infection. All HBsAg-positive persons should be considered infectious. In newly infected persons, HBsAg is the only serologic marker detected during the first 3--5 weeks after infection. The average time from exposure to detection of HBsAg is 30 days (range: 6--60 days) ( 12,13 ). Highly sensitive single-sample nucleic acid tests can detect HBV DNA in the serum of an infected person 10--20 days before detection of HBsAg ( 28 ). Transient HBsAg positivity has been reported for up to 18 days after hepatitis B vaccination and is clinically insignificant ( 29,30 ).
Anti-HBc appears at the onset of symptoms or liver-test abnormalities in acute HBV infection and persists for life. Acute or recently acquired infection can be distinguished by the presence of the immunoglobulin M (IgM) class of anti-HBc, which is detected at the onset of acute hepatitis B and persists for up to 6 months if the disease resolves. In patients who have chronic HBV infection, IgM anti-HBc can persist during viral replication at low levels that typically are not detectable by assays used in the United States. However, persons with exacerbations of chronic infection can test positive for IgM anti-HBc ( 31 ). Using IgM anti-HBc testing for diagnosis of acute hepatitis B should be limited to persons for whom clinical evidence of acute hepatitis or an epidemiologic link to a case has been identified because the positive predictive value of this test is low in asymptomatic persons.
In persons who recover from HBV infection, HBsAg is eliminated from the blood, and anti-HBs develops, typically within 3--4 months. The presence of anti-HBs typically indicates immunity from HBV infection. Infection or immunization with one serotype of HBV confers immunity to all serotypes. In addition, anti-HBs can be detected for several months after hepatitis B immune globulin (HBIG) administration. Persons who recover from natural infection typically will be positive for both anti-HBs and anti-HBc, whereas persons who respond to hepatitis B vaccine have only anti-HBs. In persons who become chronically infected, HBsAg and anti-HBc persist, typically for life. HBsAg will become undetectable in approximately 0.5%--2% of persons with chronic infection yearly; anti-HBs will occur in the majority of these persons ( 32--35 ).
In certain persons, the only HBV serologic marker detected in serum is anti-HBc. Isolated anti-HBc can be detected after HBV infection in persons who have recovered but whose anti-HBs levels have waned. Certain chronically infected persons with anti-HBc alone have circulating HBsAg not detectable by commercial serology. HBV DNA has been detected in the blood of <10% of persons with isolated anti-HBc ( 36,37 ). These persons are unlikely to be infectious except under circumstances in which they are a source for direct percutaneous exposure of susceptible recipients to substantial quantities of virus (e. g., through blood transfusion or organ transplantation) ( 38 ). An isolated anti-HBc result also can be a false-positive. Typically, the frequency of isolated anti-HBc relates directly to the prevalence of HBV infection in the population. In populations with a high prevalence of HBV infection, isolated anti-HBc likely indicates previous infection, with loss of anti-HBs. For persons in populations with a low prevalence of HBV infection, isolated anti-HBc is found in approximately 10%--20% of persons with serologic markers of HBV infection ( 37 ) and often represents a false-positive reaction; the majority of these persons have a primary anti-HBs response after a 3-dose series of hepatitis B vaccine ( 39,40 ).
HBeAg can be detected in the serum of persons with acute or chronic HBV infection. The presence of HBeAg correlates with high levels of viral replication (i. e., HBV DNA levels typically of 10 7 --10 9 IU/mL, indicating high infectivity) ( 41,42 ). Loss of HBeAg correlates with low levels (i. e., HBV DNA levels of <10 5 IU/mL) of replicating virus, although certain HBeAg-negative persons have HBV DNA levels up to 10 8 --10 9 IU/mL ( 43 ). A mutation in the precore region of the HBV genome has been identified in HBeAg-negative persons with high HBV DNA levels ( 44,45 ).
Epidemiology of HBV Infection.
HBV is transmitted by percutaneous or mucosal exposure to infectious blood or body fluids. Although HBsAg has been detected in multiple body fluids, only serum, semen, and saliva have been demonstrated to be infectious ( 46,47 ). HBV is concentrated most highly in serum, with lower concentrations in semen and saliva. All HBsAg-positive persons are infectious, but those who are also HBeAg positive are more infectious because their blood contains high titers of HBV (typically HBV DNA levels of 10 7 --10 9 IU/mL) ( 41,42 ). HBV is comparatively stable in the environment and remains viable for > 7 days on environmental surfaces at room temperature ( 48 ). HBV DNA at concentrations of 10 2 --10 3 IU/mL can be present on environmental surfaces in the absence of any visible blood and still cause transmission ( 48,49 ).
For adults, the two primary sources of HBV infection are sexual contact and percutaneous exposure to blood. Person-to-person transmission of HBV also can occur in settings involving nonsexual interpersonal contact over an extended period (e. g., among household contacts of a person with chronic HBV infection and developmentally disabled persons living in a long-term--care facility).
HBV is transmitted efficiently by sexual contact among heterosexuals and among MSM. Risk factors associated with sexual transmission among heterosexuals include having unprotected sex with an infected partner, having unprotected sex with more than one partner, and history of another STD. Risk factors associated with sexual transmission among MSM include having multiple sex partners, history of another STD, and anal intercourse.
Percutaneous transmission of HBV can occur from receipt of blood transfusion or organ or tissue transplant from an infectious donor; injection-drug use, including sharing of injection-preparation equipment; and frequent exposure to blood or needles among health-care workers. In the United States, donor selection procedures and routine testing of donors have made transmission of HBV via transfusion of whole blood and blood components a rare occurrence ( 50,51 ). Persons with hemophilia who received plasma-derived clotting factor concentrates were previously at high risk for HBV infection, but such transmission has been eliminated through viral inactivation procedures and use of recombinant clotting factor concentrates. Among persons with bleeding disorders treated at U. S. hemophilia treatment centers during 1998--2002, no infections with viral hepatitis, including HBV, were attributable to blood products received during that time ( 52 ). Outbreaks of HBV infection from exposure to contaminated equipment used for therapeutic injections and other health-care--related procedures, tattooing, and acupuncture also have been reported, although such exposures among patients with acute hepatitis B are reported rarely ( 53--57 ). In the majority of cases, transmission resulted from noncompliance with aseptic techniques for administering injections and recommended infection-control practices designed to prevent cross-contamination of medical equipment and devices. No infections have been demonstrated in susceptible persons who had oral mucous membrane exposure to HBsAg-positive saliva, but transmission has occurred through a human bite and has been demonstrated in animals by subcutaneous inoculation of saliva ( 46,58--60 ).
Persons living with chronically infected persons are at risk for HBV infection through percutaneous or mucosal exposures to blood or infectious body fluids (e. g., sharing a toothbrush or razor, contact with exudates from dermatologic lesions, or contact with HBsAg-contaminated surfaces). Persons with chronic HBV infection also can transmit HBV in other settings (e. g., schools, child care centers, or facilities for developmentally disabled persons), especially if they behave aggressively or have medical problems (e. g., exudative dermatitis or open skin lesions) that increase the risk for exposure to blood or serous secretions.
Adults at Risk for HBV Infection.
In the United States in 2005, the highest incidence of acute hepatitis B was among adults aged 25--45 years (Figure 1). Approximately 79% of newly acquired cases of hepatitis B are associated with high-risk sexual activity or injection-drug use; other known exposures (i. e., occupational, household, travel, and health-care--related) together account for 5% of new cases, and 16% deny a specific risk factor for infection ( 61 ; CDC, unpublished data, 2001--2005).
Adults at risk for infection by sexual exposure. The most common source of HBV infection among adults in the United States is sexual contact. Heterosexual transmission accounts for approximately 39% of new HBV infections among adults, and transmission among MSM accounts for approximately 24% (CDC, unpublishe data, 2001--2005). Serologic evidence of HBV infection (i. e., anti-HBc positive) has ranged from 10% to 40% among adults seeking treatment in STD clinics ( 62--64 ) and from 10% to 25% among MSM aged <30 years ( 65 ; CDC, unpublished data, 1999--2000). Follow-up studies identified HBV infection in 20%--42% of susceptible heterosexual partners of persons with acute hepatitis B ( 66--68 ). Among susceptible heterosexual spouses of persons with chronic HBV infection, the seroprevalence of HBV infection ranged from 25% to 59% ( 69--71 ).
Injection-drug users. IDUs account for approximately 16% of new HBV infections in the United States (CDC, unpublished data, 2001--2005). Incidence of HBV infection among unvaccinated IDUs is high, ranging from 10 to 31 per 100 person-years ( 72--74 ). Risk for HBV transmission increases with the number of years of drug use and is associated with frequency of injection and with sharing of drug-preparation equipment (e. g., cottons, cookers, and rinse water), independent of syringe sharing ( 73,75 ).
In a study of the seroprevalence of HBV infection among IDUs admitted to drug treatment in six U. S. cities, 64% (range: 50%--81%) had serologic evidence of HBV infection, and seroprevalence increased with age ( 76 ). Studies of street-recruited IDUs ( 77,78 ) and female IDUs ( 79 ) have identified similar prevalence of HBV infection, whereas a lower prevalence (25%) was found in a study of young IDUs (aged 18--30 years) ( 74 ). Chronic HBV infection has been identified in 3.1% of IDUs in a detention setting ( 77 ) and 7.1% of IDUs with HIV coinfection ( 80 ).
Household contacts of persons with chronic HBV infection. Seroprevalence of HBV infection among susceptible household contacts of persons with chronic infection has varied, ranging from 14% to 60% ( 69,71,81--85 ). The risk for infection is highest among sex partners of, and children living with, a person with chronic HBV infection in a household or extended family setting ( 83--85 ).
Developmentally disabled persons in long-term--care facilities. Developmentally disabled persons in residential and nonresidential facilities historically have had high rates of HBV infection ( 86,87 ), but the prevalence of infection has declined substantially since the implementation of routine hepatitis B vaccination in these settings ( 88,89 ). Nonetheless, because HBsAg-positive persons reside in such facilities, clients and staff continue to be at risk for infection.
Persons at risk for occupational exposure to HBV. Before hepatitis B vaccination was widely implemented, HBV infection was recognized as a common occupational hazard among persons who were exposed to blood while caring for patients or working in laboratories ( 90,91 ). Since then, routine hepatitis B vaccination of health-care workers and use of standard precautions to prevent exposure to bloodborne pathogens have made HBV infection a rare event in these populations ( 92--94 ). Since the mid-1990s, the incidence of HBV infection among health-care workers has been lower than that among the general population ( 94 ). Public safety workers with exposures to blood also might be at risk for HBV infection ( 95--97 ); however, the prevalence of HBV infection in occupational groups such as police officers, firefighters, and corrections officers generally does not differ from that in the general population when adjusted for race and age ( 97 ), and infection is associated most often with nonoccupational risk factors ( 97,98 ). No increased risk for occupationally acquired HBV infection has been documented in workers exposed infrequently to blood or body fluids (e. g., ward clerks, dietary workers, maintenance workers, housekeeping personnel, teachers, and persons employed in day care settings) ( 91 ).
Hemodialysis patients. Since the initiation of strict infection-control practices and hepatitis B vaccination, the rate of HBV infection among patients undergoing hemodialysis has declined approximately 95% ( 99,100 ). Nonetheless, repeated outbreaks of HBV infection among unvaccinated patients underscore the continued risk for infection in this population ( 101 ).
Persons with chronic liver disease. Persons with chronic liver disease are not at increased risk for HBV infection unless they have percutaneous or mucosal exposure to infectious blood or body fluids. Furthermore, studies of the outcomes of acute hepatitis B among patients with chronic liver disease provide little evidence that acute hepatitis B increases their risk for an acute liver failure. However, concurrent chronic HBV infection might increase the risk for progressive chronic liver disease in HCV-infected patients ( 102 ).
Travelers to HBV-endemic regions. Short-term travelers to regions in which HBV infection is of high or intermediate endemicity (Box 2) typically are at risk for infection only through exposure to blood in medical, health-care, or disaster-relief activities; receipt of medical care that involves parenteral exposures; or sexual activity or drug use ( 103 ). Infection rates of 2%--5% per year among persons working in such regions for > 6 months have been reported ( 104,105 ).
HIV-positive persons. Published data on the overall prevalence of HBV and HIV coinfection in the United States are limited. Studies of certain subgroups have identified prevalence of previous or current HBV infection of 45% in HIV-infected MSM aged 22--29 years (CDC, unpublished data, 1998--2000), 24% in adolescent HIV-infected males ( 106 ), and 43% in HIV-infected women, including 76% among HIV-infected female IDUs ( 79 ). Chronic HBV infection has been identified in 6%--14% of HIV-positive persons from Western Europe and the United States, including 9%--17% of MSM, 7%--10% of IDUs, and 4%--6% of heterosexuals ( 107 ).
The course of HBV infection can be modified in the presence of HIV, with a lower incidence of jaundice and a higher incidence of chronic HBV infection ( 20,108,109 ). Limited data also indicate that HIV-infected patients with chronic HBV infection have an increased risk for liver-related mortality and morbidity ( 110 ).
Incidence of Acute Hepatitis B.
During 1990--2005, the overall incidence of reported acute hepatitis B declined 78%, from 8.5 to 1.9 per 100,000 population (Figure 2), and the estimated number of new HBV infections, after adjusting for underreporting and asymptomatic infections, declined from approximately 232,000 to approximately 51,000 infections (CDC, unpublished data, 1990--2005). Among children and adolescents aged <19 years, incidence declined 96%, from 2.4 to 0.1 per 100,000 population. Among adults aged > 19 years, incidence declined 76%, from 9.9 to 2.4 per 100,000 population, and racial/ethnic disparities in incidence were nearly eliminated for Asians/Pacific Islanders, American Indians/Alaska Natives, and Hispanics (Figure 3). Incidence also declined substantially among blacks aged > 19 years during this period, from 19.7 to 4.2 per 100,000 population; however, in 2005, incidence among blacks remained nearly three times higher than that among other racial/ethnic populations. After leveling during 1999--2002, acute hepatitis B incidence among adults decreased 35% during 2002--2005, from 3.7 to 2.4 per 100,000 population (CDC, unpublished data, 2006). In 2005, the highest incidence of acute hepatitis B occurred among persons aged 25--44 years.
Prevalence of HBV Infection.
During 1988--1994, the overall age-adjusted prevalence of HBV infection (including previous or chronic infection) in the U. S. population was 4.9%, and the prevalence of chronic infection was 0.4% ( 111 ). Persons who have immigrated to the United States from countries in which HBV is endemic (Box 2, Figure 4) are affected disproportionately by chronic HBV infection; in particular, the majority of chronic HBV infections in the United States are among Asians/Pacific Islanders ( 112--114 ). The prevalence of chronic HBV infection among persons immigrating to the United States from Central and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa varies (range: 5%--15%) and reflects the patterns of HBV infection in the countries and regions of origin. During 1994--2003, approximately 40,000 immigrants with chronic HBV infection were admitted annually to the United States for permanent residence ( 115 ; CDC, unpublished data, 2005).
Prophylaxis Against HBV Infection.
Hepatitis B Vaccine.
Hepatitis B vaccine is available as a single-antigen formulation and also in fixed combination with other vaccines. Two single-antigen vaccines are available in the United States: Recombivax HB ® (Merck & Co., Inc., Whitehouse Station, New Jersey) and Engerix-B ® (GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium). Of the three licensed combination vaccines, one (Twinrix ® [GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium]) is used for vaccination of adults and two (Comvax ® [Merck & Co., Inc., Whitehouse Station, New Jersey] and Pediarix ® [GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium]) are used for vaccination of infants and young children. Twinrix contains recombinant HBsAg and inactivated hepatitis A virus. Comvax contains recombinant HBsAg and Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) polyribosylribitol phosphate conjugated to Neisseria meningitidis outer membrane protein complex. Pediarix contains recombinant HBsAg, diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis adsorbed (DTaP), and inactivated poliovirus (IPV).
HBsAg is the antigen used for hepatitis B vaccination ( 116,117 ). Vaccine antigen can be purified from the plasma of persons with chronic HBV infection or produced by recombinant DNA technology. For vaccines available in the United States, recombinant DNA technology is used to express HBsAg in yeast, which then is purified from the cells by biochemical and biophysical separation techniques ( 118,119 ). Hepatitis B vaccines licensed in the United States are formulated to contain 10--40 µ g of HBsAg protein/mL. Hepatitis B vaccines produced for distribution in the United States do not contain thimerosal as a preservative or contain only a trace amount (<1.0 µ g mercury/mL) from the manufacturing process ( 120,121 ).
Hepatitis B Immune Globulin.
HBIG provides passively acquired anti-HBs and temporary protection (i. e., 3--6 months) when administered in standard doses. HBIG typically is used as an adjunct to hepatitis B vaccine for postexposure immunoprophylaxis to prevent HBV infection. For nonresponders to hepatitis B vaccination, HBIG administered alone is the primary means of protection after an HBV exposure.
HBIG is prepared from the plasma of donors with high concentrations of anti-HBs. The plasma is screened to eliminate donors who are positive for HBsAg, antibodies to HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV), and HCV RNA. In addition, proper manufacturing techniques for HBIG inactivate viruses (e. g., HBV, HCV, and HIV) from the final product ( 122,123 ). No evidence exists to indicate that HBV, HCV, or HIV ever has been transmitted by HBIG commercially available in the United States. HBIG that is commercially available in the United States does not contain thimerosal.
Adult Vaccination Schedules and Results of Vaccination.
Preexposure Vaccination.
Vaccination of Adults.
Primary vaccination consists of > 3 intramuscular doses of hepatitis B vaccine (Table 2). The 3-dose vaccine series administered intramuscularly at 0, 1, and 6 months produces a protective antibody response in approximately 30%--55% of healthy adults aged < 40 years after the first dose, 75% after the second dose, and >90% after the third dose ( 124,125 ). After age 40 years, the proportion of persons who have a protective antibody response after a 3-dose vaccination regimen declines below 90%, and by age 60 years, protective levels of antibody develop in only 75% of vaccinated persons ( 126 ). In addition to age, other host factors (e. g., smoking, obesity, genetic factors, and immune suppression) contribute to decreased vaccine response ( 127--130 ). Alternative vaccination schedules (e. g., 0, 1, and 4 months or 0, 2, and 4 months) have been demonstrated to elicit dose-specific and final rates of seroprotection similar to those obtained on a 0-, 1-, 6-month schedule ( 131 ).
The combined hepatitis A--hepatitis B vaccine (Twinrix) is indicated for vaccination of persons aged > 18 years with risk factors for both hepatitis A and hepatitis B. The dosage of the hepatitis A component in the combined vaccine is lower than that in the single-antigen hepatitis A vaccine, allowing it to be administered in a 3-dose schedule instead of the 2-dose schedule used for the single-antigen vaccine.
Nonstandard Vaccine Schedules.
No apparent effect on immunogenicity has been documented when minimum spacing of doses (i. e., 4 weeks between doses 1 and 2, 8 weeks between doses 2 and 3, and 16 weeks between doses 1 and 3) is not achieved precisely. Increasing the interval between the first 2 doses has little effect on immunogenicity or final antibody concentration ( 132--134 ). The third dose confers the maximum level of seroprotection but acts primarily as a booster and appears to provide optimal long-term protection ( 135 ). Longer intervals between the last 2 doses result in higher final antibody levels but might increase the risk for acquisition of HBV infection among persons who have a delayed response to vaccination. No differences in immunogenicity are observed when vaccines from different manufacturers are used to complete the vaccine series.
Response to Revaccination.
Although serologic testing for immunity is not necessary after routine vaccination of adults, postvaccination testing is recommended for persons whose subsequent clinical management depends on knowledge of their immune status, including certain health-care and public safety workers; chronic hemodialysis patients, HIV-infected persons, and other immunocompromised persons; and sex or needle-sharing partners of HBsAg-positive persons (Appendix A). Of persons who did not respond to a primary 3-dose vaccine series with anti-HBs concentrations of > 10 mIU/mL, 25%--50% responded to an additional vaccine dose, and 44%--100% responded to a 3-dose revaccination series ( 136--141 ). Better response to revaccination occurs in persons who have measurable but low (<10 mIU/mL) levels of antibody after the initial series ( 136,137 ). Increased vaccine doses (e. g., double the standard dose) were demonstrated to enhance revaccination response rates in one study ( 140 ) but not in another ( 138 ). Intradermal vaccination has been reported to be immunogenic in persons who did not respond to intramuscular vaccination ( 142,143 ); however, intradermal vaccination is not a route of administration indicated in the manufacturers' package labeling. Persons who do not have protective levels of anti-HBs 1--2 months after revaccination either are primary nonresponders or are infected with HBV. Genetic factors might contribute to nonresponse to hepatitis B vaccination ( 130,137 ).
Groups Requiring Different Vaccination Doses or Schedules.
Compared with immunocompetent adults, hemodialysis patients are less likely to have protective levels of antibody after vaccination with standard vaccine dosages; protective levels of antibody developed in 67%--86% (median: 64%) of adult hemodialysis patients who received 3--4 doses of either vaccine in various dosages and schedules ( 100 ). Higher seroprotection rates have been identified in patients with chronic renal failure, particularly those with mild or moderate renal failure, who were vaccinated before becoming dialysis dependent. After vaccination with a 4-dose series, the seroprotection rate among adult predialysis patients with serum creatinine levels of < 4.0 mg/dL was 86%, compared with 37% among patients with serum creatinine levels of >4.0 mg/dL, 88% of whom were dialysis patients ( 144 ).
Humoral response to hepatitis B vaccination also is reduced in other immunocompromised persons (e. g., HIV-infected persons, hematopoietic stem-cell transplant recipients, and patients undergoing chemotherapy) ( 145--147 ). Modified dosing regimens, including doubling the standard antigen dose or administering additional doses, might increase response rates ( 148--150 ). However, limited data regarding response to these alternative vaccination schedules are available.
Anti-HBs is the only easily measurable correlate of vaccine-induced protection. Immunocompetent persons who achieve anti-HBs concentrations of > 10 mIU/mL after preexposure vaccination have nearly complete protection against both acute disease and chronic infection, even if anti-HBs concentrations decline subsequently to <10 mIU/mL ( 151--154 ). Although immunogenicity is lower among immunocompromised persons, those who achieve and maintain a protective antibody response before exposure to HBV have a high level of protection from infection ( 155,156 ).
After primary immunization with hepatitis B vaccine, anti-HBs levels decline rapidly within the first year and more slowly thereafter. Among young adults who respond to a primary vaccine series with antibody concentrations of > 10 mIU/mL, 17%--50% have low or undetectable concentrations of anti-HBs (reflecting anti-HBs loss) 10--15 years after vaccination ( 155--157 ). In the absence of exposure to HBV, the persistence of detectable anti-HBs after vaccination depends on the concentration of postvaccination antibodies ( 158 ).
Even when anti-HBs concentrations decline to <10 mIU/mL, nearly all vaccinated persons remain protected against HBV infection. The mechanism for continued vaccine-induced protection is thought to be the preservation of immune memory through selective expansion and differentiation of clones of antigen-specific B and T lymphocytes ( 159 ). Persistence of vaccine-induced immune memory among persons who responded to a primary adult vaccine series 4--23 years previously but then had anti-HBs concentrations of <10 mIU/mL has been demonstrated by an anamnestic increase in anti-HBs concentrations in 74%--100% of these persons 2--4 weeks after administration of an additional vaccine dose and by antigen-specific B and T cell proliferation ( 160 ). Although direct measurement of immune memory is not yet possible, these data indicate that a high proportion of vaccinees retain immune memory and would have an anti-HBs response upon exposure to HBV.
Population-based studies of highly vaccinated populations have demonstrated elimination of new HBV infections for up to 2 decades after hepatitis B immunization programs were initiated ( 161--163 ). Breakthrough infections (detected by the presence of anti-HBc or HBV DNA) have been documented in a limited percentage of vaccinated persons ( 159,164 ), but these infections typically are transient and asymptomatic; breakthrough infections resulting in chronic HBV infection have been documented only rarely among infants born to HBsAg-positive mothers ( 165 ) and have not been observed among immunocompetent adults.
Limited data are available on the duration of immune memory after hepatitis B vaccination in immunocompromised persons (e. g., HIV-infected patients, dialysis patients, patients undergoing chemotherapy, or hematopoietic stem-cell transplant patients). No clinically significant HBV infections have been documented among immunocompromised persons who maintain protective levels of anti-HBs. In studies of long-term protection among HIV-infected persons, breakthrough infections occurring after a decline in anti-HBs concentrations to <10 mIU/mL have been transient and asymptomatic ( 155 ). However, among hemodialysis patients who responded to the vaccine, clinically significant HBV infection has been documented in persons who have not maintained anti-HBs concentrations of > 10 mIU/mL ( 166 ).
Postexposure Prophylaxis.
Both passive-active postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) using HBIG and hepatitis B vaccine and active PEP using hepatitis B vaccine alone are highly effective in preventing infection after exposure to HBV ( 167--170 ). HBIG alone has also been demonstrated to be effective in preventing HBV transmission ( 68,171--173 ), but with the availability of hepatitis B vaccine, HBIG typically is used as an adjunct to vaccination. Guidelines for PEP for adults with occupational ( 174 ) and nonoccupational exposures (Appendix B) to HBV have been developed.
The major determinant of the effectiveness of PEP is early administration of the initial dose of vaccine. The effectiveness of PEP diminishes the longer after exposure it is initiated ( 27,175,176 ). Studies are limited on the maximum interval after exposure during which PEP is effective, but the interval is likely < 7 days for needlestick ( 171,172,177 ) exposures and < 14 days for sexual exposures ( 68,154,168,170,173 ).
Substantial evidence suggests that adults who respond to hepatitis B vaccination are protected from chronic HBV infection for at least 20 years even if vaccinees lack detectable anti-HBs at the time of an exposure ( 151--153 ). For this reason, immunocompetent persons who have had postvaccination testing and are known to have responded to hepatitis B vaccination with anti-HBs concentrations of > 10 mIU/mL do not require additional passive or active immunization after an HBV exposure and do not need further periodic testing to assess anti-HBs concentrations.
Vaccine Safety.
Hepatitis B vaccines have been demonstrated to be safe when administered to infants, children, adolescents, and adults ( 178 ). Since 1982, an estimated 70 million adolescents and adults and 50 million infants and children in the United States have received > 1 dose of hepatitis B vaccine (CDC, unpublished data, 2004).
Vaccine Reactogenicity.
The most frequently reported side effects in persons receiving hepatitis B vaccine are pain at the injection site (3%--29%) and temperature of >99.9 ° F (>37.7 ° C) (1%--6%) ( 124,125 ). However, in placebo-controlled studies, these side effects were reported no more frequently among persons receiving hepatitis B vaccine than among persons receiving placebo ( 179 ).
Adverse Events.
CDC and FDA continually assess the safety of hepatitis B vaccine and other vaccines through ongoing monitoring of data from the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) project, the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS), and other surveillance systems. A causal association has been established between receipt of hepatitis B vaccine and anaphylaxis ( 178 ). On the basis of VSD data, the estimated incidence of anaphylaxis among children and adolescents who received hepatitis B vaccine is one case per 1.1 million vaccine doses distributed (95% confidence interval = 0.1--3.9) ( 180 ).
Early postlicensure surveillance of adverse events suggested a possible association between Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) and receipt of the first dose of plasma-derived hepatitis B vaccine among U. S. adults ( 181 ). However, in a subsequent analysis of GBS cases reported to CDC, FDA, and vaccine manufacturers, among an estimated 2.5 million adults who received > 1 dose of recombinant hepatitis B vaccine during 1986--1990, the rate of GBS that occurred after hepatitis B vaccination did not exceed the background rate among unvaccinated persons (CDC, unpublished data, 1992). An Institute of Medicine review concluded that evidence was insufficient to reject or accept a causal association between GBS and hepatitis B vaccination ( 178,182,183 ).
One retrospective case-control study ( 184,185 ) reported an association between hepatitis B vaccine and multiple sclerosis (MS) among adults. However, multiple studies ( 186--189 ) have demonstrated no such association. Reviews by scientific panels have favored rejection of a causal association between hepatitis B vaccination and MS ( 190,191 ).
In rare instances, chronic illnesses have been reported after hepatitis B vaccination, including chronic fatigue syndrome ( 192 ), neurologic disorders (e. g., leukoencephalitis, optic neuritis, and transverse myelitis) ( 193--195 ), rheumatoid arthritis ( 196,197 ), type 1 diabetes ( 198 ), and autoimmune disease ( 199 ). However, no evidence of a causal association between these conditions or other chronic illnesses and hepatitis B vaccine has been demonstrated ( 183,190,200--203 ).
Reported episodes of alopecia (hair loss) after rechallenge with hepatitis B vaccine suggest that vaccination might, in rare cases, trigger episodes of alopecia ( 204 ). However, a population-based study determined no statistically significant association between alopecia and hepatitis B vaccine ( 205 ).
Contraindications and Precautions.
Hepatitis B vaccination is contraindicated for persons with a history of hypersensitivity to yeast or any vaccine component ( 206--209 ). Despite a theoretic risk for allergic reaction to vaccination in persons with allergy to Saccharomyces cerevisiae (baker's yeast), no evidence exists to document adverse reactions after vaccination of persons with a history of yeast allergy.
Persons with a history of serious adverse events (e. g., anaphylaxis) after receipt of hepatitis B vaccine should not receive additional doses. As with other vaccines, vaccination of persons with moderate or severe acute illness, with or without fever, should be deferred until illness resolves ( 210 ). Vaccination is not contraindicated in persons with a history of MS, GBS, autoimmune disease (e. g., systemic lupus erythematosis or rheumatoid arthritis), or other chronic diseases.
Pregnancy is not a contraindication to vaccination. Limited data suggest that developing fetuses are not at risk for adverse events when hepatitis B vaccine is administered to pregnant women ( 211 ). Available vaccines contain noninfectious HBsAg and should cause no risk of infection to the fetus.
Implementation Barriers and Rationale for New Recommendations.
Soon after hepatitis B vaccine was licensed in 1982, ACIP recommended vaccination for adults at increased risk for HBV infection ( 212 ). However, the recommendations were not widely implemented, and coverage among adults at risk for HBV infection remained low. By the early 1990s, the difficulty in vaccinating adults at risk for HBV infection and the substantial burden of HBV-related disease resulting from infections acquired during childhood indicated that additional hepatitis B vaccination strategies were needed ( 213,214 ). In 1991, recommendations for vaccination of unvaccinated adults at high risk for HBV infection became part of the national strategy adopted by ACIP and professional medical organizations to eliminate HBV transmission in the United States ( 3 ). However, hepatitis B vaccine still is not offered routinely in medical settings serving adults, and a substantial number of adults at risk for HBV infection remain unvaccinated.
Multiple factors contribute to low hepatitis B vaccination coverage among adults at risk. In contrast to vaccination of children, no national program exists to support vaccine purchase and infrastructure for vaccine delivery to uninsured and underinsured adults. Reimbursement mechanisms for vaccination of adults with health insurance also are not widely used. In addition, certain patients and health-care providers are reluctant to discuss risk behaviors ( 215 ), and providers might not make hepatitis B vaccination a priority compared with other clinical care services.
One strategy demonstrated to be effective at increasing vaccination coverage among adults at risk for HBV infection is to offer vaccination to all adults as part of routine prevention services in settings in which a high proportion of adults have HBV risk factors ( 10,216--223 ). In STD and HIV treatment facilities, health-care settings serving IDUs, and health-care settings targeting services to MSM, nearly all patients have behavioral risk factors for HBV infection. Furthermore, a high proportion of persons receiving health care in HIV testing facilities or correctional facilities report sexual and drug-use risk behaviors ( 224,225 ). Therefore, providing hepatitis B vaccination in these settings offers an efficient and effective way to reach adults at highest risk. During 2001--2004, in a study of 760 adults with reported acute hepatitis B who participated in CDC's Sentinel Counties Study of Viral Hepatitis, 39% reported a history of STD treatment, 40% reported a history of incarceration, and 22% reported a history of drug treatment; overall, 61% would have had at least one opportunity to be vaccinated either during STD or drug treatment or at a correctional facility ( 226 ).
Demonstration projects that supported the purchase of hepatitis B vaccine and its administration in settings in which a high proportion of adults have HBV risk factors have established the feasibility of providing the vaccine as part of comprehensive STD, HIV, and hepatitis prevention services ( 10 ). When clients were offered hepatitis B vaccination in such settings, first-dose acceptance rates of 70%--85% were achieved ( 10,216,223,227 ). These demonstration projects have identified the components of successful adult hepatitis B vaccination programs (Box 3). In addition, "one-stop" delivery of integrated prevention services was preferred by the majority of patients and typically resulted in enhanced delivery of all prevention services ( 227 ). Return visits for second and third doses of hepatitis B vaccine also provide opportunities for patients to receive other STD/HIV-related services (e. g., test results, additional counseling, and referral). Multiple studies have established the cost-effectiveness of providing hepatitis B vaccination at STD/HIV counseling and testing sites, correctional institutions, drug-abuse treatment centers, and other settings serving adults at risk for HBV infection ( 228--231 ).
Universal vaccination of adults in settings in which a high proportion of persons have HBV risk factors will reach a substantial proportion of all adults at risk for HBV infection. However, not all adults with risk factors for HBV infection visit these settings. For example, an estimated 80%--95% of STDs are diagnosed in settings other than STD clinics ( 232,233 ). Therefore, primary care and clinical preventive service providers (e. g., physicians' offices, community health centers, family planning clinics, liver disease clinics, and travel clinics) also should provide hepatitis B vaccine whenever indicated or requested as part of regular preventive care. Limited data are available regarding best practices in primary care and specialty medical settings to achieve high vaccination coverage among adults at risk for HBV infection. In one project in which hepatitis B vaccine was made available free of charge to primary care clients in community clinics, low vaccination coverage rates were observed, compared with rates at other venues ( 10 ). This finding suggests that provision of free vaccine alone might not ensure increased use of hepatitis B vaccine and that other implementation strategies (e. g., education and training of clinicians and standing orders) are needed to prompt providers to offer vaccination to adults.
In primary care settings, targeting vaccination to persons at risk is an efficient approach to preventing HBV infection. During 2001--2005, among persons with acute hepatitis B who participated in CDC's Sentinel Counties Study of Viral Hepatitis, 84% reported risk behaviors or characteristics, either during the incubation period (i. e., 6 weeks--6 months) or during their lifetimes, that placed them in a group for which hepatitis B vaccination was recommended (CDC, unpublished data, 2001--2005). Providers in primary care settings can ascertain patients' risks for HBV infection and identify candidates for hepatitis B vaccination during routine patient visits. Assessment of patients' sex - and drug-related risk factors is recommended by the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force and the American Medical Association (AMA) ( 234,235 ) and has the ancillary benefit of identifying candidates for other prevention interventions (e. g., screening for HIV infection and other STDs and drug-abuse treatment).
However, risk-targeted approaches can miss persons in need of prevention services. Patients might be reluctant to report sex - and drug-related behaviors, particularly when these behaviors are not perceived as relevant to the clinical encounter. In addition, despite recommendations of the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force and AMA, providers might be reluctant to inquire about behavioral risk factors. For example, surveys of physicians and patients conducted during 1995--1999 indicated that fewer than half of patients were asked about sexual behaviors ( 236--238 ). Health-care providers should educate all patients about the health benefits of hepatitis B vaccination, including risk factors for HBV infection and the importance of vaccination for persons who engage in certain risk behaviors. This information might stimulate patients to request vaccination from their primary care providers, without requiring them to acknowledge a specific risk factor.
Another possible strategy is to offer vaccination to all adults in age groups with the highest incidence of infection as part of routine medical care (Figure 1). An age-based approach might simplify vaccination-related decision-making by practitioners and remove the stigma associated with disclosure of risk behaviors. Other adult vaccines, including those for influenza and pneumococcal disease, are delivered on age-based schedules. However, the effectiveness of age-based strategies in increasing hepatitis B vaccination coverage among adults at risk is unknown. In addition, age-based strategies for adult vaccination would be substantially more costly than risk-targeted approaches (CDC, unpublished data, 2005).
Lack of funding for vaccine and its administration is a major barrier to provision of hepatitis B vaccine to adults. Hepatitis B vaccine often is a reimbursable charge in health-care settings that bill insurance or Medicaid for services, and surveys of public and private insurers indicate high rates of coverage for hepatitis B vaccination ( 239,240 ). In one study, an estimated 74% of adults aged 18--49 years with risk factors for HBV infection had health insurance coverage ( 241 ). However, public clinics might not have systems in place to bill for vaccination services, and reimbursement of private providers might be inadequate to cover the purchase and administration of vaccine. Other adults either lack private insurance or are not eligible for reimbursement by Medicaid. Although the Vaccines for Children program provides federally funded vaccine and administration costs for vaccination of uninsured and underinsured children and youth aged <19 years, no similar program supports adult vaccination.
Certain adult hepatitis B vaccination programs have been successful at identifying federal, state, or local funds to provide free or low-cost hepatitis B vaccination to uninsured or underinsured adults. For example, the Immunization Grant Program, created under Section 317 of the Public Health Service Act, provides funding to state, local, and territorial public health agencies for vaccine purchase and vaccination-program operation ( 242 ). Section 317 funds can be used to purchase childhood and adult vaccines, including adult hepatitis B vaccine. However, lack of adequate funding constrains efforts to increase vaccination coverage among adults. To maximize available resources for hepatitis B vaccination, public and private health-care providers should become familiar with insurance billing and reimbursement mechanisms that can be used for hepatitis B vaccine. AMA billing and reimbursement guidelines are available at ama-assn/ama1/pub/upload/mm/36/ama_hep_coding_trifo. pdf.
Although HBV infections are expected to decline as a result of universal childhood immunization and increased vaccination of adults at risk, an estimated 1.25 million persons in the United States are living with chronic HBV infection and require essential prevention services and medical management. In particular, Asians/Pacific Islanders in the United States have a high prevalence of chronic HBV infection, representing a major health disparity. Persons with chronic HBV infection often are unaware of their infection status or do not receive needed care. Few programs have been implemented to identify HBsAg-positive persons, provide or refer these persons for appropriate medical management, and provide vaccination to their contacts ( 243 ). During delivery of hepatitis B vaccination and provision of other preventive services, health-care providers have opportunities to identify persons with chronic HBV infection, refer them for counseling and management, and ensure that their susceptible contacts receive vaccination. Guidelines to identify and manage HBsAg-positive persons have been developed (Appendix C).
Implementation of the recommendations and strategies outlined in this report and the companion ACIP recommendations for infants, children, and adolescents ( 11 ) should lead ultimately to the elimination of HBV transmission in the United States. New information will have implications for this effort, and adjustments and changes are expected to occur.
Recommendations and Implementation Strategies for Hepatitis B Vaccination of Adults.
Recomendações
Hepatitis B vaccination is recommended for all unvaccinated adults at risk for HBV infection and for all adults requesting protection from HBV infection (Box 4). Acknowledgment of a specific risk factor should not be a requirement for vaccination. Providers should select the vaccine schedule they consider necessary to achieve completion of the vaccine series (Table 2, Box 5). Public health programs and primary care providers should adopt strategies appropriate for the practice setting to ensure that all adults at risk for HBV infection are offered hepatitis B vaccine (Box 6).
Implementation Strategies.
In settings in which a high proportion of persons have risk factors for HBV infection (Box 7)
--- all adults should be assumed to be at risk for HBV infection and should be offered hepatitis B vaccination if they have not completed a licensed hepatitis B vaccine series;
--- health-care providers should implement standing orders ( 244 ) to administer hepatitis B vaccine as part of routine services to adults who have not completed the vaccine series and make hepatitis B vaccination a standard component of evaluation and treatment for STDs and HIV/AIDS (Table 3); e.
--- when feasible, hepatitis B vaccination should be offered in outreach and other settings in which services are provided to persons at risk for HBV infection (e. g., needle-exchange programs, HIV testing sites, HIV prevention programs, and homeless shelters). In primary care and specialty medical settings (e. g., physician's offices, family planning clinics, community health centers, liver disease clinics, and travel clinics), providers should implement standing orders to identify adults recommended for hepatitis B vaccination and administer vaccination as part of routine services. To ensure vaccination of persons at risk for HBV infection, health-care providers should.
--- provide information to all adults regarding the health benefits of hepatitis B vaccination, including the risk factors for HBV infection and persons for whom vaccination is recommended;
--- help all adults assess their need for vaccination by obtaining a history that emphasizes risks for sexual transmission and percutaneous or mucosal exposure to blood;
--- administer hepatitis B vaccine to adults who report risk factors for HBV infection; e.
--- provide hepatitis B vaccine to all adults requesting protection from HBV infection without requiring acknowledgment of a specific risk factor. Occupational health programs should.
--- identify all staff whose work-related activities involve exposure to blood or other potentially infectious body fluids in a health-care, laboratory, public safety, or institutional setting (including employees, students, contractors, attending clinicians, emergency medical technicians, paramedics, and volunteers);
--- provide education to staff to encourage vaccination;
--- implement active follow-up, with reminders to track completion of the vaccine series among persons receiving vaccination; e.
--- provide appropriate postvaccination testing (Appendix A). Providers in all settings in which hepatitis B vaccine is provided should.
--- assess patients' needs for other vaccines recommended for adults (schedule available at cdc. gov/nip/recs/adult-schedule. htm) and administer these vaccines at the same office visit at which hepatitis B vaccine is administered;
--- identify and vaccinate all susceptible household, sex, and needle-sharing contacts of HBsAg-positive persons, and provide HBsAg-positive persons with appropriate referrals for counseling and medical management (Appendix C);
--- provide culturally appropriate materials to educate adults about hepatitis B and the importance of vaccination (available at cdc. gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/b/index. htm#materials);
--- offer vaccination in a way that is accessible, convenient, and flexible for patients;
--- be familiar with ACIP's general recommendations on immunization ( 210 ), which provide technical guidance regarding common immunization concerns of health-care providers;
--- give persons who are eligible for vaccination a copy of the most current vaccine information statement for hepatitis B vaccine, as required by federal law (see Appendix A, Hepatitis B Vaccine Dose and Administration);
--- institute methods to identify persons with a history of vaccination (see Appendix A, Unknown or Uncertain Vaccination Status);
--- provide vaccinated persons with a personal record card documenting receipt of vaccination (available at immunize/guide/aov21_appb_record. pdf);
--- develop tracking and reminder systems to ensure completion of the vaccine series (descriptions of such systems are available at cdc. gov/nip/publications/adultstrat. htm);
--- report adverse events to VAERS using report forms and assistance available from CDC at telephone 1-800-822-7967 or from VAERS at vaers. hhs. gov; e.
--- be familiar with billing and reimbursement guidelines for hepatitis B vaccination (available at ama-assn/ama1/pub/upload/mm/36/ama_hep_coding_trifo. pdf). Public health agencies and medical organizations should educate providers about the benefits of hepatitis B vaccination for their patients and methods to implement and support hepatitis B vaccination services in their settings and practices. Health departments and community-based organizations should increase awareness of the benefits of hepatitis B vaccination, particularly among persons at increased risk for HBV infection. Educational materials are available at cdc. gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/index. htm. Health departments are encouraged to implement adult immunization registries to track the receipt of hepatitis B vaccine in all settings in which adults are vaccinated. Information on immunization registries is available at cdc. gov/nip/registry. Although hepatitis B vaccination programs aim to achieve the highest possible rate of vaccine series completion, concerns regarding completion of the hepatitis B vaccine series should not preclude initiation of hepatitis B vaccination. Each dose of vaccine confers some protection against HBV infection. Vaccine immunogenicity is not decreased by lengthened intradose intervals, and the second and third doses can be administered during subsequent health-care visits outside of the recommended vaccine schedule.
The following persons contributed to the development of this report: Guthrie S. Birkhead, MD, AIDS Institute, New York State Department of Health, Albany, New York; Anna S. F. Lok, MD, Division of Gastroenterology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Molli C. Conti, Hepatitis B Foundation, Doylestown, Pennsylvania; Josiah D. Rich, MD, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island; Robert A. Gunn, MD, San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, San Diego, California; Harold S. Margolis, MD, Joanna Buffington, MD, Alison Greenspan, MPH, Stephanie M. Neitzel, Kevin P. O'Connor, MA, Annemarie Wasley, PhD, Brigette F. Ulin, MPH, Ian T. Williams, PhD, Division of Viral Hepatitis, Matthew T. McKenna, MD, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed); William L. Atkinson, MD, Edward W. Brink, MD, Immunization Services Division, Susan A. Maloney, MD, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (proposed), CDC.

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Horses helping children grow ; Louise B. Graham, Bridgewater State University; Allison Lindsey, Bridgewater State University.
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